



Going to Manchuria on foot—a trudge of 800 miles
in search of new land

TORTURED CHINA

HALLETT ABEND

Illustrated



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To
THE PEOPLE OF CHINA
INARTICULATE VICTIMS
OF THE WORLD'S
NEGLECT

PREFACE

Long ago John Hay, American Secretary of State, fearing the partition of China by territory-hungry Powers, issued the "Open Door" declaration, and secured from the rest of the world what were tantamount to pledges to respect the territorial integrity of China.

This American policy was actuated by a mixture of altruism and enlightened self-interest. The United States did not covet any portion of China's territory, but it did covet the right to compete on a basis of equality for the trade of a nation containing nearly a fourth of the population of the world; and it hoped that China would develop a stable and enlightened Government which would make possible the modernization of the country, and would foster such an adaptation of western civilization as might be found congenial to the ancient civilization evolved by the Chinese people themselves.

This "hands off China" policy, as it is often called, would probably have proved a blessing for the Chinese people had not their then ruling dynasty been decadent and corrupt, and had not the overthrow of this dynasty been followed by year after year of civil commotions with an accompanying breakdown of all authority.

Today China is actually being partitioned—but not by foreign Powers, as John Hay feared. The partitioning is being accomplished by Chinese leaders themselves, until now the “territorial integrity of China” is a phrase as meaningless as the term “unification” when misleadingly applied to the occasional truces during which rival Chinese factions and warlords strain every nerve to prepare for future conflicts designed to extend their territories and increase their powers.

While the rest of the world has been, in the main, either indifferent or complacent under suave deceptions, China is being ruined—ruined financially, economically, socially, and morally. The Chinese people, who number between 400,000,000 and 480,000,000 human beings, and who deserve the sympathetic understanding of the rest of the world, have for years been the helpless victims of circumstances and of leaders or rulers who have exploited them. At present they are not only on the verge of cataclysmic ruin, but are goaded by misgovernment and its attendant evils to the point that their immediate future has become a matter of prime importance to the rest of the world.

China, today, is literally a tortured nation—tortured by internal ailments for which she seems to be unable to find a cure.

A physician, after diagnosing the illness of a patient,

might well be shocked and puzzled as to the treatment to adopt if he found the sick man harboring the active germs of more than half a dozen serious diseases.

A diagnosis of China's internal ailments reveals the political and economic equivalent to this hypothetical sick man. Bandit armies and armies of bandits, famine and disease, opium and illiteracy, national bankruptcy and economic demoralization, Communism and medievalism—these are a few of China's complications.

Since the beginning of the Revolution, nineteen years ago, the Chinese people have been left to the problem of working out their own salvation. Today the plight of the country is infinitely worse than it was nineteen years ago. Month by month during the last four years conditions in China have steadily become worse, and of late the progress from bad to worse has shown an increasing and alarming acceleration. Unless all signs fail, conditions must become much worse before they can become any better.

China, as a nation, has today practically ceased to exist. But the Chinese people exist to a total of innumerable millions—exist and suffer. The torture under which they live at the moment is not entirely due to faults of their own or to their own shortcomings. Contact with the mechanical civilizations of America and of Europe has had as disturbing an effect upon Chinese civilization

as an earthquake would have upon a great modern city.

Today, apparently, the Chinese people are unable to help themselves.

Will the rest of the world help them, and if so, how can help be best extended?

This is the question today. If it is not answered, tomorrow's question almost certainly will be: Can the rest of the world, considering its own safety and well-being, afford longer to postpone giving aid to China?

The facts and impressions which go to make up this book were gathered during four years of residence in China, for most of which time the author was employed as correspondent of *The New York Times*, first in Peking and later with headquarters in Shanghai.

The work of these years necessitated many trips, ranging from the Manchurian-Siberian border in the far North to the Hongkong-Canton area in the far South, journeys up the Yangtze River, and tours of investigation in Shantung and into other provinces in the interior.

Political crises, famines, civil wars, Communist uprisings, the activities of missionaries and of foreign and Chinese educators, medical men, statesmen, diplomats, bankers, merchants—all of these things were grist for the reportorial mill.

Grateful acknowledgment is made here to *The New York Times* and to *Current History* for permission to

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reprint portions of several articles which appeared in those publications. Appreciation is expressed also to *The New York Times* for its unfailing willingness to approve investigations which have aided materially in furnishing that background of general information essential to a competent daily reporting of the events which influence the slow and painful working out of that extraordinary phenomenon called "The Chinese Revolution."

Yokohama, Japan.

June 9th, 1930.

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Chapter One

CHAOS AND COMPARISON

IN a certain picturesque walled city in the interior of China—a city with a population of something more than 200,000—there lives a charming Chinese gentleman who is now forty years of age.

He is the son of a former official, Chinese, not Manchu, and was educated in the United States and in England. In the summer of 1911 he returned to his native land aglow with hope and ambition—hope for the ousting of the corrupt Manchu Dynasty and the founding of a modernized government, and a patriotic ambition that he might be able to play a useful part in the evolution of his country from medievalism into one of the great nations of the world.

Because of these hopes and ambitions this Chinese friend of mine was, of necessity, a revolutionist, and in October of 1911, when he was just twenty-one years of age, he thrilled to the tidings that a revolution had been started at Hankow. In February of 1912 this movement culminated in the abdication of the Manchu Emperor, and the morning star of hope was paled by what seemed to be the rising sun of accomplishment.

Nineteen years have passed since the beginnings of that revolution at Hankow, and my Chinese friend is now a man of early middle age. During all the years of his majority he has entertained hope after hope for his country, and has known one bitter disappointment after another.

Today, at the age of forty, he looks back upon a period of nineteen years of turmoil, of peril, of diminishing personal fortunes and increasing national poverty.

He speaks in bitter words of many of the revolutionary comrades of his youth, some of whom have waxed rich in what he considers the shameful security of foreign Concessions, and his lips curl when he mentions others who have kept themselves in places of power and of profit by perpetually playing the role of political turncoats.

Never during the last nineteen years has this Chinese gentleman known a period of real security for his family, his person, or his property. Time and again the city in which he lives has undergone sieges and captures. Time and again, when the city has changed hands, he has been summoned before "generals" who a few years before were coolies, and has been mulcted of a portion of his wealth as the price of safety.

Several times his home city has been looted by coolie soldiers, and on one occasion nearly a third of it was burned. One night his home was looted by a "revolu-

tionary army" and he saw the treasures accumulated by his forefathers carried away in bloody hands. His only son has been kept in a school in a foreign land for the last nine years; his wife and daughters have often been sent to the nearest foreign Concession in order to be safe from the dangers of rapine when plundering armies were nearing the city walls.

These experiences of the last nineteen years of the life of this Chinese gentleman are by no means exceptional. In China today there are millions of men who, since attaining their majority, have had no opportunity to better themselves or to benefit their own people. Their entire adult lives have been lived under conditions of uncertainty and insecurity. Except for brief periods of calm, these conditions of uncertainty and insecurity have prevailed for the last nineteen years over an area which comprises roughly one-eighth of the land surface of the globe; under these conditions nearly one-fourth of the human race has lived for almost two decades.

The rest of the world has watched this long agony of the Chinese Revolution, sometimes with interest, sometimes with sympathy, usually with bland indifference, but never with understanding.

In 1911 the rest of the world hailed the "Chinese Republic" with fatuous folly; from 1914 until the close of 1918 most of the rest of the world was engaged in the most terrific war in history; since 1918 the rest of

the world has been engaged in healing its wounds, in reconstruction, and in struggles for safety or for supremacy in various lines.

The major drama of the Twentieth Century, thus far, has been the World War. The Russian Revolution undoubtedly comes second in the matter of profound effects upon the world. But the so-called Chinese Revolution is surely third in importance. It has not yet reached the traditional climax of the third act of classic tragedy, and how long it will be before the curtain is rung down on the composure of the end of Act Five no man dares even venture to prophesy.

Now and then, to be sure, some portion of the rest of the world has become aroused over China's plight, and has sought in small measure to alleviate the sufferings of her people by sending famine relief funds. All during this nineteen years of turmoil and of wrecking many organizations have been busy attempting to introduce modern educational methods to the Chinese, modern medicine, modern methods of sanitation. Missionaries of many denominations have been persistent in trying to inculcate an alien faith into the Chinese, and from all sides there has been the pressure of the machine civilizations of America and Europe.

But in spite of these interferences, well-intentioned and otherwise, some inevitable, some impertinent, the condition of China has become worse year by year. Of

tangible reconstructions, of benefits to the people, there have been none; of oppressions and famines, extortions and massacres, degradations and abuses there has been a list so long that it can scarcely be equalled, as affecting so large a mass of people over so long a period, in the whole history of humanity.

The reasons for this continuation of intolerable chaos are many; the reasons for the long delay in the appearance of the first symptoms of improvement may be most simply stated in the terms of a comparison.

The vast continental area called China is a great deal larger than the continental area of the United States, but for the sake of the comparison imagine the two countries equal in size. Then imagine most of western Canada as a desert, comparable to the desert of Mongolia; imagine instead of the Pacific Ocean along the coast of California a barrier of mountains like those of Thibet; imagine along the southern boundary of the United States mountains and jungles of a savage land like the mountains and jungles of Burma and of French Indo-China.

Then picture this hemmed-in United States with only 7000 miles of railways, with only a few short roads passable for anything but two-wheeled carts, and with most of those roads continually menaced by large bands of roving bandits.

Pack into the arable areas of this imaginary United

States a dense population ranging from 400,000,000 to 480,000,000 human beings, perhaps as many as 90 per cent of them illiterate, put into their mouths a medley of different dialects, put into their minds the superstitions of the densely ignorant, and put into their pockets, on the average, less than five dollars a month per person in American money.

If this imaginary United States existed, only visionaries, fools, or charlatans would presume to affirm that it could be "united" within a few years; only visionaries, fools, or charlatans would refer to it as a "Republic."

Now add to this picture of an imaginary United States a rabble of ignorant armed men about 2,500,000 strong, any unit of which will fight for any faction or any cause at the bidding of any commander who, by hook or crook, can raise enough money to feed and clothe them and occasionally give them a few silver coins.

Dredge most of these commanders from the depths of society, put into the hands of these ignorant but crafty, rapacious, ambitious, and unscrupulous commanders the power of life and death over the populations of the regions they control, imagine the unarmed populations helpless and cowed to the point of meekly enduring confiscations, duplicated taxes, corrupt or craven magistrates.

In order to make this picture of the imaginary United States conform even more closely to the actual China of today one must, further, imagine nearly one-tenth of the population living perpetually below the line of proper nourishment; one must envision annual droughts and floods affecting large areas, and vast inaccessible districts in which millions of human beings have killed and eaten all the livestock and even the dogs, and now subsist largely upon roots and grasses, leaves and the bark of trees.

Then, in imagination, place at Washington, on the Potomac, instead of at Nanking, on the Yangtze, a body of men trying to govern this enormous area of affliction. Picture this Government being continually forced to wage one war after another in order to continue even a precarious existence. Vision about nineteenth-twentieths of this Government's revenues being expended for military purposes and for interest on foreign loans.

In America and in Europe one oftens hears the question, put lately with growing impatience, "Why doesn't China settle down?"

But would the imaginary United States sketched above be able to "settle down"? Could that imagined debt-burdened, always defensive Government at Washington bring peace and stability, order and security to so vast and so harassed a country?

Chapter Two

DESPERATE CURES

It may be all very well for the rest of the world to repeat the old saying about a people deserving precisely the measure of good or bad government under which it lives. And it may also be defensible for the rest of the world to remain indifferent to the plight of China on the ground that it has other problems of even more critical nature to absorb its thought and time, energies and surplus moneys.

But the fact remains that while unemployment spreads like a blight over many countries which are overbuilt with factories, China today is the world's greatest undeveloped market, and China affords a potential cure for many of the economic and industrial woes of other nations.

But before China can help the rest of the world, China must be helped. Before China can buy what the rest of the world would like to sell to her, China must have peace and order, security for life and property. In short, China must first have a government which can really govern, instead of alternately fighting or bargaining for the right to collect a portion of its revenues.

The Chinese people, than whom there are none more hard-working and frugal, few more friendly and genial, none more cheerful under shocking adversities, must be raised from dire poverty.

Five years of stability and good government in China would have a marvelous effect upon the rest of the world. It would probably mean the doubling of the average individual Chinese income. Instead of earning an average of ten dollars in silver a month, a sum now much less than five dollars in American money, the average Chinese would probably be earning twenty dollars a month in silver. The basic costs of living would scarcely double under these conditions, so that the average Chinese, living in what would seem to him a state of unbelievable prosperity, could buy at least twice as much as he buys today of the goods which the rest of the world would like to sell to him.

This possible doubling of the income of a people who make up nearly one-fourth of the population of the globe would have a profound effect upon all the other nations of the world, and some of the more intelligent Chinese are already becoming deeply concerned that if China does not put its own house in order, self-interest will eventually prompt the rest of the world to take the task in hand.

They fear, with a not unnatural cynicism, that the great Powers may finally undertake a "friendly" inter-

vention in Chinese affairs—an intervention not admittedly actuated by unemployment and doles and idle factories at home, but ostensibly undertaken from humanitarian motives in order to bring order out of chaos and to end the famines and pestilences, the sufferings and gradual dissolution of China.

A friendly international intervention of this kind is obviously not being contemplated at this time. Instead, the Powers, by hasty recognition of the Nanking Government, by revision of treaties, by going as far as they have dared in surrendering special treaty rights in China, have sought to give the Nanking Government "face" with the Chinese people.

But if the present Nanking Government is brought crashing down to ruin, and all signs in China itself indicate that such a crashing is probable, there will follow a period of such chaos that the rest of the world will have to take counsel. If Nanking is overturned, the combination of opposing factions which accomplish the overturn will begin to quarrel amongst themselves within half a year of their victory, sectionalism and civil war will be renewed on an unprecedented scale, and the poverty and misery of the people will increase.

One of the principal, though unacknowledged reasons why such a friendly intervention may be hastened is to be found in the fact that desperate men willingly try desperate cures, and Soviet Russia stands just at

China's elbow continuously urging that Communism, and Communism alone, can give China peace and prosperity, power and a commanding place amongst the other nations of the world.

The "Communist menace" has been so over-exploited in American and European newspapers for the last twelve years that it no longer excites the publics of those continents. But in Asia it is a very real thing. Not only in China, but in India, in the Malay Peninsula, in the Philippines, in Sumatra, in Java—all through the Far East, the agents of Communism have been busy with propaganda amongst the poor and amongst the oppressed; and unfortunately the native populations of almost all of Eastern Asia, except Japan, belong to one or another and often to both of those categories.

In China, unluckily, most of the people are both poor and oppressed, and it was in China that Russian and Chinese Communist propagandists were not only given a free hand for a year, but were the secret predecessors and conspirators paving the way for the advance of the Nationalist armies.

The Nationalists began their advance northward from Canton in June of 1926, and from then until July of 1927 Chinese and Russian Communists not only made their progress easy, but also worked incessantly within the Nationalist armies, lecturing daily to the soldiers. And after the armies had swept on northward, over the

Yangtze River and into Hankow and beyond, there were Communist organizers left behind to start "Red" unions of peasants and of workmen.

It was the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen, China's principal revolutionary hero, and the founder of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party, who opened the door into China for the Russian Communists. In spite of the fact that his "Last Will and Testament" to the Chinese people urged continued friendly cooperation with Russia, Dr. Sun lived to regret his acceptance of aid from Moscow.

Those few of the leaders of the Nationalist Party who are informed, carefully conceal the fact that Dr. Sun Yat-sen, when he died at Peking in 1925, was a disillusioned and disappointed man, that he was haunted by the dread of Communist domination of his country, and that he twice asked the United States Government to take the lead in organizing a specific form of friendly foreign intervention in China in order to combat the growing ascendancy of Russian Communism.

Dr. Sun's proposals for foreign intervention were also actuated by the fact that he had reluctantly reached the conclusion that the Chinese people could not, under existing conditions, put their own house in order without outside help. In foreign assistance he saw China's only hope, and this deep conviction of the late leader during the last years of his life contrasts curiously with today's anti-foreign propaganda sanctioned and even en-

couraged by many of the leaders of the Nationalist Party who profess to be his devout followers.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen had turned to Russia for advisers and for assistance after he had been embittered because the foreign Powers not only withheld recognition from the southern regime which he had established, but rebuffed his tentative requests for advisers and experts and for financial assistance.

When he turned to Russia, as a last resort, he met with a ready response, but he soon realized his mistake. The men who had come to help him showed every disposition to take entire charge, and to distort his movement for Nationalism into Communism. China was to be used merely to forward Moscow's aims for world revolution, if the Russians could have their way.

Dr. Sun believed that this would mean decades of strife and misery for China, and when, late in the spring of 1923, Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, the then American Minister, visited Canton, Dr. Sun arranged for a secret conference and asked Dr. Schurman to have Washington sound out London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, and some of the lesser governments to see if the Powers would take upon themselves a joint intervention in China for a period of five years.

Dr. Sun told the American Minister that if the Powers would agree to his suggestion, he himself, as head of the Canton regime, would issue a proclamation inviting

them to come into China, and he also guaranteed to spend the rest of his life at propaganda work amongst the Chinese people in order to make the proposed intervention and foreign tutelage acceptable to them.

This plan for a period of intervention and tutelage in modern forms of governmental administration had been thought out by Dr. Sun Yat-sen down to details. He proposed joint military occupation by the Powers of all railways and of all provincial capitals. He asked that expert military organizers, police force organizers, railway experts, flood-control engineers, sanitation experts, and trained administrators for all governmental departments be sent to China. His dream was that during the five-year period of the proposed intervention the foreign experts should adapt modern methods to China's needs in all departments of the provincial and national governments, and then that a year before the period of intervention ended, national and provincial elections should be held, with candidates chosen from amongst those who had been schooled as assistants to the foreign administrators.

The newly elected Chinese officials were then, according to his plan, gradually to take over duties of administration as the foreigners relinquished control preparatory to a measured evacuation. The entire costs of the scheme, he believed, could easily be derived from

the increase in the national income which would result from honest and efficient administration.

These projects were duly transmitted to Washington, and it is understood that Washington sounded the other Powers. But no agreement could be reached—largely because of the bitter and costly, and fairly recent experience which some of the Powers concerned had had during the joint intervention in Siberia.

About two months before he died, early in 1925, Dr. Sun renewed his appeal to the American Minister; again nothing came of it, and Dr. Sun's last days were those of a disheartened and disappointed man who felt that the only salvation discernible for his people could come from those who were not willing to assume the responsibility.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen has been dead for more than five years, and since then Chinese Nationalism has become deeply tinged with anti-foreignism. If such an intervention were to be undertaken at this time, it would probably arouse a sullen resentment and spirit of non-cooperation amongst large classes of the population.

One of China's leading young philosophers, during a recent discussion of this matter, declared that he believed even the mere discussion of the possibilities of joint friendly intervention by the Powers would have a salutary effect upon Chinese politics, and would force the

military leaders to effect a truce and form a comparatively stable coalition government. He ended by quoting an old Chinese proverb:

“The nation is weak only when it has no strong enemies, and is strong only when it fears invasion.”

Chapter Three

IF CHINA "GOES RED"

MONTH after month during the year 1929, and on into the early part of 1930, disturbing news came from the southern and south-central portions of China. Communist bands, during this period, captured city after city and county after county, and the strength of what came to be known as the "Red" forces was obviously rapidly on the increase.

In case after case the local and even the provincial authorities reported to the Nanking Government that the Communists had become so strong that further resistance had become hopeless. As the area under Communist control spread, it became a no-man's-land. News from the districts held by the Communists was scarce, but now and then Shanghai, Canton, or Hongkong learned from refugees of bloody massacres, of lootings, of burnings, and of the destruction of even the meagre degree of law and order that had previously existed.

Does this mean that China is "going Red"?

If so, why is the Communist strength being manifested in South China, instead of in the far North, or in Manchuria, where Russia and China have common

frontiers, and where the infiltration of Communist influence would seem easiest?

If the Chinese Communists triumph, will China become Moscow's catspaw, and if she does what will be the result upon China's relations with the rest of the world?

Will the founding of a Soviet Republic in China have serious repercussions elsewhere in Asia?

M. Borodin, the astute organizer and agent of the Third International, who went to Canton when the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen turned to Moscow for aid in his revolutionary schemes, always declared publicly that China was not ready for Communism. The country and the people, he insisted, were too poor. What use for Communism when there is no wealth to divide?

It is more than probable that when Borodin discoursed in this vein he had his tongue in his cheek—if not he was a less clever man than he seemed to be.

Russia's 140,000,000 people, the rest of the world is often told, endured having Communism forced upon them by a small minority—by fewer than 1,000,000 actual Communists, in fact; and in many quarters it is still the fashion to speak of the "Communist tyranny" perpetuating itself in Russia. If this interpretation of Russia's situation is correct, the achievement of attaining to the tyrannical powers was made possible because the Communists won over the army—and the Russian army

in 1917 and 1918 was a body of disheartened and desperate men. Any alternative seemed better than the plight to which it had been brought under the Czarist regime.

Desperate peoples try desperate cures, and today the masses of the Chinese people are, because of frightful misgovernment and scandalous exploitation, just as desperate as were Russia's armies in 1917, if not more so.

The Chinese people endured misgovernment under the Manchu Dynasty. The hopes fostered in the early years of the Revolution, which began nineteen years ago, have repeatedly been disappointed or betrayed. The warlords have ruined the country. The impact of the mechanical civilizations of America and of Europe has occasioned economic dislocations of profound significance. The tradition of family discipline has lost much of its former power, and China's various religions no longer have much hold upon the popular mind.

Why would Communism, cleverly presented as a remedy for all ills, not make an immense appeal to a vast and impoverished proportion of the population which is more than 90 per cent illiterate and which, on the average, knows little concerning affairs other than those strictly local, or, at widest range, provincial?

The Chinese people, in the mass, are still too ignorant, too illiterate and too parochial in their outlook to have

even the vaguest idea of national, let alone world affairs. They have not, as yet, the power to reason out the fact that all of the conservative leaders have failed to alleviate the conditions which make life so nearly intolerable that its precariousness is almost a blessing in disguise. But they are restless, dissatisfied with conditions which progress only from bad to worse; they are bitter with disappointments which seem all the greater because the hopes which were betrayed were only vague hopes tinged with the rose of an uninformed optimism.

In other words, the Chinese people—the peasants, the patient coolies, the toiling tens of millions of laborers—are ripe for change. If smooth-tongued men urge them to pursue thus-and-such a course, and promise as a result conditions which must seem the equivalent of the millennium, it will be astonishing if these illiterate tens of millions do not do as the Communist propagandists urge them to do—rise under a concerted plan, massacre the gentry and the propertied classes, divide the land in order to cease paying rent, and obliterate government and governing classes in the hope that this act will free them from the burden of taxation which year by year has grown heavier and heavier as the ambitions and requirements of the various contending warlords have become greater and greater.

By a curious and ironical chain of circumstances the Communists of China, so-called, hold areas which strate-

gically menace the safety and continuance of the Nanking Government, and which put it between two fires. North China, always the stronghold of conservatism, is in open rebellion against Nanking, and because of this fact the greater portion of Nanking's armies have been moved north of the Yangtze River. This movement has forced Nanking to denude of troops the very areas in which the Communists are strongest—the areas in which their propaganda has enjoyed the most widespread circulation and has had the longest time in which to achieve a hold upon the minds of the masses.

Manchuria and the northern provinces, the areas of China closest to Russian territory, have always been on their guard against the Communists, but Moscow's representatives and organizers were welcomed into South China and enjoyed unusual facilities for the spread of their propaganda.

As long ago as 1923, after the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen had turned to Russia in order to obtain assistance for the revolutionary government which he had organized at Canton, Russian propagandists were welcomed into the South. The Chinese Communist Party became formally affiliated with the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party, which controlled the Canton Government, and soon the Communists and their sympathizers, the Left Wing, were in control of the Party policies.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, and in 1926 his suc-

cessors at the head of the Nationalist movement began the northward military drive which was destined to overrun most of China proper and to culminate in the capture of Peking and Tientsin in the summer of 1928.

Practically all of China south of the Yangtze River, and considerable portions of it north of that waterway, were easily taken by the Nationalists before midsummer of 1927, the period when General Chiang Kai-shih broke with the Communist and Left Wing factions at Hankow, and established what has since become the Nationalist Government at Nanking. This break was the beginning of a period of ruthless suppression of Communists by General Chiang Kai-shih and his faction; but from June of 1926 until July of 1927 Chinese and Russian propagandists, incorporated into or following in the wake of the Nationalist armies, made the most of their opportunities of spreading the gospel of Communism amongst the peasants, students, and laborers of most of South China and amongst more than 50 per cent of the dwellers of the populous Yangtze Basin.

These propagandists told the common people that the Nationalist armies were their deliverers, and then when the Nanking faction broke with Communism and its ways, and deliverance from misgovernment and extortion was as distant as ever, the propagandists told the masses that their cause had been betrayed. What wonder, then, that as soon as Nanking withdraws its soldiers from

this area, tens of thousands of so-called Communists take the law into their own hands, seize the land, besiege cities, exterminate the official classes, and attempt to establish what they conceive to be Soviet forms of government?

If China finally "goes Red" it will not be because a majority of the Chinese deliberately choose to live under Communism. The majority of the Chinese people—a majority at least as great as 90 per cent—will know nothing of what Communism really is or means. The "going Red" of China will merely mean that an ignorant, desperate, and harried people have yielded to the blandishments of such slogans as "Divide the land, and cease paying rent"; "Do away with the oppressive moneyed and gentry classes"; "Slay all officials who have oppressed peasants and workers."

In other words, if China turns to Communism it will not be a deliberate political move, but rather the convulsive jerking of a tortured people maddened by oppression and misrule.

A movement of this kind, of course, would attract or would evolve leaders, and these would probably be a mixture of the radical "young intellectuals" and of virile and powerful personalities who would emerge from the peasant, coolie, or other laboring classes. Even from the abyss of abject ignorance leaders of this kind would be almost certain to emerge. They did so during the French

Revolution and at the time of the French Commune, they have done so in modern Russia, and they have already done so during the Chinese Revolution.

A development of this kind would probably result in a close *rapprochement* between China and Russia, even though the domestic policies and developments would, of necessity, have to differ widely. China already considers the rest of the world her enemy, and Russia not only continues to believe in the antagonistic bloc of capitalistic nations, but continues to dream of and to work for world revolution. A Sovietized China would probably cooperate with the Third International—and with startling results.

Anti-foreignism is already one of the main policies of the Nanking Government, and everywhere in China where Nationalist influence has made itself felt there is antagonism in varying degrees against foreign influences, special foreign treaty rights, the pressure of foreign debts, and the existence of foreign concessions and business interests.

If a Communist China comes into existence, and particularly if that China works in harmony with Russia, Japan's position in Manchuria will at once become dangerous and precarious in the extreme. The foreign guards of the Legations in Peking, the International Settlement at Shanghai, foreign warships and gunboats in Chinese coastal and inland waters, all foreign concession

areas—these will at once become the targets of Communist China.

It has long been the fashion for all Chinese factions and spellbinders to assure the Chinese people that all of China's domestic woes are caused by the existence of the foreign concessions and by the special privileges which some foreigners enjoy in China under the extraterritoriality and other treaty provisions. It will be only logical, if China falls under the control of Communist leaders, for these leaders to redouble their denunciations of the position which the "capitalistic" Powers enjoy in China.

If even a portion of China comes under the rule of what, in name at least, is called a Soviet Republic, the effect upon most of Asia will be profound and perilous.

The Philippines, already restless, will raise a newly raucous cry for independence. France will be almost certain to have to cope with new uprisings in Indo-China. The Dutch, in Java, are already troubled by Communist trouble makers. The fires of rebellion in India will flame even higher than before. Everywhere in the Far East the ferment of nationalism is at work, and the pressure of fermentation against the old bottles of foreign domination will probably result in some terrific explosions.

What would be the attitude of the foreign Powers towards so portentous a development in China—a development which would profoundly affect their relative positions in the Far East?

Would they, could they stand by and watch and do nothing? Or would they meddle in China's internal affairs by giving active backing to the anti-Communist faction in China which seemed most likely to survive? They attempted such an intervention in Siberia after the World War, with results that were neither creditable nor profitable.

After all, China belongs to the Chinese people, and many thoughtful Chinese and foreign observers who live in that unhappy land are today convinced that China must go far to the "Left" before it can evolve any stable form of government and finally settle down to the ways of unity and peace. To date neither the moderates nor the reactionary conservatives have shown any ability to cope with China's domestic problems.

Many Chinese intellectuals feel that if China wants to turn to Communism as a possible solution of her present intolerable woes, it would be a crime for the rest of the world to interfere, no matter how laudable the motives for such an interference might be or might seem to be. These intellectuals point out that the foreign Powers have never done anything tangible to help China, and that therefore they have no right to try to prevent the Chinese people from trying any desperate cure that may offer even a remote hope of relief.

China is so huge in extent that it is highly possible that Communism, as a creed or as an idea, would be

foiled of domination, just as factions and individual leaders have been foiled in their plans for pacification or unification by the size of the country, the number of its dialects, and the varying temperaments of its hundreds of millions of inhabitants.

It is conceivable, then, that a portion of China may become a Soviet Republic, while another portion or portions may be ruled by the Nationalists or by the conservative Northern coalition.

A development of this kind, involving the partition of China territorially and on fundamental political and economic principles, would be merely the prelude to further civil wars.

The Chinese brand of Communism is in China, to stay or to be exterminated with the accompaniment of a ghastly blood-letting, for Chinese Communists are not like those of France or Germany, and would never consent to sit as a minority in a parliament—even if China had a parliament, which it does not.

Communism is in China to conquer—or to die. And whatever the outcome of the struggle the Chinese people, it seems, must suffer from the inevitable conflict.

Chapter Four

ORIGINS

THE government which has been functioning at Nanking has suffered tremendously from two different kinds of misrepresentation. Detractors of that government have spread propaganda to the effect that it is hideously corrupt, that it is founded solely upon violence and maintained by force, that it is wilfully tyrannical, and that it must be overthrown before China can enjoy either peace or prosperity.

Supporters of the Nanking Government have gone to the other extreme. They have declared that the leaders of that regime are all high-minded men, that they are actuated solely by motives of exalted patriotism, that they are able and irreproachably honest, that they have the support of the people, and that they are launching great enterprises for the reconstruction of China.

The truth about Nanking is to be found midway between these two extremes. As is only natural under the circumstances, the personnel of the government is an odd and unfortunate mixture of fervid patriots, of cold-blooded self-seekers, of ambitious but unscrupulous politicians, of disgraceful turncoats, of sincere supporters

of the Nationalist Party, and of large numbers of political camp followers.

That corruption and venality exist at Nanking may be taken as a matter of course, but in general it may be stated that it is not the prominent leaders who are busy filling their money-bags.

One of China's principal problems of administration is to find a sufficient number of men of the proper ability, training, and honesty to handle affairs of government. In China today there is a lamentable shortage of men who possess all these requisites. The country has not enough men of the proper type to staff the central government alone, not to mention the necessity for finding able, honest, and trained men to handle the affairs of the great provinces or the business of administering the teeming cities.

In order to understand the Nanking Government it is necessary to go back to the spring of 1926. It is necessary to consider the state of China before the Nationalists began their conquest of the country by launching their armies northward from Canton, the status of Canton at that time, the methods by which those armies were raised and equipped, and how they were trained.

The verdict on Nanking's probable stability must depend, too, upon a thorough understanding of how the government was founded there, of why many of its supporters have deserted it to become actual or potential

opponents, and of the methods which Nanking found it necessary to use in order to checkmate these opponents and prolong its tenure of authority.

In the early spring of 1926 General Chiang Kai-shih, now erroneously called the "President" of China, was merely the commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy, an institution about eleven miles outside of Canton where cadets were trained for commissions in the Nanking Army.

At that time there was a Kuomintang or Nationalist Party government functioning at Canton, but this so-called government did not actually control all of Kwangtung, the large southern province of which Canton is the provincial capital. The rest of China was divided into zones controlled loosely by various warlords who paid at least a nominal allegiance to a cabinet form of government which existed at Peking.

Marshal Sun Chuan-fang was overlord of five provinces, maintained his own regional capital at Nanking, and controlled the rich port of Shanghai. He was supposed to be very strong in a military sense.

China north of the Yangtze River was loosely partitioned amongst four dominant warlords, the two most important of whom were Marshals Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin.

Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, commander of the Kuominchun or People's Army, had been driven out of Peking

early in 1926 by a combined assault of the armies of Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin; but neither of these victors had then personally taken possession of the old capital, Wu remaining in the field or at Hankow, and Chang Tso-lin maintaining his own autonomous government at Mukden, the capital of the three Manchurian provinces, which had been his undisputed possession for a number of years.

In Shansi province General Yen Hsi-shan was supreme, and was known as "The Model Governor" because he had kept his province out of civil warfare since the outbreak of the Revolution in 1911, and because he had made notable progress with road building, with expanding a school system, and with reforestation and irrigation projects.

The fourth of the predominant Northern warlords was Marshal Chang Tsung-chang, governor of the province of Shantung, and sole arbiter of the destinies of more than 30,000,000 people. This Chang Tsung-chang, like Chu Yu-pu, the governor of Chihli and ruler of the Peking-Tientsin area, was a supporter of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian warlord.

The government maintained at Peking at that time rarely enjoyed any actual authority outside the walls of that ancient city, and did not enjoy formal recognition from any of the Powers. The Foreign Office of the Peking Government was used by the Ministers of the various foreign Legations in Peking as something of a letter box.

There they left protests and diplomatic documents, not with the idea that the Peking Minister of Foreign Affairs could really adjust any foreign complication, but solely, as one of the Ministers phrased the situation, "to keep the record straight."

In Canton an amazing situation existed, but though the authority of the government there was precariously established, the fervor and hope and activity were pronounced—largely because of the presence of skilled Russian advisers and organizers.

In the summer of 1925 the Chinese workmen at Hongkong had struck, as a patriotic protest against what is now called the "Shanghai incident"—namely the shooting down of a large number of Chinese demonstrators under orders given by a British police official of the Shanghai International Settlement.

Tens of thousands of Hongkong Chinese workmen quit work and went up the Pearl River to Canton. Everything British was boycotted, and the strikers' union at Canton would not permit any ship to unload there if it had even stopped at Hongkong for supplies of fresh water or for fuel.

Estimates of the number of Hongkong strikers who flocked into Canton vary from 70,000 to 100,000. A year after the strike was begun, that is, in the summer of 1926, there were still more than 40,000 of these strikers in Canton, and they were a law unto themselves. They



Dislodged by war



Wrecked city gate after a battle

maintained their own picket and police system, they maintained their own court and jail, they confiscated goods suspected of being of British origin, they called local strikes of various kinds, and often chased Canton's municipal police off of the streets. The cost of feeding these strikers and their families ran from \$7000 to \$10,000 a day, and was shared jointly by the Canton Government and by the Nationalist Party, officials of which then estimated that more than \$3,000,000 in government and party funds had been spent in this way within the year since the strike had begun.

"What else can we do?" asked Eugene Chen, then Canton's Minister for Foreign Affairs. "Empty bellies make revolutionists. These men are not industrial strikers. They walked out as a patriotic protest against the Shanghai shootings, and they must be fed, or we shall have a revolution right here in the city."

It was during April, May, and June that General Chiang Kai-shih managed to lay the first foundations of his present power and prestige. His army was the most powerful in the Canton area, but even then he seemed to be restive under the domination of the Russian advisers, who were headed by the famous M. Borodin as political adviser and by General Galen, a military expert sent from Russia.

In the early spring of 1926 General Wu Ti-chen, then Canton's chief of police, ordered that the strikers should

be disarmed. Chiang Kai-shih not only vetoed this order, but imprisoned Wu Ti-chen in the Bocca Tigris forts, and put a radical in charge of the police force, whereat the Communists rejoiced.

For several weeks Chiang Kai-shih seemed definitely to have made common cause with the radicals. C. C. Wu, then mayor of Canton, now Chinese Minister in Washington, fled to Hongkong and on to the International Settlement at Shanghai, and other conservatives left the Canton regime.

But the rejoicing of the Communists was short-lived. Canton wakened one morning to find Chiang Kai-shih's own troops in complete possession of the city. Military patrols were met in every block, and machine guns dominated important street intersections.

The windows of the government buildings literally bristled with the rifles and bayonets of Chiang's soldiers.

The date for this *coup d'état* had been carefully chosen. It was the date set for the meeting of the Central Executive Committee, which is the supreme organ of the Nationalist Party. Chiang Kai-shih had not been a member of that committee, but on the day of this *coup* he was elected to membership, and was made Generalissimo of the Nationalist armies. He at once declared martial law, and then appointed in his headquarters a virtual duplication of all the Party offices, and arrogated

to himself the personal right to veto all acts of all civil or military officials.

Then Chiang submitted to the Central Executive Committee a set of resolutions, which were, of course, passed with alacrity. These resolutions were designed to expel from the Nationalist Party all members who also belonged to the Communist Party; they declared that no Communist could hold a rank higher than that of lieutenant in the Nationalist army; they forced the resignations of all civil officials above assistant bureau chiefs who had belonged to the Communist Party, and they declared that no committees or other organizations which numbered more than one-third Communists or ex-Communists would be permitted to function.

Chiang Kai-shih issued a proclamation to the citizens of Canton, announcing that the "Red menace has been met and defeated" and promising that so long as he lived there would be no proletarian dictatorship.

It was the turn of the Communists to follow Dr. C. C. Wu and others in hasty flight to the safety of Hongkong or Shanghai, and many Russian advisers joined the Chinese Communists in a scrambling exit.

But Borodin did not leave, nor did General Galen, and within a fortnight pressure of circumstances forced Chiang Kai-shih to compromise with the Russians and with the Communist wing. His heart was set upon the

Northern military expedition, and for that he had to have Russian arms, Russian ammunition, Russian money. When he chased the Communists out of Canton, Russian ships from Vladivostok ceased to steam up the Pearl River and discharge precious cargoes at Canton.

Within two weeks a truce had been arranged, the Russians all returned to Canton, and so did the Chinese Communists. The work of preaching anti-foreignism and Communism was resumed with new vigor, posters and slogans decorated the walls of Canton, new radical unions were organized, and daily lectures to the soldiers were resumed by the Communist propagandists.

Late in June of 1926 the Nationalist armies began that northward movement which was to result in the capture of Hankow in September, and in the taking of Nanking and Shanghai early in 1927. City after city capitulated with little actual fighting; province after province was overrun by the swelling Nationalist forces. Propaganda and cash had made the way easy. Sun Chuan-fang, that proud overlord of five provinces, saw whole divisions of his troops go over to the enemy. Peasants and workmen welcomed the new conquerors, for they had been told that with the arrival of the Nationalists the millennium would be ushered in.

After the horrible "Nanking incident" of March, 1927, when foreigners were murdered and foreign Consulates looted by Chinese soldiers, General Chiang Kai-

shih definitely broke with the Communist-dominated government which had been established at Hankow, and in July of that year the Hankow regime ceased to exist. Borodin and his Russians, and many Chinese Left Wing members and Communists departed for Russia or elsewhere in Europe. —

Since then General Chiang Kai-shih has lived a chequered political life, maintaining himself now by alliances with the radicals, now with the conservatives. Once he resigned all posts and went to Japan, only to return and reorganize his forces, win new allies, and become ever stronger and stronger.

Chapter Five

"UNIFICATION"

It was in June of 1928 that the Nationalist armies, swollen by the adhesion of the forces of many a mercenary general who cared nothing about Nationalism, finally captured the Peking-Tientsin area, and brought nominally under Nanking's sway all of China up to the Manchurian boundaries.

Marshal Chang Tso-lin, who had been dictator at Peking, and had revived many of the forms and ceremonies of old imperial days, was killed when a portion of the railway train in which he was retreating was blown up by a bomb just on the outskirts of his own capital, Mukden.

That summer Peking witnessed a gathering of the great and the near great. The Revolution was called a completed enterprise, so far as military activities were concerned. There was great talk of reconstruction, of disbanding the armies, of initiating gigantic road and railway building projects so that the ex-soldiers would have employment. The unification of China, the rest of the world was told, had become an accomplished fact. Those who were sceptical concerning the probable

length of the peace were called "die-hards," "reactionaries," and names even more harsh.

It was a strange collection of civil and military leaders who flocked into China's ancient capital during those summer months. When the characters and the political and military records of those leaders were dispassionately considered it became evident that civil strife must continue, and that despite the fine plans and undoubted sincerity of some of the leaders the attempt at a stable coalition must end in tragic failure.

Most of the fighting which occurred during the three months just prior to the capture of Peking and Tientsin had been done by Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang's troops, known as the Kuominchun army. These veterans, 300,000 strong, had completed an epic march of nearly 7000 miles since they had been ousted from Peking in the early spring of 1926, their route having led first north and west, circling southern Mongolia, back into China proper in distant Kansu province, and thence eastward through Shensi and Honan before they attacked the Peking area from the south.

General Chiang Kai-shih was there, of course, and legions of his troops had worked their way northward through Shantung.

General Yen Hsi-shan was there, his armies having come from beyond the Shansi mountains, directly west of Peking.

Generals Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen were there—leaders of the Kwangsi faction, who had been holding the Hankow area, and Pai's 60,000 men were encamped around the outer walls of Peking, while Pai brought a "bodyguard" of 6000 troops into the inner city itself where he pre-empted the northeast section.

It was Marshal Li Tsung-jen who best summed up the optimistic view of the situation in the summer of 1926.

"Something new has come to changeless China, and forces have been let loose in this old land that self-seeking men cannot control," he declared in an official interview given out for cabling to America.

"The Legations of the Treaty Powers, most foreigners in this country, and even vast numbers of Chinese do not realize this change," Li Tsung-jen continued. "This new something is sincerity on the part of China's leaders, coupled with the birth of patriotism and public spirit on the part of many of China's millions of citizens.

"Those who do not understand the new China believed that the Nationalists would split asunder as soon as they took Peking. They have judged us by the standards by which they have correctly judged the old type of Northern militarists. The natural thing has been to expect us to quarrel over a division of the spoils.

"But a seeming miracle has come to pass, in that even if some of us are not sincere we realize that if today we should attempt to follow the old selfish system we

would at once lose our followings, our supporters, and most of our strength."

Fine sounding words, these, and excellent for foreign consumption.

Yet less than nine months later, in March of 1929, Li Tsung-jen was heading an armed rebellion against the Nanking Government.

Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang was equally enthusiastic in the summer of 1928, but by May of 1929 his troops were blowing up railway bridges and digging trenches in order to halt the advance of Nanking forces. In the interval Feng had been at Nanking, filling the post of Minister of War in the cabinet, but he left the capital secretly and took the field at the head of his forces.

General Yen Hsi-shan, another of the leaders who declared that unification had been completed in the summer of 1928, withdrew from Nanking early in 1929, and later prepared for war while denouncing General Chiang Kai-shih.

Li Che-chen, often called Li Chai-sum, ardently supported Nanking in 1928, but in March of 1929 he was imprisoned at the capital on charge of treason, and a year later was still held captive.

Pai Chung-hsi, one of the able young commanders of the Nationalist advance, remained in the Peking area until February of 1929, then had to flee in disguise, and has since headed two separate rebellions in the far South.

The fate of Pai's army of 60,000 men is an excellent illustration of the fact that Chinese armies, whatever they may be labeled at any given time, are really purely mercenary troops willing to fight for any cause or any faction.

When Pai marched them up to Peking in June of 1928, only abusive words would have been used to describe any person who might have expressed a doubt of their allegiance to the cause of Nationalism and their loyalty to the Nanking Government.

But when Pai fled early in 1929, command of this large body of troops was automatically taken over by General Tang Sheng-chi, with the approval and support of General Chiang Kai-shih and of the Nanking Government.

Now this General Tang Sheng-chi, while ostensibly loyal to Nanking in 1927, had marched down the Yangtze River from the Hankow region, but had been defeated by Nanking, and had fled to Japan. He was denounced by Nanking as a "Communist" and an "enemy of the State."

But it was this same Tang who, early in 1929, landed in North China from his exile in Japan and, with the approval of Nanking, took over command of Pai's 60,000 men.

Just for the sake of bringing Tang Sheng-chi's record up to date, it may be mentioned that he remained "loyal"

to Nanking all during the summer of 1929, and during that time maneuvered his army into Honan province. In October and November of 1929 he ably assisted the Nanking armies in their fight against the Kuominchun rebellion, but in December, after the Kuominchun revolt had been suppressed, Tang staged a surprise rebellion of his own, and was again outlawed and driven to seek a second exile in Japan, and his armies, once Pai's, are again anti-Nanking.

Many purely domestic political considerations have been named as being the causes of these frequent changes of the allegiances of various Chinese generals. Some are said to have been influenced by the Communists, others are "Left Wing" adherents and object to a centralized conservative administration. Some of the generals are no doubt sincere opponents of Nanking because of differences of opinion concerning the legality of the Third Kuomintang or Nationalist Congress.

This Congress, held in March of 1929, bade fair to be dominated by the "Left Wing" element. Delegates had been elected from various local and provincial headquarters of the Kuomintang Party, and Chiang Kai-shih and the Nanking regime felt that the stability of the government was menaced. Accordingly, many of the "Left Wing" delegates were not permitted to take their seats, and their places were filled by men arbitrarily appointed by Nanking to fill the vacancies. Charges of

nepotism, of corruption, and of Chiang Kai-shih's supposed ambitions to become a dictator also inflamed many important persons to open opposition.

These turbulent conditions have resulted in many "party purification" movements, under which the Nanking supporters of Chiang Kai-shih have voted expulsion from the party of whole groups of opposition factions. These expelled members and cliques challenge the legality of the expulsions, and declare that control of the party machinery is in the hands of "usurpers."

With these internal disputes the rest of the world has nothing to do, but the rest of the world is entitled to weigh the fact that these venalities and shifting loyalties and internal disagreements serve to keep civil war an almost continuous performance in China, and as a result drive more than 400,000,000 people nearer and nearer to that measure of abject poverty and despair which may bring about a Communistic cataclysm.

It is this internal situation which not only makes impossible the disbandment of China's enormous armies, but which is ruining her railways, eating up her revenues, and driving hundreds of thousands of persons into lawlessness and banditry.

In Canton, in the spring of 1926, unobserved by the rest of the world outside of China, and derided even by Shanghai, a mighty wave was swelling. This wave did not spend itself until the summer of 1928, when its

muddied and wreck-strewn edges washed through the gates of Peking, more than 2000 miles to the north.

On its way it engulfed tens of thousands of lives, ruined enormous areas of cultivated lands, destroyed countless villages and many small towns, and brought to a halt the educational, hospital, and missionary activities of thousands of foreigners who had come to China solely to help the Chinese people. The money losses it entailed have never been calculated.

Had the result of this been the pacification or the unification of China, the experience would probably have been worth the terrific cost, but now, nearly two years after the capture of Peking, civil war is not ended, the country is not unified, and the armies are larger than they ever were before.

It is noticeable that since the Russian and Communist advisers and propagandists have been ousted from the Nationalist Party, the fervor which characterized the movement in 1926 has dwindled almost to the vanishing point.

Today, it is true, every general and every politician chants his loyalty to the Nationalists and his veneration for the doctrines of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen, but in a majority of cases this is lip service only. Loyalty to the Party today, so far as most of the regional warlords are concerned, is precisely as valuable an asset to China as was the "loyalty to the Republic" which every Chinese

general professed during the years between 1911 and 1926.

One of the most disheartening elements of the situation is the fact that the masses of the Chinese people, who in 1927 and 1928 looked upon the Nationalist armies as deliverers from the intolerable corruption and misgovernment of the Northern satraps, are today bitter and disillusioned.

The promises of two and three years ago have not been kept. Nanking has not improved the condition of the Chinese people. The fact that it has had to fight an almost continuous series of wars in order to maintain itself is excuse enough for the failure of reconstruction achievements, but this excuse does not dull the sharpness of China's disappointment nor make her sorrows the more tolerable.

Chapter Six

PARTY, GOVERNMENT, AND OPPOSITION

EARLY June of 1930—just two years after the capture of Peking by the Nationalists—and the whole of China except Manchuria is again involved in a great war. The Nanking Government, assailed from the North and from the South, and with vast areas overrun by bandits and by Communist bands, is forced again to fight for its existence.

The various generals leading their forces against Nanking and the civilian political leaders backing those generals, are the same men who made the seeming triumph of Nationalism possible and who did more to effect the capture of Peking in 1928 than did the men who control Nanking.

Every faction of the opposition in 1930 declares its loyalty to the principles of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party; every one of the armies fighting against Nanking is flying the Kuomintang Party flag, and also the flag of the Nanking Government—the flag of China. The Party is hopelessly disrupted, the sham of a civilian-controlled government is nakedly exposed.

Disunion, strife, destruction, disrupted trade, forced

levies upon peasantry and towns, shocking treacheries and the open use of money for the purchase of "loyalties"—these are the salient features of the 1930 war, just as they have been, in lesser degree, the salient features of the wars which have been recurring with appalling frequency since the year 1911.

The 1930 spectacle is enlivened by a great number of mandates and manifestoes. Nanking declares itself to be the only real exponent of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party principles. It denounces one faction of its opponents as "old style feudalists"; another clique it denounces as "semi-Communist"; and still another is labeled "reactionary."

It is noteworthy, however, that the opposing factions being called these hard names by Nanking have not changed their principles or policies to any great extent since "unification" in 1928. The semi-Communists are no more radical in 1930 than they were two years before, the conservatives no more feudalistic.

The only real change that has come over the scene during this whole period of "unification" is that each leader has climbed aboard the Kuomintang band-wagon, and that each has sought to read into the principles of the Party policies which suit his own desires. The "unification" has been no more actual than if in the United States advocates of enforcement, modification, and repeal of the Prohibition Law were all to "unite" in one

political party and then fight like cats and dogs for control of the party's machinery; no more actual than if in Great Britain the Conservative, Liberal, and Labor parties were to unite in one "Nationalist Party" and then battle amongst themselves for the right of running the country.

Before the end of 1930 the Nanking Government may "win the war," or Nanking may be overturned by the rebels. But if Nanking wins, Nanking will be unable to hold the country together, and if Nanking is defeated and overturned it will be only a short time before the victors will be fighting amongst themselves. When that occurs, the most tenacious and ambitious of the "Nanking crowd" will return from exile or emerge from hiding and endeavor to re-establish themselves in power. No matter which side gains a temporary victory, there is no prospect for peace in China, no probability that any Chinese leader or group will be powerful enough to end the tortures of the Chinese people.

This Kuomintang or Nationalist Party, for control of which seemingly, so many factions are fighting—just what is it? What are its principles, over which so many powerful generals are at present disagreeing so violently?

The Kuomintang is a political organization the total dues-paying membership of which does not include one in one thousand of China's 480,000,000 people.

In 1929 the total membership of the Kuomintang was

422,022, of whom 172,796 were officers and soldiers in the various armies, 202,321 were civilians scattered over the many provinces of China, and 47,906 were Chinese living in foreign lands. These, at least, were the figures given out by the Secretariat of the Third Party Congress in the spring of 1929.

In October of 1929, the Organization Bureau of the Kuomintang, while claiming substantially the same total membership, published statistics on "classifications" which show a wide discrepancy when the number of soldier members claimed in the previous March is considered. The October figures follow:

Soldiers, 23 per cent.

Workmen, 29 per cent.

Liberal professions, 25.7 per cent.

Students, 10.5 per cent.

Merchants, 4.3 per cent.

Peasants, 7.5 per cent.

This is a curiously composed organization to set itself up as the dictatorial power over a helpless mass of 480,000,000 people to found and control a government which makes treaties with the rest of the world in the name of China, and to arrogate to itself the education of the people of China during a "period of tutelage" which is, presumably, to be followed by a constitutional government based upon the will of the people, if or when

the Kuomintang Party decides that the people are ready for self-government.

The Kuomintang, founded by the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen, was reorganized along Russian lines when Borodin was sent to Canton, and today stands over and above the Nanking Government. It is a law unto itself, and can negative even the decisions of the government leaders.

Wherever there are enough members, "Locals" of the Kuomintang are organized, and these "Locals" are empowered to elect delegates to a "Congress" which is supposed to meet annually, but does not do so. The "Congress," in turn, elects a Central Executive Committee, which, however, is not in continuous session, and this Central Executive Committee in turn elects a Standing Committee which is vested with power to act when the Central Executive Committee is not in session. Under the Central Executive Committee there was also organized a Central Political Council, and this in turn was authorized to organize provincial and local branch political councils all over China. These branch political councils became important, particularly in North China, by their assumption of dictatorial authority, which precipitated frequent clashes with regional civilian and military authorities.

The supreme committee organizations of the Kuomintang Party prepared an Organic Law for China, which

was solemnly promulgated on October 10, 1928. This document is supposed to take the place of a constitution for China until such time as the "period of tutelage" is at an end.

Following the adoption of the Organic Law, which provides for a "Five Power System" of government, the Nanking regime changed its name from the Nationalist to the National Government of China, and organized five departments or Yuan, namely, the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan. The Council of State is to consist of from twelve to sixteen members, from whom the chairmen and vice-chairmen of the five Yuan are chosen.

The chairman of the State Council, who is General Chiang Kai-shih, acts as President of the government, which in Chinese eyes and in the character chosen to designate the office is not a position equivalent to that of President of China, though he is designated to represent the nation at state functions and in the reception of foreign diplomats.

This elaborate and cumbersome governmental machine was supposed to assure the supremacy of civil over military authority, but the force of events and the fact that the Nanking Government has almost from its foundation been forced to fight war after war in a struggle to survive have given to General Chiang Kai-shih the

powers and standing of a military dictator. Whether the military would have been curbed had the country remained at peace is a debatable question.

The continuous series of rebellions and mutinies, culminating in the formidable onslaught launched against Nanking in the early summer of 1930, forced the Nanking Government as measures of self-preservation to adopt many high-handed policies which have served only to increase the number and rancor of its opponents. All who refused to bow to the dictatorship of the Kuomintang oligarchy headed by General Chiang Kai-shih have been, nominally, at least, expelled from the Party, and criticism has been rigorously punished, whether it came from individuals or from the press. Independence of thinking has been put under an official ban, and in an attempt to hold some semblance of power the Nanking regime has been forced to adopt the attitude and methods of a ruthless tyrant.

These developments, of course, have given the hostile cliques and factions new and telling propaganda material against the Nanking regime, but in justice to Nanking it must be said that there is grave doubt if at any time moderate or conciliatory policies would have achieved any greater success than has resulted from the ruthless and unscrupulous use of every power available to overthrow and discredit the opposing leaders and factions.

Party statistics show that, after deducting the soldier and overseas members, the Kuomintang's ordinary civilian members of all classes living in China are a distinct minority within their own organization. Moreover, more than a fourth of these resident civilian members live in the southern province of which Canton is the capital. Six provinces boast less than 1000 Kuomintang members each, and one province has none at all.

In spite of this small membership, unequally distributed over the vast area of the country, it would be idle to dispute the fact that the revolutionary movement in China and the stirrings of a nationalistic spirit are largely due to the activities of the Nationalist Party. At one time, particularly when the fervor created by Russian and Communist agents was at its height, the Nationalist Party gave promise of really uniting the thinking portion of the population, but the internal struggles for Party domination have so alienated large blocs that today the supporters of the Nanking regime are probably only a small minority of the total of patriotic and politically conscious people of China. Intolerance of opposition or criticism and a bitter struggle for survival have split the Party to a degree seemingly hopeless. An attempt to monopolize leadership has probably forfeited that leadership, and if the present Nanking regime survives or again attains power after an overthrow, it will, for a long period at least, be merely the military guard-

ian or sponsor of one wing of the revolutionary struggle.

The coalition which launched the desperate military struggle in the early summer of 1930, in a determined effort to overthrow the power of General Chiang Kai-shih, planned on calling a People's Congress in case of victory; but even if this plan is carried out the elements to be represented will be so diverse, and the impossibility of imposing the will of such a Congress upon regional militarists who might disagree with its decisions will be so great as to afford nothing of real promise for an abiding peace.

With General Chiang Kai-shih heading the Nanking Government in its defensive struggle for survival, the principal leaders of the opposition move in the summer of 1930, and their recent affiliations, political and military, may be summed up as follows:

General Yen Hsi-shan, the "Model Governor" of Shansi province, is the titular head of the Northern Coalition, and plans a government with headquarters at Peking. General Yen is an able administrator, and an adroit politician. He is the only survivor of the original provincial revolutionary governors who came to power at the time of the 1911 Revolution. In 1925 he was involved in a brief military conflict with Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, but was given assistance by Marshal Chang Tso-lin. In 1927 he turned against Chang Tso-lin, joined the Nationalists, and was instrumental in the

capture of Peking in 1928. He was a Nanking Cabinet Minister until early in 1929.

Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, erstwhile "Christian General," after being driven out of Peking in 1925 by Marshals Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu, went to Russia and spent seven months there as the guest of the Soviet Republic. He was largely instrumental in effecting the capture of Peking by the Nationalists in 1928, and until February, 1929, was Minister of War in the Nanking Cabinet. In 1929 he left his armies, and sought the protection of Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi province, not to return to active politico-military life until the late spring of 1930. He has denounced General Chiang Kai-shih in unmeasured terms. Feng is more socialistic in his theories than is Yen, and his enemies often accuse him of being in the pay of Russia. During the brief periods of peace he has administered his areas exceptionally well, and has punished sternly all official graft and "squeeze."

Generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi are leaders of the ultra-conservative Kwangsi clique. They, too, were pillars of the Nanking Government during the brief period between the capture of Peking by the Nationalists in June of 1928 and the outbreak of new civil wars in February of 1929. Since then, they have repeatedly attacked Nanking's forces in the area of Canton and elsewhere in South-Central China.

General Chang Fa-kwei, commander of the "Iron-sides" division of troops, is the military chieftain of the extreme Left Wing of the Kuomintang Party, and both he and his civilian backers have been "expelled" from the Party by the Nanking faction. Like others ousted from Kuomintang membership by various "party purifications" conducted by the Nanking regime, they insist that the expulsions were illegal and ineffective. The opening of the 1930 campaign against Nanking found the radical Chang Fa-kwei cooperating with the armies of the ultra-conservatives, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi.

In the far North, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, the head of the Manchurian Government, sat holding the balance of power but refusing to abandon an attitude of watchful neutrality, though he maintained a nominal allegiance to Nanking and flew the Nanking and Kuomintang Party flags. This "Young Marshal" has no reason to love any of the contending leaders in China proper. Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yu-hsiang, and Chiang Kai-shih had combined to drive his father, the late Marshal Chang Tso-lin, from Peking in 1928, so sentiment would not incline him to one side or to the other. Manchuria's best plan seems to be to let the factions in China fight to the point of exhaustion, always watching warily lest one faction or the other win so decisive a victory that it

would become so powerful that it could force Manchuria to give more than lip-service to a possible future central government.

Besides these main leaders, whose names are more or less familiar to the outside world, a swarm of lesser generals played an important part in the politics and strategy of the opening weeks of the 1930 civil war. These men, controlling whole provinces or only a dozen counties, and with armies of from 20,000 to 100,000 men each, all declaimed their loyalty to the Kuomintang Party, and most of them were ready to throw in their lots with the side which could offer the most money or the greatest increase in territory, or were watching with bated breath to see how the tide of battle might turn so that they could announce "loyalty" to the faction which seemed most likely to triumph.

Despite this welter of chaos, many Chinese of pronounced abilities and irreproachable character feel that the Nanking regime has been the best government which China has known since long before the collapse of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911. They admit that it has disappointed both the Chinese people and the rest of the world, in that none of the plans for rehabilitation have been even seriously put under way; but they hold that the character of the men who have been supporting Nanking is proof that the government could have accomplished much for the weal of China had it not been

subjected to continued military attacks the repulse of which consumed all available revenue and forced a war-time rigor of repression upon independence of thought and action.

The Communists, of course, hold widely differing views, as do the adherents to the Left Wing or radical bloc of the Kuomintang Party, which is led by the very able Wang Ching-wei.

Madame Sun Yat-sen, widow of the great revolutionist and founder of the Kuomintang Party, is the able and bitter spokesman of the Left Wing, and her words command immense respect and attention in China, not only because she was known to have been her husband's confidante and helper during many years of his patriotic work, but because her position is one of personal tragedy.

Madame Sun lives in Europe now, spending much of her time in Moscow. She literally fled from China when the radical Hankow regime collapsed in July, 1927, and was succeeded by the Nanking Government. Since then she has been in China for only one brief period—when she returned to her native land in 1929 to attend the removal of her husband's body from its temporary resting place near Peking to the magnificent mausoleum in which it now rests on the outskirts of Nanking.

Madame Sun Yat-sen is a sister of T. V. Soong, the Nanking Minister of Finance. Her youngest sister is

now Madame Chiang Kai-shih, wife of the Nanking generalissimo, and another sister is married to a member of the Nanking Cabinet. Her step-son, Mr. Sun Fo, is Nanking's Minister of Railways. In spite of the strength of these ties, particularly in China where family influence has for centuries been paramount, Madame Sun has refused to become reconciled to the Nanking Government, but instead declares that it has betrayed the principles of the Revolution and has negated much that her late husband accomplished.

In the summer of 1929, soon after the State burial of her famous husband, Madame Sun, then living temporarily in Shanghai, gave out an official interview in which she said, in part, that she had been "harassed by spies and informers" ever since her return to China, and that "family and political pressure" had been exerted in an effort to get her to live in a fine home prepared for her at Nanking, so that the government "might exploit my presence for political advantage."

"Rest assured that no one considers the Nanking Government as representative of the Chinese people," declared Madame Sun, and then she attacked the Nanking party leaders for retaining her name on the Central Executive Committee "as a trade mark, to deceive the public."

When she was asked if she did not note signs of progress, Madame Sun replied:

"I have noticed nothing but the killing of tens of thousands of revolutionary youths who might one day have replaced the rotten officials; nothing but the hopeless misery of the people; nothing but the selfish struggling of militarists for power; nothing but extortions laid upon the already starving masses—in short, nothing but counter-revolutionary activities.

"Do you suppose for one moment that Dr. Sun organized the Kuomintang as a tool for the rich to get still richer and suck the blood of the starving millions of China?"

Directly addressing the governmental leaders at Nanking, Madame Sun continued:

"Who is benefited? Only those of you who ride about in limousines. I demand that you all stop raising your standards of living. It is already too luxurious, and a million times higher than the average person's. Militarists and officials who, a few years ago, I knew to be poor, are suddenly parading about in fine limousines and buying up mansions in the Foreign Concessions for their newly acquired concubines. I ask you, where did the money come from?"

"As for carrying out the program of Dr. Sun, which part of it are Chiang Kai-shih and his assistants carrying out? They have betrayed even his last instructions, to which they render lip-service every day. Does one start to awaken and educate the masses by suppressing their

voices? By suppressing their meetings? By suppressing publications? By suppressing organizations?"

Here is bitterness indeed, and it is part of China's tragedy that her sincere patriots differ so widely that even the Kuomintang, which has set itself the task of establishing a government and of teaching the Chinese how to govern themselves, should be torn into irreconcilable factions.

With bitterness and hatred disrupting the patriots, and venality and hatreds and ambitions determining the shifting policies of many of the military leaders, what chance have the voiceless and unarmed hundreds of millions of the Chinese masses?

Chapter Seven

DISSOLUTION

THE spectacle of a whole people living under conditions which can be best described as being marked by the dissolution not only of law and order and government but even of ancient codes of ethics and morals is tragically depressing. And almost as depressing as the spectacle itself is the fact that the leaders of this people refuse to see or to admit the baleful processes which are under way, and even denounce as "enemies of China" those persons who, actuated by a sense of impending tragedy, seek to warn them of the consequences of a continuation of present trends.


The ordinary traveler who goes to the Orient sees but little of the real China. As a rule, his ship puts in only at Shanghai and at Hongkong—in the former he is likely to see nothing but the foreign-controlled International Settlement and the French Concession, in the latter he sees not China at all, but a British Crown Colony the majority of the inhabitants of which are Chinese.

If the ordinary traveler is venturesome he may go up the Pearl River from Hongkong and see Canton, which

has been largely rebuilt and modernized. He may go northward from Shanghai and see Tsingtao, that admirable little city which the Germans built upon the site of a fishing village. Then he will probably visit Tientsin, and not step outside the Foreign Concessions. In Peking, except for the decaying magnificence of the Forbidden City and the unique and attractive shabbiness of the streets where curios and embroideries are sold, he will probably see little except the area in and around the foreign-controlled Legation Quarter. If he is lucky, he may be invited to the home of a foreigner who lives in a picturesque modernized Chinese house—clean, with wooden floors, plumbing, electric light, and central heating.

If this visitor goes northward from Tientsin and Peking and into Manchuria he will be struck and puzzled by a sharp contrast. He will be in an area which, by comparison with China proper, is abundantly prosperous and hopeful. The reason for this sharp difference is that Japan has announced to all Chinese factions that civil war will not be tolerated in Manchuria—but the tale of Manchuria must be told in another place.

Perhaps the traveler will board an American, British, or Japanese steamer and venture up the Yangtze River as far as Hankow. There, too, he will see little save the foreign-built area, and will enjoy his gin-slings on the spacious veranda of the admirably managed Race Club.



Sun Yat-sen mausoleum at Nanking, where the "founder of the Revolution" is buried. The mausoleum cost \$6,000,000, Mex.



Best type of China's 2,500,000 soldiers

On the way down the river he will probably stop off at the new capital, Nanking, see the new Chung-shan Boulevard, the Sun Yat-sen mausoleum, and the International Club.

But he has not seen the real China. Excluding Manchuria and the new Nanking, he has seen only those cities in China which for many decades have been to a great extent under foreign influence. He will have touched the 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 Chinese who are accustomed to living in or next door to foreign administered areas. But he will know almost nothing of the China where the rest of the 400,000,000 (or is it 480,000,000?) live and toil and suffer. He will have no conception of the extent to which they are misgoverned and oppressed, nor of the degree to which government, as it is known in America and in Europe, has practically ceased to exist over nearly one-eighth of the world's surface.

Chinese sources can tell this tale better than can foreign investigators or authorities. The following examples of China's dissolution were culled from the Chinese press, from Chinese news agencies, and from interviews with Chinese during the year 1929 and the first two months of 1930. This period of only fourteen months included for the Chinese people miseries such as Europe has not known since the Middle Ages.

"The warlords have left us nothing except our eyes,

to weep with," said a Chinese friend after looking over the collection of clippings and notes from which the following summary was made. "They are smashing our bones, to suck out the marrow."

In November, 1929, an official Chinese report made after investigations in Honan province, opens with this striking paragraph:

"For 300 years no such calamity has befallen Honan. It is too deep even for tears. The people live in deep water and hot fire such as outsiders cannot even conceive of."

Detailing conditions that were found in Miench'ih district, the report says that Miench'ih, even before the outbreak of the November civil war, had suffered such continuous raids from mountain bandit gangs that more than 1000 towns and villages had been looted and burned. In these villages more than 5200 people had been slaughtered, more than 10,000 had been carried off into the hills and held for ransom, and more than 40,000 oxen, horses and donkeys had been driven away by the raiders.

"When they capture a person for ransom," continues the report in picturesque Chinese phraseology, "they first pierce his legs with iron wire, and bind them together as fish are hung on a string. When they returned to their bandit dens, the captives were interrogated and were

pricked with sickles to make them tell of hidden property they possessed. If there was the slightest hesitation in answering, they were immediately cut in two at the waist—as a warning to the others. Then they compelled the villagers to disclose where was hidden the little store of grain with which they were trying to eke out an existence. This they carried off, leaving the victims to starve. If any of the adults attempted to escape, the whole family was slaughtered.”

With calm impartiality the report says that the spread of banditry has been due to excessive taxation, civil wars, and prolonged drought. In 1928 the crops were poor. In the spring of 1929 there were no animals left to pull the ploughs, so men and women ploughed as long as their strength permitted. Families sold their children; men sold their wives. Then they took to banditry, rather than starve.

“In many cases in Miench’ih,” the report concludes, “there will be found only eight or ten houses left standing in towns which a year ago had 400 or 450 houses. What has become of the families which once lived in the demolished homes no man can tell.”

Listen now to the official complaint which the magistrate of Hing Tai district, in Hopei province, sent to the provincial authorities of Hopei early in the spring of 1930:

"We have received your telegraphic instructions to commandeer 30 mules. At the same time the Gendarmerie Commander is demanding 81 mules and 30 mule carts. Meanwhile the 41st Division is calling for 70 mules, and the 8th Artillery Regiment wants 80. In addition to this, the 41st Division demands 42 mule carts and 500 wheelbarrows. The people of this small city are so poor that we cannot see how the military can hope to have these of their wishes gratified."

"When Heaven has decided to destroy a people, there is no use trying to save them," says the official report of a Shanghai Chinese relief organization which also investigated conditions in Honan province. This report tells of the raids made by Wang Tien-kwoh, a notorious bandit leader, and of what befell the town of Kwanyin.

"Kwanyin consisted of 400 homes and a population of about 2000 people. After the last raid something over 10 houses were left standing, and the population was reduced to about 500.

"The people saw that life was impossible, and decided to cross the Yellow River northward, and seek shelter in the province of Shansi until times should be better. They marched to the bank of the river and secured a boat in which 200 got across.

"The boat returned, and 300 crowded into it for the

second crossing. But when the craft was in midstream it was seen that the northern bank was lined with soldiers, and these prohibited the starving crowd from landing. The authorities in Shansi had plenty of beggars of their own, and were in no mood to welcome hungry ghosts from Honan.

"The boatmen turned back, but by this time bandits had collected on the southern bank, prepared to rob the poor folk of their clothes and of whatever possessions they might have salvaged from the ruin of their homes.

"The refugees would not permit the boatmen to approach the southern bank, and the soldiers would not permit them to land on the northern bank, and thus the boat dallied in midstream until dusk.

"The wind arose as the sun went down, and the tired helmsman made a wrong move and swung the boat broadside to the swift current. In a moment it went over, and every soul was drowned."

"Bandit suppression" moves are frequently announced by the military, but the Chinese investigators declare that the unpaid soldiers have an agreement with the bandits, and always keep one day's march behind. At stated intervals the bandits leave piles of loot by the paths and roads, and these pay the soldiers for their cooperation.

Letters which reached Shanghai from the interior in February of 1930, written by Chinese pastors and by missionaries, tell appalling tales of the drop in population attributable to civil war, pestilence, Communist raids, and brigandage.

A new census of Hupeh province, which had a population of 28,616,000 in 1925, shows a loss of 4,000,000 people, though there has been no famine in Hupeh in the interval, and little emigration. When the new census figures are analyzed, the loss in population is shown to have taken place entirely in those forty-six *hsien* or counties which have suffered from civil war, brigandage, and Communist uprisings and massacres, often followed by pestilence. The twenty-two counties which have enjoyed peace show undiminished populations, or even slight increases. Pictures sent to Shanghai from Hupeh show the deserted ruins of whole cities.

When the Kuominchun rebels hurriedly evacuated the city of Loyang, in Honan province, in November, 1929, five military hospitals were left filled with seriously wounded soldiers. Native doctors, nurses, and servants decamped in panic before the Nanking Government troops moved in. The latter gave no care to the wounded, but looted the hospitals of foods and drugs, and for three days the wounded men lay with no care of

any kind. As a result typhus fever developed, and spread through the city and surrounding countryside.

After all, it has become an accepted commonplace to hear of large towns and even cities in the interior provinces being raided by bandit gangs, despite the swollen "armies" which are eating the heart out of all the provinces. In the Pearl River Delta region, around Canton, bandit and pirate outrages of an indescribable nature have also become matters of course.

But only within the last year have there been many cases of this kind in the immediate vicinity of Shanghai, or in the area surrounding Shanghai and the seat of government at Nanking.

Most shocking of the raids in this region was the double pillaging and ultimate ruin of the city of Liyang, on Taihu Lake, only forty-five miles south of an important town on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway.

Twice before bandit gangs had raided Liyang, though the city lies supposedly in the heart of the district most firmly controlled from Nanking. But in December of 1929 a well organized bandit gang about 3000 strong conducted a ferocious foray, killing more than 350 men, women, and children, made off with loot worth about \$3,000,000, and by incendiary fires destroyed property worth an additional \$10,000,000.

Liyang is a strongly walled city, and was taken by a ruse. More than 500 of the bandits drifted in by twos and threes, disguised as farmers, and put up at small inns. Late at night these conspirators gathered, overpowered the guards, opened the city gates, and their fellows came swarming into the sleeping and helpless city.

Telegraphic appeals were sent to Nanking, troops were rushed to Liyang, and the bandits were driven out. Two days later they returned in even larger force, drove out the troops, and then completed their terrible work of murder, rapine, looting, and incendiarism. More than two score of the rich gentry were taken away to be held for ransom.

One feature of these raids is that the bandits always carry away with them a large number of the prettiest young girls to be found in every city or village which they raid.

The story of what happens to these victims cannot be told in type, but is indelibly printed upon their faces when the ravished and demented creatures finally wander back to their former homes, or is told in even more ghastly fashion if their mutilated bodies are found in ditches or in the brush before bands of roving dogs have devoured them.

Wutsun, a city on the Chekiang-Kiangsu border, south of Shanghai, also sustained a disastrous bandit raid late in 1929. This gang, estimated at 500 strong, secured \$500,000 in loot, shot down seven men in the street, wounded ten others, carried off four rich men as hostages, and attacked scores of the women and girls with nauseating savagery.

Despairing of receiving any protection from the government, the people of Wutsun district are trying to raise enough money with which to purchase a shallow-draft gunboat, armed with machine guns, to ply back and forth in the canals.

The month of December, 1929, and the first half of January, 1930, saw similar raids on the towns of Waman, Taiho, Yungsin, Lienwha, and Ningkang. At the latter place the bandits killed the chief magistrate by pouring boiling water over him while he lay bound hand and foot in the main street.

With conditions of this kind existing in the vicinity of the capital, and near China's largest and richest seaport, the conditions in the far interior must be far worse.

Take the case of Szechuan, that mighty province lying above the famous Gorges of the Yangtze River, and just east of the mountains of Thibet. Szechuan has a population estimated at 60,000,000, and flies the Nanking flag, but for a long period the province has, in actuality, been

cut up into "zones" by four or five tyrannical satraps.

Listen now to the pathetic petition for deliverance which the people of Chi'ichang district, in Szechuan province, sent to the Nanking Government in September of 1929. With simple dignity the elders recounted:

"For the last thirteen years we have suffered calamities by the act of Heaven and from incessant brigandage, so that we are at the point of despair. We are fighting now for our very existence, for there is nothing left to us but our lives, and to save these we must drive out General Kwoh Ru-tung, this leader of wolves and tigers."

General Kwoh, a Nanking appointee, was the ruler of the Chi'ichang district, and had collected the annual land taxes for six years in advance, had levied eight different taxes against the 1929 grain crops, and had whimsically devised nearly a dozen other special levies. The petition of the elders continues:

"The whole district has been desolated, and some thousands of homes have been robbed and burned. Kwoh's soldiers take food from the people, seize our women, and carry off young and old for ransom.

"East and west, for some tens of li, the bark of a dog or the crow of a cock is not heard any more.

"The water is deep, and the fire is fierce, and there is no way of escape, so the people sigh—as in the ancient ode—that the sun and the moon might perish so they could perish with them."

This petition, which represented 26 towns and villages, closed with a plea that Nanking would forgive the people for rising in rebellion against General Kwoh, who at the time the petition was sent to Nanking was besieged in an old walled city by a mob of more than 5000 frenzied peasants armed with spears, scythes, a few rifles, and eleven machine guns.

The Nanking Government, of course, is utterly helpless in the face of a situation of this kind. It cannot be blamed for being unable to send aid hundreds of miles into the interior, any more than it can be blamed for the asserted fact that General Kwoh was a Nanking appointee. In remote districts like Szechuan these regional generals, keeping a wary eye on the course of events, all "joined the Nationalists" when the Nanking armies captured Peking and Tientsin. There was nothing Nanking could do save accept the proffered allegiances, hope they were sincere, and then "save face" by appointing the new adherents to the offices they already held.

The large city of Changteh, in Hunan province, was prosperous until 1926. Today it is more impoverished than it has been since the Taiping Rebellion, more than half a century ago, and in 1929 it was mulcted so heavily by successive militarists that recovery will be very slow. Today most of the people of Changteh are nearly

destitute, and the surrounding countryside is overrun with bandit gangs.

Five different generals held successive sway in Changteh during 1929, and each of them levied his own "annual taxes" and blandly ignored the tax receipts given by his predecessors.

Early in 1929 General Tan Tao-yuen, who had been well liked by the people, moved up the river to fight General Li Tsung-jen. Before he evacuated the city, however, he levied the customary tribute, "in order to pay arrears of troops."

During his absence General Chao Tuh-pien, formerly a highly successful bandit leader, but now grown respectable, moved in and took over the "protection" of Changteh. He at once demanded \$250,000 in silver coin, declaring that his troops had not been paid for many months, and that if this sum were not forthcoming he would be unable to control his men, and they might loot the city.

Soon after the money was paid over General Chao's army marched out, but at once General Li Yuen-chieh's army marched in. This angered the two preceding ruling generals, Tan and Chao, so they combined forces and laid siege to Changteh.

After a fortnight's siege, General's Chao's men made a breach in the walls, captured the city, and "looted every home and shop" according to Chinese reports.

This done, they made off to the mountains, taking with them hundreds of tons of merchandise, more than \$1,000,000 in cash, about 80 women and girls who have never been heard of since, and 30 wealthy men who were held for ransom.

Early in July of 1929 General Wu Shang's army took over the city without bloodshed. The troops were clean, orderly, well uniformed, and seemed well disciplined. But soon dissension broke out amongst the junior officers of this army. A mutiny seemed likely, so General Wu fled secretly, taking with him his new concubine and considerable treasure which had been wrung from the citizens as "taxes."

Next in succession was General Wang Pei, and there seemed promise of quiet and security, but within a fortnight he was murdered by his own mutinous troops, and Changteh seemed to face the certainty of a new looting.

At this critical juncture General Tai Tao-yun arrived with his army, and since then order has been well maintained. But of course General Tai's men must be paid, so new taxes have been levied to appease the city's new defenders.

Large portions of the populous and once wealthy provinces of Hunan, Hupeh, Kwangsi, Honan, and Fukien provinces have "gone Red," and collectively more than 30,000,000 people in scattered areas now live under

the domination of what are called "Communist bands." In most cases these Communist bands are merely powerful bandit gangs, the leaders of which have picked up a patter of Communist slogans as a result of the scrambled ideas scattered amongst the ignorant coolie soldiers and the illiterate peasants by Russian and Chinese Communist propagandists at the time the Nationalist armies made their first successful northward thrust.

It is in populous Hupeh province, of which Hankow is the capital, that the Communists control most territory, and seem to have worked out something most nearly approaching a political and economic program.

"Suppression of vice" is the principal slogan of the Communist bands of Hupeh, and they are rigorous in suppression of gambling, opium smoking, poppy growing, operation of restricted districts, and other evils which under ordinary administrations are permitted to continue so long as they furnish sufficiently high taxes and "squeeze."

Except for suffering an absolute ban against all forms of religion, the people who submit without resistance to Communist rule are not molested; but the Hupeh Communists not only destroy all idols, temples, churches, and missions, but rigorously punish all persons found guilty of continuing secret worship of any kind.

One Chinese Christian priest was found preaching to

his flock. As a warning to others, the lips of the offender were cut off before he was executed by a rifle squad.

Discipline in these Hupeh Communist bands is reported to be better than in most of China's swollen armies. Looting and rapine are forbidden, and the rich are not mistreated so long as they willingly yield the heavy levies which the Communists assess against them. The poor are favored in every way, and pay no taxes.

Even before they burn the temples and churches, the Hupeh Communists, on capturing a town or city, make haste to destroy all official records and all title deeds. Members of the old regime who are found to have oppressed the very poor are often summarily executed.

When government troops recapture towns or cities from the Communists, they use similar tactics, and summarily shoot down all the residents who are found to have cooperated in any way with the Communists during their period of occupation.

Honan province, which has been trampled over by rival armies literally scores of times since "The Republic" was "founded" in 1912, is probably in worse plight than any other province in China, except famine-stricken Kansu and Shensi.

Honan has an area of 68,000 square miles, and the population has been roughly estimated at 25,000,000. In

this province the Communists operate on a more limited scale, and are vastly outnumbered by bandit gangs, made up in the main of unpaid soldiers who have deserted the various armies. Chinese investigators place the number of organized bandits in Honan at about 400,000.

The once prosperous city of Iyang, in western Honan, changed hands amongst various bandit gangs seventy-two times during the five months preceding March 1st, 1930, and at last accounts was only a starving ruin.

The even larger city of Kunghsien, nearby, has been raided almost as often. Chinese newspapers in Shanghai report that more than 5000 houses and shops have been burnt at Kunghsien, 3000 people carried off for ransom, and 20,000 head of livestock driven away. There are no available statistics touching upon the number of victims of successive massacres.

In Honan province, despite the fact that fully one-fifth of the 2,500,000 soldiers under arms in China today are concentrated in that one province, bandits and Communists control most of the area except a narrow belt along both sides of the two railways, and even so they often raid into the railway zones, carry off station masters, or tear up the rails in order to wreck troop trains.

Southwest Kwangsi province has become so dangerously "Red" that France has officially closed the border,

lest Communism spread into Tongkin and French Indo-China.

In northern Kiangsu province, stone turrets two and a half stories high, liberally loopholed and crenellated at the top, are becoming a commonplace feature of the landscape. These turrets, built by farmers and villagers, are used as lookouts against bandits, and also as towers of refuge and defence during raids.

From the summit of a small hill, just on the outskirts of the city of Haichow, in Kiangsu, more than 200 such turrets may be counted without the aid of glasses. Most of the well-to-do of this region have been massacred by the bandits, or have moved to the safety of foreign-controlled areas at places like Hankow or Shanghai. The few missionaries who have returned to that district, after being driven out by the Nationalist armies, live in mud huts. They dare not repair their former homes, lest such rehabilitation act as a lure and bring about new bandit raids.

When the old walled city of Chochow, only thirty-eight miles southwest of Peking, underwent the horrors of a siege of more than eighty days in the winter of 1928-29, a frightful record of horror was piled up for the 100,000 residents.

Toward the end of the siege, when mothers were strangling their newborn babes because the food was

gone and their withered breasts gave no milk, the defenders permitted a large portion of the civilian population to leave the city.

A relief camp was established nearby, but this swarmed with the Chinese equivalent to "white slavers," who sometimes paid as much as five dollars in silver for hunger-wasted young girls who gave promise of being pretty when once they had been fattened a little.

In city after city all over the interior of China conditions exist similar to those in Chengtu, the capital of Szechuan province, where the merchants sent to their military dictator a petition against further taxation which said: "We have nothing left but the grease between our bones."

The fact that the foregoing instances are typical of what is happening all over China is well known to the chanceries and Foreign Offices of the world. Consuls all over China report these things as they occur, and the Legations in Peking have files of reports on internal conditions of the country which would almost make stone Buddhas weep.

With millions of people on the line of starvation, several tens of millions normally underfed; with 2,500,000 men in the roving armies and other hundreds of thousands openly practising banditry; with millions under

“Communist” domination—what does the rest of the world do?

For one thing it listens complacently to phrases which are meaningless, like “the great ground-swell of Chinese Nationalism,” “the right of every people to work out its own destiny,” “the territorial integrity of China,” “meeting China’s legitimate aspirations half-way,” and “the progress of our Sister Republic.”

Mere humanitarianism, it would seem, would prompt the rest of the world, after nineteen years of watching and waiting, to decide that if China cannot help herself, the time has arrived when she must be helped.

Long ago the German Kaiser rattled his sabre, and talked about “The Yellow Peril.” Today the Yellow Peril is more than tinged with Red, and a selfish continuation of the “hands off China” policy has become a sophisticated cruelty to tens of millions of miserable human beings, most of whom would welcome any hands that came to succor them in kindness. More than that, this “hands off China” policy has become a terrible danger to those who practise it, for if China, goaded by misgovernment, goes down into convulsions of ruin all of Asia will be shaken.

The savings of generations of thrift have been wasted during the last nineteen years, and hopes nourished for almost two decades are turning to cynical despair.

Let China work out her own salvation?

By all means, if she can do so.

But what about permitting China to be driven into national ruin because her problems are of such a size and such a nature that she cannot solve them herself?

Honestly faced, this question cannot be answered with glib self-complacency, nor with hackneyed phrases about the "right to self-determination."

Chapter Eight

FAMINES AND OPIUM

FAMINES, wars, and pestilences, the atrocious correctives to over-population, have been busily at work in China for the last two decades, and with these three interlocking causes of widespread distress opium is now closely linked. But despite four agencies destructive to human life, three of which have a deteriorating effect upon morals and ethics, it is doubtful if China's population is decreasing.

Certain provinces and selected areas today support far fewer people than they did when the "Republic" was founded, but the tremendous increase in population in Manchuria, and the immense fecundity of the people, working unchecked in those areas which are comparatively well ordered, will probably offset the losses in afflicted zones.

What would happen to the rest of the world under the pressure of a population which would expand as China's population would expand under conditions of peace, plenty, and sanitation, is a grave problem. It will probably take a century or more to appreciably educate even the coastal provinces away from the system of an-

cestor worship, which results in making large families not only desirable but, from a religious standpoint, indispensable.

Statistics in China are, with rare exceptions, only guesses—sometimes stupid, sometimes shrewd. But the most generally accepted statistics announce that the average Chinese woman bears nine children. Today infant mortality is very large, and the death rate in China, excluding the figures attributable to famines and wars, is extraordinarily high. The rate at which the population will increase when peace and sound administration come, and during the period which must lie between the establishment of these conditions and the education of the masses away from the ideal of large families, is only one of the phases of the China situation which must cause grave concern to the rest of the world.

There are what may be termed two "schools of thought" on this question. One, with an air of vast detachment, urges that China be left alone and be permitted to continue the process of committing national suicide, because an orderly, well governed China would increase in population at such a rate that it would press too hard upon the rest of the world. The other, admitting a combination of humanitarian and selfish motives, urges that China should have the assistance of the rest of the world in order to end the intolerable conditions under which most Chinese live, and declares that an

orderly China is not only an insurance against Communism in Asia, but will also help in bringing prosperity to the industrial nations of America and Europe.

The American Red Cross Commission, headed by Colonel E. P. Bicknell, which investigated famine conditions in China in the summer of 1929 at the request of President Hoover, found it almost impossible to differentiate between "famines due to natural causes" and famines brought about by man-made causes, or by an unhappy combination of both.

China, as a nation, is not now, and has not been for many decades, short of foodstuffs. But China, as a nation, has been so backward in developing modern forms of transportation, and her militarists have been so busy monopolizing or destroying those which have been constructed on Chinese soil by foreign capital that periodically immense areas of the country experience food shortages which bring periods of undernourishment to an unusually large proportion of the inhabitants of those areas, and death from actual starvation to uncounted tens of thousands.

This brings about the somewhat absurd situation that while professional tub-thumpers are busy appealing to the American people for famine relief funds for people actually dying of starvation in Kansu or Shensi, Szechuan or Shansi provinces, Manchuria may be exporting large quantities of grains raised in the temperate zone,

while South China is profiting by the export of rice.

Questions of relief projects for China are nearly always debatable, and of late have been not only briskly but even rancorously debated by advocates of sane policies and groups swayed by sentiment.

One side will declare that the rest of the world must give freely to help this suffering people who cannot help themselves. The other side insists that it is folly to send money or to ship food to a country which, in actuality, is not suffering from a food shortage, but which spends hundreds of millions of dollars annually upon civil wars—civil wars which disrupt the operation of railways and make it impossible to send grain in quantities into the isolated areas which need grain.

By an odd and ironical coincidence it is usually those who chant most loudly about "helping this people who cannot help themselves," who insist most vehemently that the responsible governments of the world should treat as an equal the so-called "Government of the Republic of China," which cannot maintain a sufficient degree of order within the borders of China to make possible the provisioning of its own starving millions.

The Chinese people in general have a curiously detached attitude toward these famines which are so frequently recurrent as to be almost continuous. Perhaps this is only natural, for it has been estimated that even

when there is no famine in China fully 2,000,000 Chinese die annually from starvation. Hunger is a natural thing in a country where the average man lives on so small a margin between well-being and want that the margin may be wiped out in a day.

Typically illustrative of the Chinese detachment of view on this question is the attitude adopted by a Chinese millionaire of Shanghai who, a few years ago, was a member of a Famine Relief Committee organized by foreigners of that port to relieve a famine in a portion of Kiangsu province.

The Committee met, scanned available statistics, and decided to appeal to the American public for several million dollars. One hard-headed American then arose and suggested that the response from America would be more ready if it could be shown that the Chinese people in China's largest and wealthiest city were doing something to help their own countrymen. He then turned toward the millionaire Chinese member of the committee, and asked him to head the list of local Chinese subscribers.

This wealthy and cultured gentleman rose to his feet and shocked the sentimentalist present by announcing that he would give nothing.

"In this province," he said, "two million people may die of hunger if relief is not forthcoming. And yet, in

this densely over-populated area, the births this year will exceed the normal number of deaths by more than two millions."

The enthusiasm of the Famine Relief Committee collapsed like a ripped balloon, and in that particular instance the American public was not appealed to for funds.

It is difficult to read about conditions in a famine-stricken region, and then to shrug the shoulders and say "Let them die." It is almost impossible to travel through a famine-stricken area and then decide that foreign aid is inadvisable.

And yet—

In the early spring of 1928 there was a famine in Shantung. The American public was being asked to give money to help feed the hungry. Into Tsinanfu, the capital of Shantung, more than 28,000 refugees from the famine districts had trooped for shelter. They camped in the ravines and gullies near the city—camped in little pup tents made of woven straw, and slept on the bare ground despite the cold winds which brought alternate snow squalls and drenching showers. Once each day each of these 28,000 wretches was given one bowl of hot millet gruel, salted but made without the addition of meat or vegetables.

Marshal Chang Tsung-chang was then governor of Shantung province, which numbered at that time a pop-

ulation of nearly 30,000,000 people. And even while these 28,000 people shivered in rags at the gates of his capital, Chang Tsung-chang was host at a great banquet, given to celebrate the installation of a \$50,000 central heating system in his spacious *yamen*. At that banquet the guests were served on a dinner set of cut glass—a special order from Belgium which had cost \$40,000.

There was no actual shortage of food in Shantung as a whole, and at that time rice was cheaper in the not distant Yangtze Valley than for ten years. But there had been no rains in a portion of the province the summer before, and crops had been bad the year before that. Then Chang Tsung-chang's tax gatherers descended upon the drought-stricken areas. The people had no money. Their grain reserves were taken in lieu of cash, and when they had not sufficient grain reserves the soldiers tore from their mud houses the wooden beams and roof-trees—for wood is worth money in China. Whole villages were abandoned, their roofless houses standing open to the skies, and it was money wrung from these people which paid for that central heating plant and for that cut glass dinner service.

Chang Tsung-chang became an exile in Japan. He was driven out by the Nationalist armies. But today many of the peasants wish he were back in power, and sigh for "the good old days" when taxes, while a terrific burden, were not so high as they are now.

Under conditions of this kind the sending of foreign aid is tantamount to a direct intervention in China's internal affairs. Had Chang Tsung-chang continued in power, and had conditions not been alleviated by aid from abroad, the day would surely have come when a desperate and frenzied people would have arisen against him. Giving money to famine relief funds to be used in areas misgoverned in this way is not entirely an act of mercy to feed the hungry; in a very real sense it is giving money to subsidize such rascals and to keep them in power, for every temporary alleviation of the situation serves merely to postpone the day when the Chinese people, goaded to action, will finally rise against oppressive misgovernment and vicious exploitation.

And yet, if they are left to suffer until they revolt, they may "go Red!"

In the coastal areas the cost of relieving distress is almost absurdly cheap. In Peking, for instance, where the Salvation Army usually keeps about 35,000 people alive all winter by giving them each one bowl of gruel a day, the cost runs only to 53 cents, Chinese money, to feed 30 persons for 30 days. This includes grain, salt, and cooking fuel, and the daily ration per person is seven ounces of dry grain made into gruel.

But in the remote famine areas costs of relief are much greater. In Shensi province, in the autumn of 1929, wheat which normally sells there for \$8 Chinese money per

measure of 133 pounds, had risen to \$60 for 133 pounds. Shensi was repeatedly isolated during 1929 by the cutting of the railways by various warring militarists.

In the far western part of Kansu province transportation costs had risen to prohibitive figures. Oxen, horses, and mules had all been either driven off by the military or by bandits, or had been eaten. In the region of the city of Lanchow it cost \$70 to transport 1200 pounds of grain a distance of only 80 miles.

What wonder, under conditions of this kind, that the caravan route over the Lupan Shan mountains in this region has been renamed "The Road of Death"? This caravan route crosses the divide at a height of 9000 feet, and investigators report that in the autumn of 1929 it was strewn with the unburied corpses of people who had died of weakness and starvation while endeavoring to make their way afoot to districts which still had food.

In Sianfu, the large capital city of Shensi, conditions were so bad in October of 1929 that foreign famine relief workers held a meeting and decided that thenceforward they would give food only to those who seemed strong enough to live through the winter. There was not food enough for all, and it was agreed that it would be wrong to feed the weak and sick and failing people whose lives, at best, could be prolonged for only a few days or weeks.

Yet in the face of these conditions the Red Cross Com-

mission, in the Bicknell report, had the courage to recommend that no assistance be given to China famine sufferers. This recommendation was made at the end of one of the most succinct and incisive summaries of China's chaotic condition which has ever appeared in print, and naturally drew the fire of all the sentimentalists and visionaries who, year after year, have imagined that China was about to "settle down" and prosper under a stable government.

The Bicknell report, as a result, at once became a political document of first importance, and for a time gave promise of goading the Nanking authorities into making some kind of competent efforts toward bettering conditions, or even toward bringing about a cessation of civil strife so that China's "face" might be saved before the world.

Unhappily for China, half a year after the report had been made public Nanking had still done almost nothing to feed her own hungry, and the prospects of internal peace remained as remote as ever. The concrete results of the report have been that Chinese anti-foreignism is a little more accentuated than before, that future investigation commissions that may visit China will find themselves seriously hampered, and that a section of the American people is better informed about China than they were before.

"Don't try to give the American people the whole truth about China in one dose," advised one of the most astute critics of Far Eastern affairs. "In the first place they wouldn't believe you, and in the second place their stomachs are too weak."

The Red Cross report, though it aroused the resentment of most of the Chinese press, and of all the Chinese politicians, was welcomed by most of the foreign language press of China as a timely and courageous document. Editorially most of the foreign language newspapers in China urged the Nanking Government to face the facts of the case, and try to remedy domestic conditions. They pointed out the folly of Nanking insisting that extraterritorial rights be surrendered to a government which, according to an official report of the world's greatest humanitarian organization, was powerless to protect its own nationals from starvation caused by military extortion and the other factors of bad administration which had brought famine conditions upon millions of people.

Mr. Hu Han-min, one of the pillars of the Nanking regime, denounced the Red Cross in unmeasured terms, but brought out no facts to controvert its findings. His conclusion was that the report was "evidence that the Imperialists do not want the Revolution to be a success."

In reality the report accomplished a signal service, be-

cause it tore aside the deceptive cloak made by the Propaganda Department at Nanking to disguise the real conditions in China.

One Chinese-owned and edited periodical had the courage to observe: "It is impossible for Chinese to deny the disgraceful conditions indicated in the American Red Cross report, which declares that foreign aid is not warranted because of lack of a stable government, exactions of warlords, banditry, and confiscatory taxation.

"If the report can stimulate the Chinese Government towards devoting its energy to reforming the present political situation and taking vigorous action to relieve famine, instead of squandering millions on petty private civil wars, one may expect not only a diminishment of the perennial famine horror, but also a raising of the morale of the whole Chinese people."

While some Chinese newspapers denounced the "impudence" of the report, none could deny the truth of its summary of conditions, and *The China Times*, a Chinese language daily published in Shanghai, frankly admitted that: "Inconsistencies and contradictions abound, and from a foreigner's viewpoint our militarists are as despotic as ever, our bandits as rampant, illegal and harsh taxes as numerous, and our people as poor and our finances as exhausted as before. Is there anything in which we can conscientiously point to an improvement?"



"Home" of famine victims, under a bridge



Fleeing from a Shantung village before the approach of an army

Inextricably bound up with the question of famine is the question of the cultivation of poppies and the widespread use of opium, usually with governmental toleration and often with official connivance and encouragement.

Not only does the use of the drug tend to the impoverishment of the users, and thereby reduce tens of thousands to the actual borderline of want, but the devotion of very large areas to the growth of the opium poppies materially decreases the total food production of the country, and in many areas has contributed directly to the bringing about of famine conditions.

Of course the opium question leads back, as do all questions in China, to the institution of militarism, for when taxes levied by militarists become so high that it is no longer profitable to raise food crops, the harassed peasants plant poppies, and in some districts are ordered by the warlords to devote specific percentages of their soil to poppy growing because such land must pay higher taxes than land devoted to other crops.

At one time China had the opium evil well under control, though never near eradication. Today the opium production is as large as ever before in the history of the country, if not materially larger.

A few years ago in many districts mercenary peasants risked planting poppies in alternate rows with rows of grain—then, if officials investigated and forced destruc-

tion of the poppies, the peasants would still have half a crop.

In 1930 in many areas whole valleys are planted with poppies. In Anhui province this evil is particularly acute. Official "suppression" measures end abruptly after opium farms have been taxed \$200 in Chinese money for every area equal to an English acre, and even this levy leaves the growers a magnificent profit if soldiers, acting as "suppression agents," do not confiscate (and then sell) the harvest.

Though at Geneva and elsewhere Chinese apologists are loud with mendacious denunciations of other nations as being responsible for the present drug addiction of an enormous percentage of the population, the truth appears inadvertently even in an occasional official report.

For instance, the Provincial Commissioner of Finance of Hupeh province, with headquarters at Hankow, in an official summary of income for September, 1929, showed that two-thirds of the tax collections in Hupeh for that month came from opium. Total revenues for that month were about \$3,000,000, of which, among others, the wine and tobacco tax yielded \$50,000, the salt tax \$50,000, the stamp tax \$60,000, and the opium tax nearly \$2,000,000.

In Hankow, when the provincial government was hard pressed for money, twenty-four of the largest opium dealers agreed, in September of 1929, to contrib-

ute \$130,000 a month for one year for a joint monopoly of the trade, and for a guarantee against "squeeze" from corrupt officials. Besides these regular large-scale dealers, in Hankow alone there were then 714 known "divans" where opium was openly retailed to the smoking public, according to the *W'uban Pao*, a Chinese newspaper published there which has had the temerity to criticize officialdom.

Szechuan province, far to the west, raises a very large quantity of opium, all of which must come down through the Yangtze River gorges in order to reach Hankow, Shanghai, and other great cities in the plain. In September of 1929 the Chinese press of Shanghai boldly denounced the manner in which this drug traffic was made to yield a large tax revenue.

The Opium Suppression Bureau, it was charged, operates with the assistance of soldiers and civilian officials appointed by the military governor of Ichang, the city at the termination of the gorges. These soldiers and civilian officials conduct a rigorous search of all cargo from Szechuan, but permit discovered opium to be forwarded on its way when a tax of \$750 per picul has been paid either in cash or in the drug itself at current wholesale prices. A picul is 133 pounds. Opium confiscated by the Opium Suppression Bureau is not destroyed, but is also sold down river.

In remote Kweichow province caravans of donkeys

laden with opium are a common sight, and the fact that the traffic enjoys official protection is attested by the invariable presence of guards of provincial troops which accompany the caravans in order to prevent bandits from grabbing the profitable drug. In most cities in Kweichow opium smoking establishments brazenly hang out plainly worded signs, and except for the visits of the tax collectors these places know no official interference.

From the Canton area, in South China, to the banks of the Sungari River, near the Manchurian-Siberian border, poppies are openly cultivated; and all over China opium yields a series of taxes which, in the aggregate, must amount to a staggering total.

The peasant who grows the poppies pays special taxes; taxes are collected when the seeds are sold; the man who manufactures the opium meets new official levies; the wholesaler must pay a heavy tax; the man who operates an opium smoking establishment pays his special tax per month for every pipe in his place, and finally the unfortunate addict is usually fined with regularity.

Sir Cecil Clementi, governor of Hongkong until early in 1930, declared in a public address that "opium smoking in China can be stopped within six months or a year of the time that China stops growing opium," and this statement is undoubtedly true, for with no domestic crop to draw upon the price of the drug would be so

high that only the rich could afford to continue the habit.

Because it is the fashion to blame foreigners and the "unequal treaties" for all of China's ills, Chinese delegates to the League of Nations are much given to declaring that China is drug-enslaved because of narcotics smuggled into China in foreign ships which put into the Foreign Concessions. They declare, with vehemence, that most of this traffic is handled by foreigners who are immune from prosecution because of their extraterritorial status.

It cannot be denied that in the Foreign Concessions there is some illicit traffic in morphine, cocaine, heroin, and other drugs, but for every grain of these drugs introduced into China through these foreign channels, there are probably 100 pounds of opium grown by Chinese on Chinese soil with the tolerance and to the profit of Chinese officialdom.

What can be done for these hundreds of millions of human beings who have had the misfortune to be born in China during this generation? Their own officials are not only impotent to relieve them from death by starvation, but by misgovernment and civil wars have created conditions of improverishment difficult for the rest of the world to comprehend, and then, in order to continue their meaningless feuds, connive at debauching them with habit-forming drugs.

If the rest of the world tries to help these people the cry of "imperialistic aggression" will be raised anew, and smouldering anti-foreignism will quickly be fanned into a flame. If the rest of the world continues its "hands off China" policy the eventual result will probably be bankruptcy or Communism.

And if the rest of the world helps the Chinese people to peace and prosperity, doing away with the wars, famines, pestilences, and drugs, the Chinese people will probably breed so rapidly that they will constitute a menace to the nations that have saved them.

Chapter Nine

PROPAGANDA AND PRESS

BECAUSE considerations of "face" have for hundreds of years played an important part in Chinese life, it is only natural that the Chinese should prove adept at political propaganda, both at home and abroad. And it is only natural that the Nationalist movement, during the days of the Kuomintang-Russian alliance, should have greatly benefited by the combination of Chinese adroitness at making things seem other than they are and the well-developed Russian system of political propaganda.

China's geographical isolation, the immensely high word-rate for cable transmission of press dispatches out of China, and the willing assistance of many foreigners in the deliberate attempt to deceive the rest of the world—these all have combined to the easy upbuilding in America and in Europe of a dangerous misconception of conditions in China, of the effect of those conditions upon the social and economic life of the Chinese people and upon China's relations with the rest of the world.

Some of China's diplomatic representatives abroad have not scrupled to sponsor interpretations of the trend of events which have been of an astonishing mendacity;

money has been freely used by the Nanking Government in its efforts to influence the writing and publication of favorable "news," and iron methods of repression have been employed against individuals and against publications which have refused to join in the attempt to hoodwink foreign publics or which have boldly published the truth about China's domestic affairs.

However, the inevitable trend of events in China has given the lie to the propaganda, has made the paid and volunteer propagandists appear foolish in the eyes of the rest of the world, and has disillusioned the publics of America and Europe which had been only too willing to believe that China was unified and was well on the way to the development of a stable government which could and would initiate rehabilitation measures on a large scale.

The Nanking Government has ample justification for the maintenance of a censorship, for almost constantly it has been beset with civil wars and rebellions of grave importance. Nanking has justification, too, for resentment against a portion of what is known as the "die-hard" foreign language press in China; for the publication on Chinese soil, under protection of foreign laws, of newspapers or periodicals which adopt a haughty air of superiority and can see no good in the Chinese people naturally wounds the pride and arouses the bitter anger of those in authority.

But there is no case on record of Nanking taking repressive measures against a man or a newspaper because of publication of the position or strength of an army, the results of a battle, or the plans for a campaign. The things that arouse Nanking's ire are critical reports of existing conditions, intimations that all is not peace and harmony in the country or in the Nationalist Party, or frank reviews of the extent to which bribes of cash or position are used in order to maintain the Nanking regime in its precarious hold upon a few of China's many provinces.

Accounts of governmental inaction in the face of famines, or the unmasking of misleading propaganda designed to secure modifications of treaties—these are unforgivable sins, as are warnings to the people abroad to take Nanking's versions of events with more than a pinch of salt, or intimations that the time is still far distant when foreign capital can be put into China with any degree of safety. Criticisms of the ideology of the Nationalist Party is also held unpardonable.

There is no list available of the many Chinese newspapers which have been denied the use of the mails, or have been confiscated since the "unification" of the country in 1928, but postal bans have been declared against four foreign language newspapers in that period. The British owned *North China Daily News* of Shanghai and the *Peking and Tientsin Times* have both incurred the

wrath of the powers that be at Nanking, and two American-owned papers, the *Evening Post* of Shanghai and the *Star* of Tientsin have both been denied the mails for weeks on end.

During the same period deportation proceedings against six American newspaper correspondents have been up for discussion at Nanking. Four of the cases were dropped, in two cases the correspondents were put under a "social ban" and denied access to government officials. In one of these two cases a note was sent to the American Minister demanding deportation, and the telegraph privileges of this correspondent were cancelled by official order.

Even in the matter of its own attempt to strangle freedom of expression the Nanking Government indulges in misleading propaganda, and now plans upon an immediate and grand scale expansion of its determined efforts to bamboozle the rest of the world.

"The principle of absolute freedom of the press will be observed," declared an official statement issued at Nanking in September, 1929, by the Central Executive Committee of the Nationalist Party, that irresponsible body above the law which holds absolute power over the government. The attempts to muzzle the press and to punish individuals and newspapers which had been bold enough to tell the truth about the situation had put Nanking on the defensive—hence the serious weighing

of the whole problem by the Central Executive Committee.

The declaration of "the principle of absolute freedom of the press" was, however, saddled with a rider which qualified the announcement by specifying that in times of military emergency and in areas under martial law "censorship is justifiable." This left matters precisely as they were before, and since that September declaration, issued as a sop to public opinion abroad, there has been no mitigation of official intolerance of the truth. The official order about "freedom of the press" also specifies that "no newspapers, periodicals or news agencies will be allowed to carry on reactionary propaganda or to maliciously attack the Central Government."

In practice this works out to mean that all news which is not Nanking's own version of affairs is listed as either "reactionary propaganda" or a "malicious attack."

Within two months of issuing this "freedom of the press" pronouncement, official spokesmen of the government had indiscreetly revealed their true attitude toward freedom of any kind of expression.

Early in October the government created consternation in all provincial and city branch headquarters of the Nationalist Party by issuing a mandate which declared that all suggestions, criticisms, or new views upon political questions must first be submitted to the "central authority at Nanking" before they might be published

or even publicly discussed. "Disobedience of the order will be severely punished," concluded the warning.

The fact that this order aroused a storm of objections, particularly from party branches in North China, which even then had begun to abhor Nanking's high-handed domination, did not deter the Nanking leaders from endeavoring to enforce it rigidly. This oligarchic attempt to make all party members voiceless workers who could only carry out the ideas and orders of the Nanking leaders gave Nanking's enemies new strength by lending a show of justice to their charges that Nanking was becoming tyrannical in the highest degree.

Two weeks after this order had begun to excite feverish opposition from within the party itself, Mr. Hu Han-min, one of the powerful Nanking leaders, denounced the tendency of party branches to independence of speech and thought, and declared in a public address:

"As a matter of fact, I believe that by joining the Kuomintang Party in China, a man voluntarily undertakes and agrees to limit his freedom of speech."

In mid-November Mr. Yeh Tsu-chwang, director of the Publicity Department of the Central Committee in Nanking, made an official public speech designed to warn foreign language newspapers published in China, as well as newspapers published abroad, against criticising the actions or the policies of the Nanking Government. This dignitary said:

"In a word, our Party cannot tolerate reactionary criticism, and the Government will not hesitate to act if the foreign press indulges in attacks upon China and the Chinese people."

Mr. Yeh insisted that the Nanking Government expects only two things from the press—the circulation of "reliable and accurate news, and well-intentioned criticisms based upon facts."

"Even when the Government commits an error of judgment, the newspapers should go behind the act and offer sympathetic criticisms. The Government is ever ready to welcome and adopt proposals made in a sincere spirit. If, however, a newspaper attacks the Government at every conceivable opportunity, without rime or reason, the authorities will not hesitate to take action against it.

"Let us ask ourselves if our brethren in foreign countries enjoy any freedom of the press? Not only are they not allowed to comment on foreign affairs in their papers, but they are even denied the right of defending their own national rights."

Mr. Yeh then warned Chinese-owned newspapers published in America, in Europe, and in the Straits Settlements that Nanking will "curb" them if they "try to discredit the Government." The conclusion of this diatribe was remarkable, for he ended by saying:

"Our late Chairman (Dr. Sun Yat-sen) used to say

that only the revolutionary masses are entitled to the enjoyment of popular rights. At the time we thought this represented too narrow a conception of popular rights, but now we think it is correct in every respect."

This high-handed policy of permitting only the Nanking leaders to think for the whole Nationalist Party, as well as for the rest of China, has done much to alienate the students and the "Young China" element, and has materially forwarded the processes of disintegration within the Party which were begun when disillusion began to have a palsyng effect upon the enthusiasm of supporters.

In January of 1930 the Central Political Council at Nanking authorized the immediate founding of an International Propaganda Bureau, which will work in harmony with the proposed international news service and will have its principal offices in Shanghai, New York, and London. Large appropriations for this work are recommended, and expensive staffs of "news" and publicity experts will be maintained.

Nanking announces that the purposes of these organizations will be "to combat reactionary propaganda," and to tell the rest of the world the truth about the progress of the Nationalist movement in China.

But what will be the use of spending huge sums of money to tell the rest of the world that all is peace and unity and harmony in China when half a dozen

rebellions and mutinies convulse the country every year, and when the formal annual reports of the Ministry of Finance reveal that military expenses of the Nanking Government total almost ten times as much as all civil and administrative expenses combined? Why declare to the world in one breath that reconstruction has actually been begun, and then in the next breath tell the rest of the world that 20,000,000 or 40,000,000 Chinese must starve to death unless foreign aid is forthcoming?

The *Shanghai Evening Post*, American-owned daily newspaper, late in January of 1930 published the following caustic editorial comment on this ambitious propaganda scheme:

The public, both here and abroad, is being led into the position of doubting every statement made by prominent Chinese or by Chinese organizations. Why? Because the public has learned, to its cost, and to China's cost, that 50 per cent of such statements are false publicity.

It is a patent conclusion that no government should stoop to the practices of an unscrupulous publicity agent. If a government needs its side of a controversy brought to the attention of the public, it should see that its responsible officials have contact with the public or with the press at frequent intervals.

Newspapers which in all honesty of purpose have published their views on matters of public welfare have been barred from the mails in China and ruthlessly censored. The Government seems intent upon having only its own voice heard.

The step is a false one. It arouses the suspicion that the Government has an interest in suppressing the truth—and this arouses in advance a distrust of all statements which may issue from an official propaganda bureau.

The high tide of success for the propagandists was probably seen in the winter and early spring of 1929. In February of that year, for instance, Mr. T. V. Soong, Finance Minister at Nanking, announced that conditions were sufficiently stabilized to justify large foreign investments both in government bonds and in industrial enterprises in China. Mr. Sun Fo followed this with the declaration that China would at once begin the construction of 20,000 miles of railways and of 10,000 miles of modern motor roads.

Yet even when these statements were made, Nanking knew it would have to fight the Kwangsi clique for possession of the Hankow area before the end of the next month, and frantic efforts were then being made to finance the inevitable campaign.

Mr. Sun Fo followed this with an announcement of a preposterous program under which China was to raise \$500,000,000 a year for the next 50 years for "reconstruction schemes"—\$200,000,000 from government appropriations, \$200,000,000 from foreign loans, and \$100,000,000 from domestic loans.

But even while one Nanking portfolio holder announced these grandiose schemes, another portfolio

holder was warning the country that even without any wars in 1930 the government faced the certainty of a minimum deficit for the year of \$60,000,000, and that the deficit could be held to that minimum only if half the armies were disbanded within three months!

Half a year before this, the then Minister of Communications, Mr. Wang Peh-chun, solemnly announced to the world a "General Plan on Communications," which it would have required hundreds of millions of dollars and years of work to carry out. Amongst other projects this "General Plan" included: \$10,000,000 "for developing the National Long Distance Telephone"; building 77 radio broadcasting stations, and establishing a factory to make all necessary equipment; building 60 locomotives, 150 passenger cars, and 1300 freight cars; the establishment of a far-flung air service, including even Urga, the capital of Mongolia, where Chinese are not permitted; equipping all railways with heavier rails, replacing wooden railway ties with steel ties; the improvement of all navigable streams, and the spending of \$15,000,000 on a national shipbuilding plant.

Then the Nanking Government formally adopted what was called "an enlightened scheme for the housing and assistance of the poor." With a great flourish it was announced that on the outskirts "of every city or town in China" a large tract of land would be secured to be used as a commons for the poor. Around this commons


were to be built modest but sanitary houses which were to be rented to the poor at such low figures that comfort and decency would be within the reach of all.

Proper sanitation, education of the children of the poor, the founding of an amusement district near every commons, and the provision of land for communal gardening and the pasturage of domestic animals were all included in the scheme.

"Orders" were sent from Nanking, it was announced to the foreign press, to the heads of all provincial governments and to the mayors and magistrates of all towns and cities, that these plans were to be "carried out at once."

To those who have had no experience of China there might seem to be something of worthy pathos in a public official of a penniless government issuing orders of this kind—particularly when that government at the moment controlled only four of the twenty-two provinces which make up what is called "China."

But schemes of this kind are not the result of pathetic and visionary dreams of patriots. They are concocted and spoonfed to the rest of the world for two specific purposes—to make the people of America and Europe believe that China is a nation with a responsible government which should no longer be held to "unequal treaties," and with the hope that propaganda of this kind will bring foreign money to China.



How Canton's boat families live. Many of them do not change their "addresses" for years, but are always to be found at the same tying place at night



Since, fortunately, most peoples are more practical about their pennies than they are about politics, the attempt to allure foreign capital to China has proved an utter failure; but there is no doubt but that the propaganda about the surrender of extraterritoriality and other "special privileges" has been in large measure successful, and it is probable that today a majority of Americans and Britons think their governments are wilful and stubborn in clinging to treaty provisions which were once necessary, but in "changed China" are now an insult to Chinese national aspirations.

Mendacious propaganda of this kind has been going on for many years, and for a long time there was no effort to debunk Chinese publicity. Disintegration was under way at an accelerating rate even while the rest of the world was convinced that conditions in China were on the mend, and for some years people who viewed the situation sanely could not get a hearing but were classed as "old fogies."

Consider, for instance, the following quotation:

In reconstructing her government on the principle of sovereignty vested in the people as a body, China has thrown autocracy overboard, and is putting her house in order under the aegis of democracy.

That is not a sample of the propaganda of 1928 nor of 1929; it is an abstract from an address which was made in 1918 by Dr. Wellington Koo, when he was China's

Minister to the United States. And yet neither before nor since then has any Chinese ever participated in the election of a government official, except when he has helped to choose the minority Chinese membership of some of the Municipal Councils in the Foreign Concessions of China. Dr. C. C. Wu, the present Minister to Washington, is often equally careless of facts.

And then carefully consider this:

Since the establishment of the Republic, all the officials of the country have been fulfilling their administrative and judicial functions, and commerce and industry have been resumed with added eagerness and enterprise.

Every branch of civil life has been, or is being, reconstituted or modified to accord with the new national spirit. The people as a whole are pleased with the government they have ordained, because even in the short space of a twelve-month, that government has demonstrated its honesty, its efficiency, and its loyalty to national ideals.

Besides, the form of republicanism, long ago communicated by American merchants and missionaries, and by returned students educated in America, had already universally infected the people, and as the years passed, the symptoms of a wider consciousness of popular rights developed into a veritable contagious disease for national freedom and enfranchisement.

The foregoing quotation is not from the propaganda of the last few years. It was solemnly given to the American people in 1913, by Mr. Hua Chuen-mei, at that time

the secretary of the China Society of America. And it was believed by most of the American people.

Today, to the shame of China, Nanking Government money is being spent upon the maintenance of offices in New York, in London, and elsewhere, the sole mission of which is to give out propaganda about conditions to-day which is equally untruthful, and which events of to-morrow will totally discredit.

On disbandment of troops, on opium, on foot-binding, on slavery and concubinage, on peace, on the stability of the government, and on many other matters misleading propaganda is being fed to the world every day and every month, even while ruthless efforts are being made to suppress or intimidate those who try to tell the truth, or to discredit the official deceptions which are foisted upon the rest of the world.

There is a pernicious persistence manifested in America and in Europe in pinning faith upon announcements that China has been or can be reformed or reconstructed by legislative enactments, government mandates, or declarations of policy by temporary leaders or dictators. But meanwhile the Chinese Revolution continues the frightful process of devouring its own children, even though the rest of the world is loath to believe that conditions have reached such a pass that it is a disgrace for nations calling themselves Christian or humanitarian to permit them to continue.

The time will come when the rest of the world will find it difficult to forgive those who have successfully hoodwinked it for nearly two decades, and the motives for this brazen and unceasing course of deception will, in the end, be keenly resented.

While all of this pro-Chinese propaganda, government-financed, is being conducted abroad, what kind of propaganda is being conducted amongst the Chinese people by its own government?

The rest of the world will probably be shocked to find that most of the Kuomintang propaganda carried on in China by the Kuomintang is rabidly and perilously anti-foreign, and in many districts is pointedly anti-Christian.

For instance, in the official "Primer," which is used in all schools and colleges in China, are found the following monstrous misstatements:

Foreigners with a single dollar of capital bring in a profit of \$10,000. Foreigners in China make twelve hundred million dollars' profit a year.

In imports, the foreigners, in excess of what they purchase from China, make five hundred million dollars every year.

Foreign banks which issue their own notes make one hundred million dollars in China every year.

Foreign steamers trading in China make tens of millions of dollars every year.

Foreigners have Concessions and Settlements in China, and must make four or five hundred millions in taxes every year,

In all the pages of this "Primer," which is being used to mould the minds and direct the prejudices of millions of young Chinese, there is no mention of any good ever done to or for China by any foreign government, organization, or individual.

The hundreds of millions of dollars freely given for modern hospitals, schools, universities, libraries, and other institutions—ignored.

The return of hundreds of millions of dollars in Boxer indemnities—ignored.

The thousands of high-minded men and women who have given the best years of their lives in sincere efforts to help China—ignored.

The patience of the great Powers of the world while China has been "working out her own destiny," the forbearance of the Powers in the matter of overlooking countless outrages and insults, property depredations, murders and massacres—ignored.

Chapter Ten

MISSIONARIES

THOUGH only a small proportion of them are willing to admit that they fully realize the fact, the day of the missionaries in China seems to be rapidly drawing to a close.

Superstitious though they are, and often given to the abstractions of philosophy, the Chinese, as a people, are not religious-minded. After many decades of sincere effort, and after the spending of uncounted millions of dollars, the Protestant missionaries can now claim only the meagre results of less than 1,000,000 living converts. The Catholics have done much better, and can claim nearly 2,500,000 converts.

Though Chinese indifference to Christianity often shades off into the darker hues of a violent anti-Christian movement, the factor which makes the period just ahead almost certain to be one of waning missionary effort is that the main unity of thought amongst political leaders in China is anti-foreignism, and that the missions must suffer because they are the most numerous targets which the anti-foreign marksmen can find to shoot at.

As the spirit of nationalism deepens, it will probably

accentuate the anti-foreign phase, and Chinese Christians will naturally have much to endure because of the association with foreigners which resulted in their conversion. Already the hand of the Nanking Government rests so heavily upon mission schools and colleges that the teaching of Christianity in these institutions may no longer be made a prescribed course, and courses in the Sun Yat-sen "Three Principles," which are distinctly anti-foreign, are compulsory.

As patriotism becomes more and more of a living force in China, the feeling will deepen that the presence of Christian missionaries is an impertinence. Even today the slogan used most frequently by Nationalist anti-foreign agitators runs to the effect that Christianity is the forerunner of imperialism and seeks to dull and distract the national consciousness of the Chinese people.

By an ironical coincidence it has been missionaries who, in their zeal for forwarding anything that seemed to make for the improvement of the Chinese people, have campaigned in their own home-lands most zealously for the Nationalist cause, and when the Nationalist armies swarmed northward through China it was mission interests which suffered more than any other foreign interests.

It has been the missionaries, as a class, who have urged upon their diplomatic and consular representatives, upon their home boards and supporters, and upon their own governments the wisdom and expediency of meeting all

demands, however insolent, of the Nanking Government.

This attitude, which has resulted in their helping to cripple their own possibilities for usefulness, was probably actuated by the fact that the missionaries realized that if they opposed any portions of the Nationalist program they would be driven out of the country entirely.

Unhappily this missionary meddling in Chinese domestic affairs, and in international relations, has aroused a great deal of bitterness against missionaries in a very large section of the rest of the foreign population of China. Thousands of business and professional men take the jeering and cynical attitude that the missionaries supported Nationalism in and out of season "because they knew which side their bread was buttered on," but this low and unjustified estimate of missionary character and motives entirely overlooks the fact that earnest-minded men and women will often urge or make concession after concession, and in all good faith, rather than see the work to which they have devoted their lives swept to destruction.

What could the missionaries do, other than court the favor of Nationalism? If they resisted the abolition of extraterritoriality, if they campaigned for the retention in China of foreign gunboats and foreign land forces, if they declared that the day had not yet come when the "unequal treaties" could safely be abolished, then they

aroused the natural and very bitter animosity of the people whom they were trying to reach.

So it happens that by letters to their boards and churches and friends at home, by newspaper and by magazine articles, and by lecture tours when they visited their home-lands, the missionaries have been the unwitting tools and invaluable assistants of the propagandists who were trying to hoodwink the rest of the world about China; they tragically assisted in their own undoing, and helped to build up, particularly in the United States, in Great Britain, and in Canada a public sentiment decidedly averse to any intervention in China, no matter how severe the provocation.

The missionary meddling in political affairs, in many unfortunate cases, went even farther than this. In many missionary institutions the Nationalist program was secretly encouraged in territories not yet under the Nationalist control, and hundreds and hundreds of young Chinese in mission schools, colleges, and other institutions thereby came to believe that the Nationalist movement was China's only hope.

However well-intentioned this missionary activity may have been, it was assuredly stupid to an amazing degree. At Shanghai, in the summer of 1926, the missionaries hoped for the triumph of Nationalism, and stubbornly refused to believe that if it should triumph

their own institutions would probably meet the same shameful treatment which earlier that year had been meted out by Nationalists to the Canton Hospital, to the Stout Memorial Hospital at Wuchow, and to the Canton Christian College—to mention only a few “incidents.”

The same obtuseness was almost universal all through the winter and very early spring of 1927 in the Peking-Tientsin and Shantung areas. Though almost all mission institutions between Canton and Hankow had been closed, or worse, by the northward advance of the Nationalist armies, the missionaries in North China still hoped ardently that the Nationalists would reach Peking, and refused to believe that their own institutions would eventually fare likewise.

This policy of compromise has not earned missionaries the good will of the Nationalist leaders, and the Party propagandists today, as a class, are probably the most determinedly anti-Christian group of men to be found in all China.

One would have thought that the missionaries would have taken alarm during 1926 and 1927, and would have been logical-minded enough to realize that since Russian and Chinese Communist advisers and propagandists were shaping the whole ideology of the Nationalist movement, that movement was bound to be as anti-Christian as Russian Communism itself. But no, the missionaries dubbed

friendly counselors as "reactionaries," and forwarded the very cause which culminated in the "Nanking incident" of March, 1927, and which sent about 6000 missionaries scurrying to the Foreign Concessions, to Japan, to America, and to Europe, perforce leaving their missions, hospitals, schools, and colleges to looting, to defilement, and in many cases to be put to the torch by Nationalist enthusiasts.

Many careful observers are agreed that the present administration at Nanking is the most anti-foreign in its complexion that has been accepted as the "Government of China" since the days of the frightful Boxer massacres of 1900, but Nanking's apologists hotly deny this charge, and point to government manifestoes and mandates concerning the fundamental rights of a people to freedom of worship.

In September, 1928, Article 261 of the new Chinese Criminal Code was formally enacted by the Nanking Government, and it specified that:

Whoever commits any insulting or humiliating act against any temple, monastery, grave, or any place of worship shall be punished with imprisonment for a term of not more than six months' detention, or a fine of not more than \$300. Whoever interferes with any religious service or worship shall be liable to the same punishment.

This new law reads very well, but it is not being enforced, either for the protection of Christian, Buddhist,

Confucian, or Mohammedan places of worship. Instead there have been, since the law's enactment, literally scores and scores of cases of anti-Christian violence and attacks upon churches and missions which have been led by local Kuomintang leaders—and the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party is the Government of China. So far there is no official record of any Kuomintang member being punished, or even reprimanded by Nanking for any of these attacks.

The mission institutions of learning, when they registered under Nanking's education law, found that the boards of trustees had to be more than 50 per cent Chinese, that the president must in all cases be a Chinese, and then that classes in Christianity were often barred, even when they were made voluntary. More than that, the compulsory attendance at chapel services had to be changed to make attendance voluntary. In short, mission schools, whether they liked it or not, ceased to be places where Christianity was taught to the Chinese, and became mere schools for Chinese supported by mission funds.

This state of affairs has caused several denominations to close all of their schools and colleges in China.

In some provinces, Fukien, for instance, orders were issued that no religious instruction of any kind was to be given in any schools in grades below the third year of the middle school. This ban on religious classes has made

many missionaries feel that they can no longer conscientiously appeal to supporters at home for funds, because those who give such funds give them for evangelization and would not contribute if they knew they were to be used only for secular education.

It may be contended that Chinese children should not unwillingly be subjected to "having Christianity crammed down their throats," but the obvious reply to this is that when they register at a mission institution they do so in the full knowledge that it was founded and is maintained to combine evangelization with education, and that if they do not want to accept religious instruction nor to attend chapel, they are perfectly free to go elsewhere for their schooling.

Missionaries in China have stood as virtually the trustees or custodians of millions and millions of dollars worth of property in China, purchased with foreign money which was contributed for definite purposes. What wonder that there is, today, serious "stock taking" amongst the missionaries, and much heart-searching concerning future policies?

The closing of missions, or further crippling of missionary effort, means a serious loss to non-Christian Chinese—a loss far more important than the loss of the money which for years has been flowing into China for mission work. The cause of education receives a serious setback whenever mission schools or colleges are closed.

The lame, the halt, and the blind amongst the Chinese suffer whenever mission hospitals are closed by anti-Christian demonstrations. And the cause of China suffers when the missionaries are hindered or driven out, because for decades it has been the missionaries, more than any other foreign class, who have urged and ceaselessly campaigned in favor of an international policy of patience and non-interference where China is concerned.

China's lack of schools and colleges is deplorable, and her need for hospitals is tremendous. In all of China, with more than 400,000,000 people, there are only 30,000 hospital beds—a number smaller than that of the hospital accommodation of the City of New York. New York has about one bed for every 300 persons; China has one bed for every 15,000. When it comes to trained nurses, China's total is less than 3000, and if China possessed today ten times the number of medical colleges to be found within her borders, the next century's output of graduate physicians would be unable to fulfill her needs.

The plight of mission work in China has resulted in the development of two schools of thought about future activities. One school favors the plan of concentrating all funds and all efforts on a few highly efficient institutions, because it believes that the attempt to spread Christianity and Western civilization all over China in a very thin layer is wasted effort. This school believes in train-

ing a few Chinese to high efficiency, and then letting them carry on the work.

Advocates of decentralization point out, as one detail, that the cost of sending six Chinese students through a medical college would pay for one year of primary schooling for 32,600 children. They point to the great number of highly educated Chinese who are even now unable to find positions, and urge working with the masses instead of educating the few.

When pure evangelization work is considered, the cost seems appallingly high. British mission figures show that each convert costs, in cash, 56 pounds 2 shillings—more than \$800 in Chinese money according to exchange rates prevailing early in 1930.

Dr. Robert E. Speer, addressing the Foreign Missions Conference of North America, offered figures which have never been controverted, and declared:

I pick out two of the largest missionary bodies in China. In one of these bodies last year the average addition to the church was one Chinese convert for every two employed and salaried agents, teachers, or preachers. In the other of them, it was one addition to the church during the year to every four salaried workers. Here are two things you can't get away from. They are just the fundamental essential realities.

These "fundamental realities" will become even more serious as Nationalist anti-Christian propagandists spread

amongst the Chinese people the conviction that conversion to Christianity is unpatriotic.

Why, indeed, should British donors contribute 56 pounds 2 shillings to convert one Chinese to Christianity when agents of the Chinese government are not only trying to balk conversions, but by anti-foreign propaganda are helping to keep stagnant the market in China for British goods, thereby prolonging the period during which British unemployment remains a national menace? That 56 pounds 2 shillings might well be given to Britishers who are out of work, but who would find work in plenty if China enjoyed peace and good government and could afford to buy some of the things which British factories, now idle, could produce.

The whole tendency of Protestant Christianity in China is to do away with denominations, and to merge into one National Christian Church of China. But this church, to please the Chinese, must be free from anything resembling foreign interference or even guidance. The Chinese Christians want foreign mission funds to continue to flow into China, but they do not want foreigners to have the direction of the spending of this money. Under these conditions how long will the American and British people continue lavish financing of missionary activities, and if this financing ceases, what will be the future of Christianity in China?

Many influential Chinese Christians are today outspoken in declaring that they feel missionaries to be "the agents of imperialism." They say that now that the Bible has been translated into Chinese, the need for foreign workers is at an end, and that if the missionaries have been sincere, they will now leave China and entrust to Chinese Christians the further spreading of the church.

The Chinese Christians of the Hankow-Wuchang area are on record in a set of resolutions which declares:

The only thing we can do is to work hard for the independence of the Christian Church, so that it may be free from the control of foreigners and may rid itself forever of all relationship with imperialism.

In Shanghai the Chinese Christians are on record in formal resolutions which insist that "the time has come when missionaries must choose between Chinese Nationalism and their home countries," and add that those missionaries who would not espouse Nationalism should lose no time about departing from China for their homelands.

This attitude seems to be a thankless return to the sincere men and women who have given the best years of their lives to service for the Chinese people. Not only have they been voluntary exiles from their own lands, but

most of them have almost daily risked losing their lives by murder by some unpaid soldier or roving bandit who would not scruple at killing a foreigner for the sake of a nickel-plated watch or a pair of leather shoes.

The ousting of missionaries from China involves many personal tragedies. Where are these men and women to go—what are they to do? At middle age they find themselves entirely out of touch with business conditions in their home-lands. Their Chinese scholarship will be a drug on the market. They will have, save in a few cases, no economic usefulness in their own countries. Many of them have suffered impairment of health and vitality because of years in the interior of China. Cast out after long service given under conditions of hardship and often under peril, where are they to turn?

A woman medical missionary, ice-bound off Taku Bar in a small coasting vessel, discussed this question with great frankness. Tall she was, deep bosomed, and broad of shoulder; a woman with a sad but handsome face under a great mass of white hair.

"I am going home, at the age of sixty-two, a disappointed woman." So ran her story. "For thirty-four years I have served the Chinese people as a medical missionary in a remote interior province. Even during the Boxer days I did not leave my small hospital. Evangelization work was not in my line, but for more than three decades I have worked at healing the sick, and at teach-

ing the Chinese how to live in a measure of sanitary decency.

"Today, at sixty-two, I find that I have wasted my life. I might have stayed in America, married, borne several children, and have succored the poor in our own tenement districts. That would have been a useful career. Today, just because I am a foreigner, I am being forced out of China, and by the very people whom I had fancied were my friends. It is a rather bitter thing to go home convinced that my years of service here were useless and unappreciated. But I can be useful from now until the day I die, for I shall spend the rest of my years trying to persuade young folks at home that it would be folly for them to come to China as missionaries."

The list of missionaries murdered in the interior of China in 1929 was appallingly large, and the first ten weeks of 1930 chronicled five such killings. Of course missionaries who venture into bandit-infested regions, or into areas under the domination of Communist bands do so at their own risk, and the Nanking Government cannot be blamed for what befalls foreigners who insist upon venturing into lawless zones.

But in many provinces, and particularly in Shantung, the anti-Christian campaign is carried on under the direction of the provincial Nationalist Party Headquarters. During the first three months of 1930 there were many instances of Nationalist workers inciting mobs to

march upon missions, to picket hospitals, to close schools or colleges. In many of these cases Nationalist soldiers accompanied the mobs, rifles on shoulders, to "protect" the mobs from the missionaries, and stood by as interested spectators while the missions were looted, and the churches and chapels were posted with placards carrying filthy slogans.

Here are some of the anti-Christian slogans seemingly sanctioned by the Nationalist Party, for they were found in "Special Orders" signed and bearing the official seals of Propaganda Bureau directors:

Christianity is primarily the vanguard of the cultural invasion of the Imperialists; therefore it should be speedily stamped out.

The Cross of Christ is a tool of Imperialism to crush the Chinese people.

Open the knife, and slay all who profess the foreign teachings.

Those who sympathize with Christianity are undesirable members of the Chinese race, and traitors to their country.

Under the leadership of Nationalism, do your best to attack Christianity.

The aim of Christian education is to propagate slavery, to destroy the heart of society by means of education and intoxication of the minds of the young. Therefore the thing to do is to attack Christian schools.

Anti-Christian work should be carried on from the standpoint of Nationalism. Therefore, the anti-Christian move-

ment is part of the National Revolution. If our anti-Christian movement succeeds, the first defence line of Imperialism will have been pierced.

The Nationalist Party Headquarters in Tientsin, in an official statement issued early in 1930, charged foreign missionaries with making a business of dealing in opium and morphine, and with smuggling arms into China for rebels and for thugs. When *The Peking and Tientsin Times*, a British-owned newspaper, called for a retraction and branded these charges as "calculated and frigid lies," the response of the Party leaders was to confiscate all copies of the newspaper, and to deny it circulation in the mails. The Nanking Government did not check nor rebuke the Tientsin Party Headquarters, which was then the representative of Nanking's authority in Tientsin.

Surely the Nanking leaders use different pens when they write mandates about religious liberty, when they send notes to foreign Powers about their guarantees for the protection of foreigners in China if extra-territoriality is surrendered, and when they instruct Nationalist Party locals to launch anti-foreign and anti-Christian campaigns.

Chapter Eleven

THE FOREIGN BUSINESSMEN

IN contrast to the missionaries, who, with few exceptions, have consistently favored meeting the aspirations of the small proportion of politically vocal Chinese, the foreign businessmen in China have been strongly in favor of holding China to the letter and to the spirit of treaty obligations which put foreigners in a special and protected class.

The attitude of each group, whether consciously or not, was probably determined by the natural tendency toward favoring that which forwards self-interest. Just as the missionaries knew that they would find the Chinese people alienated unless they met Chinese wishes, so the businessmen knew that they would find their properties and security of livelihood endangered if they found themselves subject to the exploitation of Chinese warlords.

But the foreign businessmen in China, unlike the missionaries, have not placed their side of the question before the people in their home-lands. Their position was not being maintained by the gift of funds from the public, as was that of the missionary. Had the reports of

branch offices in China to American and British corporation home offices received the same publicity in the United States and in Great Britain, for instance, that was given to the pleas and reports of American and British missionaries, the understanding of Chinese affairs abroad would today be more sound than it is, and sentimentalism and baseless optimism would not so deeply color the attitude of the American and British peoples and governments as they do today.

The cleavage in views between the missionaries and the foreign businessmen is deep in China, as it must necessarily be. The one class is supported by contributed funds—the other class is there to make a living. Naturally their attitudes on most questions must be fundamentally different.

Suppose the soldiers of a given "government" get out of hand and loot a whole city, destroying a mission chapel and school and also destroying the offices, warehouse, and stock of a foreign importer. The home government of the missionary and businessman will probably exact an indemnity from the Chinese faction which can be held responsible, whereupon the missionary will probably refuse to accept the money, hoping thereby to impress the Chinese with his forgiving spirit. That is quite within his rights, and he can afford to take this attitude—his home mission board will rebuild his chapel and school, or find a job for him elsewhere.

But if the foreign businessman does not accept the money to compensate him for his loss, he will probably be a ruined man. There will be no collection of quarters and dimes made in the churches of his home land to help him rebuild and restock his warehouse.

Some superficial observers will adopt the attitude that the foreign businessman has no right to try to establish himself in a country where he faces these hazards, and that when he does venture to unsafe countries like China for the sake of large profits he should not expect to embarrass his home government by asking it to rake his chestnuts out of the fire. The same criticism might be made of the presence of the missionary in a country like China.

When it comes to the question of looking to one's government to rake chestnuts out of the fire, no just distinction can be made between the man who goes to unsafe places from evangelical or altruistic motives and one who goes with the perfectly justifiable purpose of making an honest living.

The real issue is not the propriety of the presence of either of these men, but the propriety of the rest of the world giving recognition and the status of a responsible government to clamorous temporary organizations which cannot fulfill the proper responsibilities of a government.

Both missionaries and businessmen are in China under

the perfectly legal protection of agreements and treaties between their home governments and organizations which have posed as and been acknowledged as governments of China. One class does not want these ephemeral regimes held to the responsibilities of properly constituted authorities; the other class insists that they be so held.

In this fundamental disagreement the businessmen seem to have the best of the argument. If what is dealt with as the Government of China is too feeble to accept its responsibilities, then it should not expect to be recognized as a government. If the Powers so wish they could declare that there is no government in China, could call upon all their nationals to leave the country, and notify them that if they remained in the face of such a warning they would have to do so at their own risk. But so long as any Chinese regime asks for and receives recognition as a government, that regime must be held responsible for the safety of foreigners in China, unless it officially warns them away from areas over which, because of banditry or civil war, it has no control.

Apologists for China often take delight in denouncing the foreign businessmen in that country, declaring that they "exploit" the Chinese people, that by sharp practice they have ruined the honesty of the Chinese trading classes, and that they are always unsympathetic to great movements designed to benefit the Chinese people.

These charges cannot be too hotly denied.

It is true that the China coast has suffered from the visitations of foreign rogues, shysters, and crooks, and it is true that many of these undesirable gentry have often prospered under the protection of extraterritoriality, when if they had not had such protection they would have been in jail. Dishonest foreign promoters, disbarred attorneys, fly-by-night importers or exporters, would-be physicians not really qualified to practice, smugglers of cocaine and morphine—people of these classes have too often exploited the Chinese people and taken shameful advantage of their ignorance.

But these dishonest and unscrupulous individuals are greatly in the minority, and they do not prosper long. To denounce the foreign businessmen as a class, because of the activities of the few crooks, is an outrage not only against the businessmen, but also against the fairness and competence of foreign courts established in China. To the credit of these courts it must be said that they do not scruple to punish their own nationals, and that any Chinese who proceeds in foreign courts against a dishonest foreigner has a better chance of obtaining justice there than if he proceeded in a Chinese court against a Chinese crook.

In general the foreign businessmen in China are a credit to the nations and the firms which they represent. The visionaries and the sentimentalists call them "die-hards" and imperialists, because the businessmen

have always favored evolution rather than revolution in China, because they have favored various "strong men" who at times have seemed to give promise of bringing order out of chaos, and because they demand all the protection which can be accorded to them under existing treaties.

The changes brought about by the last nineteen years, and the present deplorable condition of China prove that the businessmen were right in their stand. Evolution would have been better for China than revolution, and the Chinese people today would be much better off if any of the various "strong men" who at different times sought to unify the country by force had succeeded.

Now things have come to such a pass that the only "strong man" equal to the task of bringing order to the distracted country will be an International Policeman. The only alternative to such an intervention seems to be the relinquishment of the idea of a single Chinese nation, and the establishment of three or four separate states; and even these states, if founded, will war upon one another unless the rest of the world, out of pity for the Chinese people, finds the courage to say "Stop!"

If there had been no foreign businessmen in China there would probably have been no Foreign Concessions. But the Foreign Concessions, in spite of the many derogatory things said against them, have been a good thing for China.

It is true that these foreign-controlled areas have often been used as places of refuge by Chinese criminals, by conspirators, and by ousted military leaders or politicians, and that on the face of things it seems an outrage that there should be any areas within a country administered by foreigners. But at the same time that this foreign administration of small areas within a few of China's largest cities is being attacked, it must be remembered that with few exceptions there has not been a government in China within the last nineteen years that had power of actual administration over half of China's territory.

The Foreign Concessions have not been used solely as refuges by Chinese miscreants, nor as places where Chinese rogues might invest or deposit ill-gotten wealth. They have, to a much greater extent, been places of refuge for tens of thousands of China's people of culture and enlightenment who could find no safety elsewhere in their distracted land. The Foreign Concessions have for years been object lessons to the surrounding Chinese areas in such matters as competent and honest civic administration, sanitation, sewage disposal, furnishing of adequate water supplies, fire protection, police control, street paving, city lighting, and many other phases of civic education and betterment.

To the casual traveler of today who ventures outside the Foreign Concessions in Shanghai, Canton, Tientsin

or Hankow, it may seem as though the Chinese in the adjoining areas under purely Chinese control have not profited by these object lessons, but this would be a false judgment, as visits to other Chinese cities away from foreign example would show. Even Peking, the magnificent capital of the Empire, was unspeakably filthy and insanitary only thirty years ago, except for the cleanly oasis of the foreign-controlled Legation Quarter.

It has also become the fashion in some quarters to denounce foreign firms which have built factories in a few of the Chinese cities, and horrible tales are told about long hours, small pay, child workers, and bad working conditions. These factories, the world is told, "exploit" helpless Chinese labor.

It is true that working hours in China are cruelly long, when compared with those of the Occident. It is true that child labor is employed, that the pay is small, and that many factories are not clean and not properly equipped with safety devices.

But it is also true that, with pitifully few exceptions, Chinese working people, men, women, and children, who can secure jobs in foreign-owned factories are better paid, better treated, and work under better conditions than their fellow-workers who labor in Chinese owned plants.

It is also true that a growing number of Chinese fac-

ories and industrial concerns, learning from the foreign businessmen, are now giving more attention than ever before to the welfare of their workers.

After all, foreign firms which build factories in China must compete with Chinese-owned factories. What good does it do to pass anti-child labor ordinances in the foreign-controlled areas of Tientsin, Hankow, or Shanghai, when just across the street, in the Chinese-controlled areas of these cities, there are many Chinese employers eager to employ child labor for a pittance?

Contact with the mechanical civilization of the Occident has undoubtedly been a tragedy for the Chinese people, but it could not be avoided. No Chinese Wall, however high, whether made of brick or stone, of tariffs or of prejudices, could have kept machines or the products of machines out of China.

To blame the foreign businessmen for the unsettling of China's economic life is absurd and unfair. To say that they should "get out and leave China to her own devices" is childish. Why should an American businessman get out of China, any more than he should get out of France or Germany? There is no censure when Detroit capital builds automobile factories in European cities. Why, then, should American capital not build rug factories in Tientsin, or British or Japanese capital be invested in cotton mills in Shanghai?

The foreign businessmen in China have exerted a sound

and beneficent influence there. To be sure, they have been conservative and averse to most of the movements and *isms* that have brought China to its present plight. Unhappily they did not have enough influence to act as effective brakes on the wheels of what was called progress, but what has turned out to be progression into chaos and dissolution.

Chapter Twelve

FINANCES, ARMIES, AND RAILWAYS

THE question of China's deplorable financial condition is inextricably bound up with the question of her railways, those vital arteries of communication which are deteriorating at a deplorable rate. And the question of China's railways is inextricably bound up with the problem of disbandment, for the railways are being continually disrupted by militarists, and are ceaselessly mulcted of enormous sums by military leaders who appropriate most of the income from the trackage they control.

Mr. T. V. Soong, the Nanking Minister of Finance, is probably the most able man in Chinese governmental circles today, and he has repeatedly warned the factional leaders of China that unless they stop fighting and begin the disbandment of their swollen armies they will plunge China into bankruptcy. Meanwhile wars follow wars with disconcerting rapidity, and the Finance Minister must choose between finding funds for military purposes or retiring into private life and letting someone else shoulder the burden of finding the cash necessary for Nanking to maintain its struggle for existence.

The Nationalists captured the Peking-Tientsin area early in June of 1928, and on June 30th a National Economic Conference was called. At this Conference Mr. Soong fearlessly set forth the basic factors of the situation, which were that China, which had had an army of 400,000 in 1911, and an army of 1,200,000 in 1922, was in 1928 laboring under the necessity of supporting eighty-four armies, eighteen independent divisions, and twenty-one independent brigades, totalling more than 2,000,000 men. Annual military expenditure would have totalled \$642,000,000, on the basis of adequate estimates for so large a force, but the actual cash outlay he estimated at around \$360,000,000.

China's total income, Mr. Soong declared, was only \$450,000,000, and after foreign and domestic loan obligations were met, there would be left only \$300,000,000. Thus the government faced an immediate deficit of \$60,000,000, without allotment of any funds for civil expenses or education, unless there was an immediate and sharp reduction of the armies under a general scheme of disbandment.

In January, 1929, a Disbandment Conference was held at Nanking, at which all leading militarists were present except Chang Hsueh-liang of Manchuria, and he was represented. At this Conference a Disbandment Program was agreed upon, which was to reduce the total of the armies to 715,000 men—sixty-five divisions of a maxi-

mun of 11,000 men each. The military budget for this force was fixed at \$192,000,000.

If disbandment could have been effected under this scheme China might have had a breathing spell, but no part of the scheme was ever carried into effect. Within two months after the Conference adjourned, civil war had flamed up again, and in March, 1930, the armies of China were supposed to total about 2,500,000 men.

Early in March of 1930 the Finance Minister released for publication a detailed financial statement for the Nanking Government covering the period from July, 1928, to July, 1929. This showed a total revenue of \$434,440,000, of which total \$209,536,000 went for military disbursements, \$121,318,000 for debt services, and the small balance for miscellaneous accounts and all civil and administrative services.

The table of receipts revealed that of the \$434,440,000 total income, \$100,144,000 was derived from sale of bonds and treasury notes, loans and overdrafts. Capital borrowed for the founding of the Central Bank made up \$20,000,000 of this new indebtedness.

This report by Mr. Soong pointed out that during the year in question Nanking had been forced to finance three major military campaigns, and that during much of the year, except for the Customs revenue, it had at its actual disposal the revenues of only five of China's twenty-two provinces.

The figure of \$209,536,000 for military disbursements did not, of course, include vast sums spent by the provinces for military purposes, or any of the moneys spent by the various factions which had been engaged in civil warfare against Nanking during this particular year.

And yet Mr. Soong had warned the generals at the Disbandment Conference of the perils to China of further civil wars. He declared that only by enduring a period of "privation and self-sacrifice" could the leaders hope to put the nation onto its feet. He declared that borrowing at 9½ per cent interest must come to an end. "The hope of borrowing from abroad for current expenditures must, at least for the moment, be regarded as illusory, for many of the overdue foreign loans have not been taken care of," he said, and to continue borrowing in China would place "the future of all Chinese financial institutions in great jeopardy." He pointed out that under these conditions it was impossible to carry out any plans for education or for rehabilitation, and that additional taxation could not be borne by the people.

The full extent of China's foreign and domestic secured and unsecured debts is not definitely known today. Estimates have ranged from approximately two and a quarter billion Chinese dollars to \$3,043,000,000, which is the final estimate of the Kemmerer Commission of financial experts from the United States, and is probably approximately correct.

It is also impossible to do more than guess at what China's income might be if the country were well governed, and if collections and returns of tax moneys were honestly administered.

Take the case of Chihli province (now Hopei), in 1927. Official statements revealed that the government of this province, which has an area of about 115,000 square miles and a population then estimated at 34,000,000 people, received only \$9,344,615 for the year 1927 from all taxes.

But though the provincial government of Chihli had an income of only \$9,344,615 that year and spent \$7,000,000 of that total for military purposes, the total tax collections from the people during the year exceeded \$200,000,000. Land taxes for the year, as an instance, exceeded \$35,000,000, but only \$5,800,000 of this sum ever reached the provincial vaults.

In all of China's many provinces similar conditions of "squeeze" and corruption have obtained for many years. They were bad enough under the Manchu Dynasty but have become progressively worse during the nineteen years of the "Republic."

Mr. Soong has been making valiant efforts, but so far with little success, to end the age-old and vicious system of "tax farming" which is almost universal in China. In this effort he has had the backing of the Central Executive Committee of the Nationalist Party, which has formally

ordered the Ministry of Finance to abolish the system; but the continual acute need for money, and the deep roots of custom and privilege make progress slow and difficult.

This "tax farming" system, which works tremendous hardships upon the people, is handled in the following manner. Suppose a given tax would normally yield \$15,000 from a certain area for the next six months. The government "farms out" or sells to a high bidder, or to a favorite of someone in power, the right to collect this tax in this area for the next half year, and in consideration of immediate payments accepts \$12,000, and is saved collection expenses. The "tax farmer" then makes haste to get his money back—plus a handsome profit. And this owner of the tax rights, fearful lest a new rebellion break out and upset the government he dealt with, sets his own rates, pulls in all the money he can, and shows no mercy to those who do not pay. The area in question may thus be mulcted of \$30,000 under coercive measures, instead of having paid the government the normal tax of \$15,000.

In May of 1929 the Nanking Government issued statistics based upon the then prevailing rate of exchange of gold and silver showing that taxation in China, per capita, was vastly less than in other countries, and that the per capita national debt was also extremely low when figured on a basis of 400,000,000 people.

Transferring the table into Mexican silver dollars, which is China's standard of currency, the comparison of taxation per person per year worked out as follows:

England,	\$168.00	Mex.
France,	110.00	"
United States,	56.00	"
Germany,	67.00	"
China,	1.55	"

This table, of course, included only what are called legal national taxes collected in China, and gave no account of the numberless local taxes and special levies collected at the whims of local military and civilian authorities, nor did it take into account the unknown requisitions by the military of foods, fuel, livestock, carts, wheelbarrows, bedding, and clothing to which the harassed population must submit.

The table dealing with per capita national debts showed the following figures:—

England,	\$1,822.00	Mex.
France,	1,023.00	"
United States,	377.00	"
Germany,	276.00	"
China,	5.45	"

These figures would indicate not only that China is extremely prosperous, but that Chinese Government

Bonds should be gilt-edged securities. But the figures are incomplete until one considers what the American Red Cross Commission report characterized as "the shoreless sea of Chinese poverty," and realizes that the average income per person in China per year is less than \$100 Mexican.

Since that financial report was compiled in May, 1929, the relative position of China has changed greatly for the worse because of the drop in the price of silver, for when the tables were compiled \$100 in gold could be purchased for about \$230 in Chinese money. In mid-March of 1930 it required about \$288 in Chinese money to purchase \$100 in gold.

This drop in the price of silver, and the resulting sharp decline in the purchasing power of the Chinese dollar, has resulted in an enormous upward bulge of prices in China, particularly in prices of all things imported into the country. American-made shoes, purchasable for \$28 in October, 1929, were to be had for no less than \$35 by the end of January, 1930. Tobacco, clothing of all kinds, machinery, motor cars, and the thousand and one things for the manufacture of which China has no factories—all of these skyrocketed in price.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that the banks in the International Settlement in Shanghai had on hand more than \$200,000,000 in silver—silver for which there was no market, and which was steadily

dropping in price. Proportionately unwieldly accumulations of the metal were found in all Foreign Concessions, and the interior cities and provinces suffered from a shortage of silver.

These piles of silver had accumulated because wealth seeks safety. Financial experts in China declared that these large stores of dollars and of metal bars had piled up at the comparatively safe foreign-controlled cities because elsewhere in China there were the continual risks of civil war, official extortion, confiscation of property, brigandage, Communism, and the general trade paralysis which must accompany such a combination of perils to money.

There were eight different civil wars or rebellions in China during the year 1929, in addition to the costly Russian-Manchurian conflict which resulted from the Chinese attempt to seize the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the prospect for 1930 was a repetition of these deplorable conditions.

This almost ceaseless domestic strife has naturally crippled business, has paralyzed even the inadequate railway system, has resulted in the repeated commandeering of all available Chinese-owned steamers, and has kept prospects so uncertain that merchants and bankers in the interior have, whenever possible, avoided making future commitments.

Normally more than half the \$200,000,000 in silver

stored in Shanghai vaults should be circulating in the interior of the country—but who wants to keep portable wealth in cities subject to military sieges, to bandit raids, or to Communist uprisings?

Another development which has frightened a vast amount of wealth into the areas protected by foreign gunboats or by foreign troops, is the fact that the Nanking Government and the Nationalist Party have repeatedly moved for the confiscation of large estates. One such confiscation in 1929 was particularly notorious, for it was aimed against the estate of a man who died in 1916, and was based upon the allegations that he had accumulated his fortune by official "squeeze" when he held government posts under the Manchu Dynasty which was ousted from power by the 1911 Revolution.

All over China local, provincial, and city Nationalist Party Committees have acquired the habit of declaring the businesses, properties, and even the homes of political opponents to be "enemy property," and of confiscating such properties without further legal sanction.

The existence of this evil practice became so flagrant and was causing such mutinous discontent all over the area dominated by the Nationalists, that in December, 1929, the Nanking Government issued an order that no more "enemy properties" were to be "confiscated at random" by Party Committees in the interior without first obtaining the permission of the Central Government.

This order, like so many others issued from Nanking, was well intentioned, but unfortunately Nanking lacks the power to enforce its orders over more than a small proportion of the area of China.

At a National Economic Conference at Nanking in November of 1929, Dr. Shih Yung, one of China's foremost economists, issued a sharp warning to his country's leaders and submitted some startling figures which, he said, threatened China with actual dissolution if conditions were not soon remedied and civil wars did not cease at once.

Dr. Shih began by quoting statistics which tended to prove that China's population is not 400,000,000, but is nearer 470,000,000, and that despite wars and famines it is increasing at a dangerous rate. He characterized China as a country rich in natural resources, said that the people should have an abundant supply of necessities, and then proved that agriculture, mining, and livestock raising are all being neglected and that production of necessities has been decreasing. He cited the abandoning of rice and wheat growing in many interior provinces in favor of raising the more profitable opium poppy, and said this had sharply reduced the nation's food supplies.

Detailed figures were then submitted to the Conference by Dr. Shih which proved that, excluding all luxuries, China had imported "necessary foodstuffs" to

the value of \$400,000,000, and had also imported cotton, cotton goods, silks, wools, linens, and leathers to a total value of another \$400,000,000 within the preceding twelve months. The export of Chinese silks by no means offset this outlay, for it came to only one-third of the total of clothing imports.

These figures, the economist pointed out, need not be disturbing if China were at peace, busy at productive activities, and solvent. But China continues to be torn by civil wars, to destroy more rapidly than she creates, her armies grow larger annually, the hundreds of thousands of pirates and brigands increase in number annually, the population mounts, and productive activities continue to decline while taxes grow ever higher and higher.

In spite of these tragic conditions, China would probably recuperate in an economic sense with astonishing rapidity if she could enjoy a few years of freedom from civil war, and could have a chance to go to work under a competent and honest administration.

The amazing manner in which devastated areas and ruined cities "come back" after the tide of civil war has swept past gives an indication of the conditions which would soon prevail over the whole country if chaos could be brought to an end. The cheerful industry and thrift of the masses of the people, the unusual trading abilities of the Chinese merchant class, and the

sagacity of her banking class are rare assets. The marvel of today is not that China is broken and almost bankrupt and afflicted by famines in large areas—the marvel of the situation is that the Chinese people, living and working under conditions which have been unbelievably bad for many years, have managed to keep the country in as good a condition as it is today.

China at peace would return to prosperity at a rate that would astonish the rest of the world and would put to shame the slow rate of recovery shown by most European nations after the World War. The recuperative power of the Chinese people has been shown again and again in isolated areas which have enjoyed a year or two of benevolent administration, but under present conditions any province or group of counties which becomes prosperous under a humane governor or military despot is eyed covetously by nearby satraps, and is then attacked and soon picked bare.

On December 10, 1929, the Kemmerer Commission of American financial experts, a body of seventeen specialists headed by Dr. Edwin W. Kemmerer, submitted a detailed report to the Nanking Government on the measures necessary for the financial rehabilitation of China. This Commission had labored for a year at the compilation of its report, and the Commission membership included experts of international reputation on a wide variety of subjects, including public credit, taxa-

tion, railway finance, tariffs and tariff policies, budgetary problems, currency, banking, accounting and fiscal control, banking and credits, and kindred problems.

Publication of this report in English has been deferred until it can be translated in its entirety into Chinese, and this translation is a monumental task, for the report fills many printed volumes of no mean bulk. The Commission's report to China follows the plan that Kemmerer Commissions have followed successfully in other countries. Simple and brief laws have been carefully framed, and then accompanying each proposed law is an exhaustive treatise on how the law will affect the country, how best to introduce its enforcement, and the interacting effects of each particular law with other laws proposed in the report.

Though Chinese currency is on a silver basis, China is essentially a "copper country," for coppers are the principal medium of exchange used by the masses of the population. In spite of this fact the Kemmerer Commission recommended that China must adopt a gold standard if order is ever to be brought out of the financial chaos which exists today.

China's monetary system is a hodge-podge of contradictions and absurdities, all of which hinder business development and have fattened tens of thousands of money exchange shops.

In Shanghai, for instance, the business community

struggles with two standards—the tael and the silver dollar, and both fluctuate in value when compared with the gold dollar. Though the tael does not exist in the form of a silver coin nor even in banknote form, most firms in Shanghai keep two bank accounts—one for taels and one for dollars. As a rule rents are paid in taels, building contracts are figured in taels, doctors and attorneys and other professional men submit their bills in taels, and until early in 1930 all customs dues were paid in taels. A tael is usually a trifle less than \$1.40 in silver. In other parts of China there are other standards of value for the tael, and it is rare indeed for a Shanghai dollar note to be exchanged at par for a Canton, a Hankow, a Tientsin, or a Peking dollar.

The silver dollars circulate all over China, as do the copper coins, but the 10 and 20 cent silver coins of one city are rejected with scorn by ricksha runners of another city, and even hotel servants will refuse tips in anything but their own local silver money. In some cities no small silver coins are accepted for circulation, their place being taken by incredibly ragged and dirty notes of 10 and 20 cent denominations—but these notes are often valueless when offered as a medium of exchange in another city located nearby in the same province.

The condition is further complicated by the fact that the 10 and 20 cent silver coins are all debased, and 10

cents in silver is not worth one-tenth of a dollar. As a rule one silver dollar may be exchanged for 13 silver dimes, or for six 20 cent pieces and one silver 10 cent piece. But in the same city that this exchange is made there are probably in circulation many 10 cent paper notes, which are really accepted at face value of one-tenth of a dollar.

If a Shanghai businessman makes a trip up through Shantung and Manchuria and back to Shanghai by way of Tientsin, Peking, and Hankow, and then down the Yangtze River, he will lose a great deal of money on exchange. He will have to buy Shantung paper money for Tsingtao and Tsinanfu, Japanese yen for Dairen and for use along the South Manchuria Railway, depreciated Harbin dollars for Harbin and the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, Tientsin paper money for Tientsin, Peking paper money for Peking, Hankow paper money for Hankow.

The masses of the population also suffer greatly from exchange fluctuations. Take the case of a servant or coolie who works for a flat wage of \$10 a month, but who does all his buying with coppers. One month, if silver is high in price, he may get as many as 380 coppers for one silver dollar. A few months later he may be able to obtain at the exchange shops no more than 250 coppers for a silver dollar.

Obviously one of the first things to be done by any

really stable authority which may be set up in China, if or when the civil wars are brought to an end, will be the retirement of the many local currencies of fluctuating and uncertain values, the retirement of the debased silver coins, and the introduction of a stable currency which will have the same purchasing power from one end of the country to the other.

But this is a task equivalent to abolishing all the currencies of Europe, and to establishing the same money system from northern Norway to the southern tip of Italy, equivalent to introducing the same banknotes over an area as great as that from Madrid to Moscow.

Irritable impatience with China is only a proof of stupidity or of ignorance, for China has the misfortune of not having within her far flung borders a sufficient number of educated or trained men to cope with these problems. But impatience may be justified with those of the Chinese leaders who so far underestimate the tasks which confront them that they fatuously imagine they can change conditions over this continental area merely by issuing floridly worded mandates. And impatience is surely justified because the rest of the world is given to believing that the issuing of these mandates is a sign of progress.

If China possessed 100,000 miles of railways, and if they could be kept in orderly operation, thereby ending the isolation of cities and of provinces, there might be

hope of an early solution of many of her difficulties, but today China has only about 7000 miles of railways and traffic is never secure from interruption, either because some mutinous general cuts the line at will or because some "loyal" general requisitions all available rolling stock. The practice of generals retaining most of the revenue taken in along the sections of railway which they control is another serious handicap, and makes impossible in most cases not only the payment of interest on bond issues, but even necessary repairs to rolling stock and roadbeds.

China's government-owned railways now have a total indebtedness exceeding \$550,000,000, and most of the bond issues are far in arrears in the matter of meeting interest and sinking fund charges.

In times of peace and comparative security the railways of China make magnificent showings, so far as gross revenue is concerned. From 1915 to 1924, for instance, the gross income of the government-owned lines jumped from \$56,000,000 to \$125,000,000—an average annual increase of 9.3 per cent.

For the last few years, the deterioration of the railways and the manner in which they have been monopolized and ruined by militarists, with resulting paralysis to trade, make a shocking chapter in Chinese history.

The result is that much of the country, even where railways exist, is rapidly adapting itself to a return to

the transport systems of the days of two-wheeled carts and donkey or camel caravans.

In the autumn of 1928, for instance, the general who then controlled most of the Peking-Mukden Railway south of the Great Wall arbitrarily imposed a new "tax" of \$12 per ton over the 200 miles of track which his soldiers "guarded." This tax, on top of previous charges and levies, brought the cost of moving 40 tons of freight for 200 miles to the prohibitive figure of \$680. At the same time a rival general, who held a section of the trackage of the Peking-Hankow line, imposed a new "military surcharge" of 30 per cent on all goods going through his territory.

The 280 mile line running from Tsingtao to Tsinanfu affords another example of what a Chinese militarist can do to a railway property. This line, formerly German-owned, was awarded to Japan during the Versailles Peace Conference, and subsequently at the Washington Conference Japan sold it to China, accepting mortgage bonds to a total of 40,000,000 yen.

During all the years that Marshal Chang Tsung-chang misgoverned Shantung province this railway did not even pay interest on the mortgage. But during the first six months after Japan took over temporary operation of the line, in May, 1928, the bond interest was paid regularly, all floating debts were paid off, hundreds of thousands of dollars were available for repairs and for

new bridges, and a cash surplus piled up in the banks. The income of the line under the first six months of Japanese operation was \$9,718,000, as against only \$5,988,000 for the whole preceding year, and this in spite of the fact that the number of passengers carried during the first six months of Japanese operation was nearly 450,000 less than those carried during the preceding year.

Nepotism and inefficiency combine to overload the railways with employees, the average in China having mounted to 18.5 men per mile of track, as against an average of 7.7 persons per mile in the United States.

Railway paralysis, and the effect of this paralysis, were well exemplified by the coal situation in North China in the winter of 1929-30.

Shansi province, just to the west of Peking, is rich in coal, and labor is cheap. Coal can be mined in Shansi for \$1.50 per ton. But because the railway was monopolized by military traffic during that winter, practically the only Shansi coal which reached Peking came in straw panniers slung over the backs of Mongolian camels, or in two-wheeled carts hauled over rough tracks by small donkeys. As a result of this slow and costly form of transportation the coal mined a few hundred miles away cost \$16 and more per ton in Peking.

Or turn to the city of Chengchow, in Honan province, in January of 1930, when a famous conference of

generals was held there. Chengchow is the junction point of the north-south Peking-Hankow Railway and of the east-west Lunghai Railway.

During this conference of generals at Chengchow, which lasted for a fortnight, there were many trains on the sidings, trains used as living quarters by generals, their staffs, their political advisers, their wives, their concubines. Fifty railroad locomotives were kept at Chengchow during all this conference, and they were used solely to generate steam to keep the official trains comfortably heated.

While this was going on, the traffic on the Peking-Hankow line from Chengchow more than 250 miles northward to Peking was practically at a standstill. One leaky locomotive hauled an occasional limping train of unheated third-class cars back and forth along the line, but there was no effort to maintain a schedule. Stops necessitated by the need for storing steam in the leaky boilers were so frequent that twenty hours were consumed in making a run that normally required only eight hours. And at the end of one of these twenty-hour trips three passengers were carried out of the train as corpses. They had frozen to death during the trip, lying thinly clad on the steel floor of an unheated car out of which all the window panes had been broken.

Just as living costs in China are mounting up and up as the country is pushed closer and closer to absolute

ruin, so do costs of railway travel mount as the railways approach actual disintegration.

In 1919 a first class single fare from Shanghai to Peking cost \$56.05, and the journey was made in thirty-eight hours. Today, when the trains run at all, the cost of a single first class ticket is \$90.15, and the schedule has been slowed to fifty-two hours because the rails, ties, and roadbed are in such bad condition that faster running is unsafe.

The patience and persistence which certain of the Nanking leaders show in trying to remedy these almost hopeless conditions is both surprising and praiseworthy.

Take the case of Mr. Sun Fo, only son of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Mr. Sun Fo has struggled long and hard to really unify China's railway system, and is always ready to take advice from the experts whom he has assembled in the Ministry of Railways over which he presides. Time and again he, like Mr. T. V. Soong, the Minister of Finance, has had the courage to denounce the tactics of the militarists which make rehabilitation and proper financing an impossibility.

Mr. Soong, in turn, has accomplished what seem like marvels. In several cases he has resumed interest payments and even sinking fund reservations for bonds that had been long in arrears. He has brought order out of the chaotic state of affairs into which the Salt Tax collections had fallen. He has not only maintained all

interest payments on all domestic bonds issued by his own office since the Nanking Government was established, but has also retired very substantial portions of some of these domestic issues. He is making some progress in doing away with the vicious *likin* or transit tax stations which hamper the free movement of merchandise from one part of China to another.

Mr. Soong's position is unique. He is a brother-in-law of General Chiang Kai-shih and a brother of Madame Sun Yat-sen, but it is well known that even if any of the opposition factions oust General Chiang and overturn the Nanking Government, any or all of them would be eager to have Mr. Soong accept the portfolio of Finance Minister of whatever new regime might be founded.

Mr. Soong, not yet forty years of age, is subjected to almost continued attacks of great viciousness, and even those factions which would like to have him join them charge him with becoming enormously wealthy at China's expense. Well-informed circles in China entirely discredit these scandalous charges, and one often hears the telling comment that "If China had twenty men of T. V. Soong's ability in the government, and if each of them became wealthier at a rate of \$10,000,000 a year, they would be worth it all and China would be better off than it is today."

This is typical of the eagerness with which the

Chinese people, in their present extremity, welcome men of exceptional ability or men with the real qualities of leadership. They have been preyed upon for so long by ex-coolies and political shysters that their response to the touchstone of genuine worth is immediate.

Chapter Thirteen

DISBANDMENT

EARLY in 1929, when there seemed to be some prospect of beginning the disbandment of China's huge and ever swelling armies, the Nanking Minister of Finance urged that, as a reform measure, the military forces in China be reduced to between 700,000 and 800,000 men, and that the military budget of China be held to \$192,000,000 a year.

Had this so-called reform been possible of achievement, the armies of China, predatory organizations not needed for defense from foreign aggression and useless in case of such aggression, would still have been eating up 41 per cent of China's national income. Compared with this suicidal proportion of income being used for military purposes, the United States spends only 8 per cent of the national revenue for army upkeep, Great Britain 5 per cent, France 14 per cent, and Japan 9 per cent.

In order to understand the extent to which her huge armies are eating the heart out of China, it must be realized that in the early summer of 1930 these armies,

instead of totaling less than 800,000 men, exceeded 2,500,000 men; and instead of being upon an economical peace footing, they were then, and had for years been, either actively engaged in civil warfare or in intensive preparations for struggles inevitably to come.

It is the existence of these enormous armies that has so greatly increased the cost of living in China within the last decade. Not only has the existence of these armies increased taxes to an intolerable extent, but even the revenues raised from ever-mounting taxation are always insufficient, and as a result the armies often live altogether off of the country, and their requisitions of food stuffs and supplies have totaled incalculable hundreds of millions in recent years. General Ho Ying-ching, in an address delivered at Nanking, estimated that the cash cost of supporting all of China's armies totalled at least \$800,000,000 a year, and this estimate was made when the various forces did not exceed 2,000,000 in number. Now they are a fourth again as large.

According to the last available figures, China's national revenue totals about \$432,000,000 a year, so that even if every penny of it were devoted to military purposes, without appropriating anything for foreign and domestic loan payments or for civil administrative needs, the country's whole national revenue would not do more than pay half of the upkeep of the armies even in times of peace. The rest of the money is wrung from

the tortured people who have no voice and no power. They must pay or suffer confiscation of all that they possess.

Immediately after the Nationalists captured Peking, in June of 1928, a National Economic Conference was called, and at this conference the question of disbandment was carefully considered. It was decided that a National Commission on Soldier Labor Reconstruction should be organized under the central government, and that branch commissions should be organized in all provinces. The armies were to be reduced from more than 2,000,000 men to a maximum of 715,000, and those who were disbanded were to be converted into military police or were to be given gainful employment as laborers on road construction, reclamation, colonization, or conservancy works. A bond issue to cover the costs of disbandment was also considered and approved.

The first Disbandment Conference was held in Nanking during the first week in July, 1928, but accomplished nothing. General Chiang Kai-shih had made detailed plans for reductions of regional forces, but the other commanders all suspected him of trying to arrange a disarming plan which would proportionately increase his own power, and cooperation was therefore impossible.

The Nanking Government, within the last two years, has authorized two Disbandment Loan bond issues, one

for \$30,000,000 and one for \$70,000,000, but there has been no disbandment.

On January 1st, 1929, all Chinese military factions were represented at a formal Disbandment Conference held at Nanking, and for a short period it seemed that unification of the country might be possible. But old jealousies, hates, and suspicions were too strong. The various regional warlords were loath to surrender control of regional finances to the central government, and no one general would begin disbandment first for fear that his rivals, past or potential, would not follow suit.

Fine-sounding resolutions were adopted, and detailed plans for disbanding the armies were made out, but less than a month after the Disbandment Conference was adjourned it became evident that new civil wars were inevitable, and that all factions were recruiting new forces instead of reducing the size of their armies. There was also a feverish scramble for funds with which to buy more military equipment or increase the output of existing Chinese arsenals.

It seems to be impossible to devise any plans under which the Chinese armies can be disbanded unless one faction or leader is skillful or fortunate enough to unify the country by force, and even if such a feat could be accomplished disbandment would be impossible unless a very large foreign loan could be arranged.

The man who could unify the country by force and who could then hold control over the enormous armies would first have to use them in province after province to wipe out the numerous and numerically powerful bandit organizations. With that accomplished, he would have to find money not only to pay off his troops and give the discharged soldiers at least a few dollars each with which to begin civilian life, but he would also have to secure large foreign loans with which to finance road building, dyke building, and other public works in order to be able to give employment to the million and a half or more discharged soldiers who would be turned loose upon the country.

To discharge hundreds of thousands of soldiers in an already impoverished land where famine and unemployment are common would be to turn loose just that many potential robbers, bandits, or beggars. Unless work were provided for the ex-soldiers, they would have to turn to violence in order to live. And where will the necessary hundreds of millions of dollars be found to finance such a disbandment and public works scheme for China? Certainly the Chinese people cannot produce the enormous sums that would be required, and it is equally certain that foreign investors will not consider investing in Chinese bonds unless they are backed by something more substantial than the guarantee of a military

despot who may at any time be overthrown by the revolt of supporting generals or who may be assassinated by political enemies. Such a one-man regime, even if it could be founded, would almost inevitably be followed by renewed chaos when the founder died.

Disbandment is merely another of the domestic problems which the Chinese cannot properly solve without help from outside, but it is probably the problem which must be solved before assistance in any of the other great problems can be even seriously considered.

China must have more railways—which means she must have foreign money. But no more foreign money will go into railways there until China's military problem has been settled. China must have more highways—but disbandment and peace must be attained before there will be foreign capital ready to build roads.

The Chinese people might, after some years of peace, find within their own land the capital necessary for railway and highway building and for the many other rehabilitation measures essential to the country, but there will be no Chinese capital available for these uses so long as the immense and growing armies continue to eat the heart out of the country, and the Chinese people do not have at hand any means of effecting an escape from this devouring militarism.

In time, perhaps, some one of the armies may become

imbued with a really nationalistic spirit, but as yet the huge military forces are all entirely mercenary in their composition. They fight without question on the side their leaders happen to espouse, and the leaders change allegiances with bewildering suddenness and frequency. Most of the armies are chronically in arrears in their pay—in other words they are bandit armies and are openly used as such.

China's apologists are much given to minimizing the importance of banditry in the Chinese provinces and are prone to point out that occasionally bandit gangs of ten or a dozen men carry out bold robberies in the great American cities.

In China, however, the uniformed bandit gangs dignified under the name of armies are 1000, 10,000 or 50,000 strong, as the case may be. A Chinese general who captures a city and demands from the citizens a lump sum of money within a given time under threat of turning his 50,000 men loose to loot if his demands are not met is just as much a bandit as is a gunman in Chicago who leads half a dozen desperadoes into a bank, covers the officers with his revolver, and demands that all available cash be handed out by the paying teller. The Chinese bandit is the more ruthless of the two, because his gang is stronger, but he is a bandit despite his uniform of a general and his sonorous titles.

In China a continental area is being terrorized and bled white by these super-gunmen, and there is no power nor authority in China that can check their depredations.

Chapter Fourteen

THOSE GERMAN ADVISERS

GERMAN militarism of the 1914 type, transplanted to China by "irreconcilables" of the Ludendorff clique, taught and fostered in China by these Germans—this is one of the growingly serious features of the tangled and intricate China question. Already it is assuming grave importance in Chinese domestic politics, and may soon become as serious an international problem as was the former Russian domination of the Nationalist movement.

General Chiang Kai-shih, the head of the Nanking Government, now has forty-six German military advisers on his payroll. They were employed by him as Commander-in-Chief of the Nanking armies, and they are paid by him. They are not, in actuality, employees of the Nanking Government.

In domestic politics the presence of these German war experts has already led to bitter denunciations both of General Chiang and of Germany, and the Left Wing of the Nationalists is even urging a boycott of German goods on the ground that since these German military

advisers contribute substantially to Nanking's victories, Germany is interfering in China's internal affairs.

The international phase of the problem concerns, first, matters of trade, for in many foreign circles in China there is a disposition to see in the presence of these men agents of commercial Germany trying to build up a monopoly for German firms—at least so far as all government purchases and contracts are concerned.

Another international phase of the situation is the question as to how far some departments of the German Government are cognizant of the work of these forty-six advisers. The Foreign Office in Berlin derides the suggestion that these "soldiers of fortune" who are trying to build up a gigantic military machine under Chiang Kai-shih are anything but out-of-job war experts, but there is the certainty that Colonel Max Bauer, the first chief of this body of experts, made regular confidential reports to Berlin—just as Borodin and Galen made regular confidential reports to Moscow when they were organizing the Nationalist drive from Canton northward.

There is also some evidence to the effect that these German military advisers are forerunners of a new "Drang Nach Osten" policy, as were similar advisers once employed by the Sultan of Turkey.

"Fantastic" is the term which the German Legation in Peking uses to characterize the growing belief that

Germany is using these men to build up a Prussianized military machine in China—a machine one day to be used as an ally against Russia when Germany and Russia clash, as clash they must unless Russia abandons Communism, or Germany becomes converted to the doctrines of Lenin. But there is evidence in plenty that what Germany's Ministry of National Defense plans and does is not always known by, nor approved of by the German Foreign Office, and the belief in the anti-Russian phase of the situation seems far from "fantastic" when all the facts are known.

However, it must be borne in mind that Germany's diplomatic and consular officials in China all vehemently deny that German arms are being sent to China in large quantities, but there are available to the careful inquirer lists of ships, invoices of their arms shipments, dates of the arrival of these shipments. Again the good faith of the Foreign Office representatives is not in question—but there seems to be much going on concerning which the Berlin Foreign Office is not well informed.

Colonel Max Bauer, an able assistant of General Ludendorff, was the first of the German advisers. An American newspaper correspondent, then in Germany, put him into touch with the Chinese Minister in Berlin, and Colonel Bauer made a trip to Nanking in the winter of 1927-28. He soon returned to Germany, accompanied by a Chinese Mission which was headed by Gen-

eral Chen Yi, who later became Minister of War in Nanking.

In November, 1928, Colonel Bauer returned to China, as personal adviser to General Chiang Kai-shih. At that time he said, in a newspaper interview:

I have no contact with the Nationalist Government, nor am I connected with the General Staff, nor with the Ministry of War. My duty will be to advise General Chiang Kai-shih personally, and whoever will take my advice.

This statement at once served to arouse suspicions in Nanking, particularly in the mind of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, then War Minister, and others who suspected General Chiang of attempting to make himself dictator of China.

At later dates Colonel Bauer declared that his mission was partly industrial, and that he would advise General Chiang Kai-shih on problems concerning the industrial absorption of the hundreds of thousands of men who would, it was then hoped, soon be disbanded from the immense Chinese armies.

Soon after Colonel Bauer returned to China, he was followed by a large staff of German military officers, and in all foreign trade and banking and consular circles in China there was felt serious apprehension lest a Teutonic industrial invasion might be under way, disguised as a mission of military experts.

When these Germans first came to China there was considerable criticism, for it was said that they traveled under special diplomatic passports as members of a "trade mission," such passports supposedly having been resorted to because under the Treaty of Versailles Germany is expressly forbidden from sending military or naval experts to foreign lands.

The German Legation in Peking maintains that these military advisers carried no special passports, and that the only "diplomatic" aspects of those documents might have been special visas given to them by the Chinese Minister in Berlin.

For a time the migration of such a large number of military experts from Germany to China created quite a stir in Germany. There were debates in the Reichstag, in which the Conservatives, Monarchists, and Communists found themselves oddly associated in defending the military mission. The affair occasioned quite a scandal in the German press.

Officially Germany's position has always been that these military advisers at Nanking were merely jobless military men seeking employment. All of them, it is pointed out, have long since been discharged from military service in Germany, so that their presence in China cannot constitute a violation of the Versailles Treaty.

Indeed most of General Chiang Kai-shih's German military advisers have records which show that they

were actively associated with one or another of the "putsch" attempts to overthrow the German Republic—which, says the German Legation in Peking, is further evidence that they are entirely disassociated from the German Ministry for National Defense.

Colonel Bauer, a man of unusual ability, had no opportunity to prove the sincerity of his declarations that he was to serve as an adviser on industrialization in connection with disbandment. Not only has there been no disbandment, but Colonel Bauer, when directing Nanking's troops to victory in a campaign in May of 1929, contracted smallpox and died.

Colonel Von Kriebel succeeded Colonel Bauer as General Chiang Kai-shih's leading military adviser, and as actual director of the activities of all the other forty-four Germans kept on the payroll of Nanking's Commander in chief. During the critical campaign in Honan in November, 1929, he shared General Chiang's personal headquarters in a private armored car on the Peking-Hankow Railway, and his strategy is held responsible for Nanking's victory over that serious rebellion.

After Colonel Bauer's death it was discovered that he had been in regular communication with the German Ministry of National Defense.

It is an odd coincidence that just as Borodin reported to Moscow adversely concerning the Chinese military

and political situation, so did Colonel Bauer report confidentially to Berlin his belief that it would be "impossible to unite the North and the South." He also expressed his regret at being associated with the Southerners instead of with the Northerners, and declared that in his opinion the Northern Chinese, properly trained, make by far the better soldiers.

Colonel Bauer organized an extremely efficient Military Information Bureau, which still functions. This bureau collects information for Chiang Kai-shih concerning all the fighting forces of the Chinese factions, and has even shown an amazing preoccupation with the strength of American, British, and other forces kept at Shanghai, at Tientsin, and at Peking. The matter of foreign defense plans for the International Settlement at Shanghai, and for the various Foreign Concessions in China, has also greatly aroused the curiosity of this Military Information Bureau, which is partly staffed by foreigners.

Colonel Bauer, in one voluminous report to General Chiang Kai-shih, stressed the necessity for fostering a favorable attitude toward China in the press of foreign countries, and urged that Nanking, as a government, should cultivate the good will of foreign newspaper correspondents stationed in China. These measures, he declared, were essential because China "had a bad name abroad."



Type of armored car used in China's civil wars



The city sprinkling system, Changchun

The personnel of the German group of military advisers now includes experts in infantry drill and tactics and strategy, experts in the manufacture and use of poison gas for warfare, experts in military aviation, experts in land and plane bombing, arsenal experts of various kinds, and military architects for everything from trench and dugout-systems to sanitary barracks. There are even professors in military history, and in the War College at Peking are found General Von Lindemann, General Gudovius, and Colonel Von Alten, all helping to train future officers for the Chinese armies.

In Nanking, where these experts all make their headquarters, except those at Peking and those at the Lung-hua Arsenal at Shanghai, the Germans live in barracks under a strict military discipline of their own. There they conduct daily classes in their own specialties, their pupils being various Chinese generals, colonels, and officers of other ranks. Even General Chiang Kai-shih listens to lectures especially prepared for his own ear—lectures on Napoleon's campaigns, on the importance of transport with reference to maintaining the morale of an army, on how Germany's lack of rubber in 1918 hurried her defeat because military trucks without rubber tires ruined the German highways.

But the activities of these German military experts extend far beyond the classrooms, far beyond the fighting lines, far beyond the drill grounds and the arsenals,

and Shanghai is filled with ugly rumors about monopolies, and about a system of colossal graft that is rapidly being developed.

It so happens that thus far most of Nanking's revenues are necessarily diverted to war uses, and the purchases by departments of the government, when they are made, are scanned as to their possible use in wartime. This results in the fact that in some cases the German military advisers draw up the specifications upon which contracts are made, and they draw them up in such a way that only German manufacturers can fill the orders.

One foreign firm, reduced almost to bankruptcy as a result of trying to compete with this system, was finally told that if the particular German advisers concerned were paid 25 per cent of the money involved in the contract, the specifications would be altered so that only this one firm could fill the order. The head of this firm finally obtained access to T. V. Soong, Nanking's Minister of Finance, proved his charges, and was given the order. This direct dealing, incidentally, saved the Nanking Government not only the 25 per cent "squeeze" which the Germans were demanding, but also another 15 per cent which would have had to go to other go-betweens, and Mr. Soong thereby saved Nanking 40 per cent on the purchase price for this very

large shipment, and the foreign firm still made its legitimate profit.

So far Mr. Sun Fo's Railway Ministry has kept clear of the German influence, but the Ministry of Communications is ranked as "pro-German" when it comes to buying supplies. The air unit of the Nanking Army is led by Lieutenant Fuchs, a former German war pilot. Major Hummel is reorganizing the gendarmerie. German specialists are in charge of activities at the arsenals at Nanking, at Hankow, and at Shanghai.

General Yen Hsi-shan, a Nanking opponent, employs a number of German experts at his own arsenal at Tai-yuanfu, the capital of Shansi province, but these men are manufacturing experts, not military men, and their employment long pre-dates Chiang Kai-shih's employment of military advisers of the Ludendorff clique.

Without exception, all of the new arsenal machinery purchased for the arsenals under Nanking's authority has been of German make. It is noticeable, too, that an increasing number of young Chinese cadets are being sent to Germany month by month at the expense of the Nanking Government.

The German Government's consular and diplomatic officials in China all unite in declaring that China receives no arms shipments of German origin. It is possible, they say, that since the arms embargo has been

removed German ships may bring some arms from neutral zones, or from the Polish port of Dantzic. They declare that shipments of any size from Germany itself would be impossible, because of the continued vigilance of the Allied Disarmament Commission which has been functioning ever since the Versailles Treaty was signed. They concede that at the time of the German military collapse in the autumn of 1918 vast quantities of German arms and munitions were abandoned in many parts of central Europe by Germany's retreating armies, and some of these old supplies, they say, may reach China from other countries.

But the Nanking Government, ably advised by German military experts, is not in the market for twelve-year-old arms and munitions.

And here is only a partial list of arms and munition shipments which are known to have reached Shanghai since midsummer of 1929.

On August 4th, 1929, SS *Ursula Rickmers* arrived with 21 cases of machine guns, 71 cases of machine gun cartridges, 17 cases of revolvers, 202 cases of revolver cartridges, 4 cases of Bergmann revolvers and accessories, 69 cases of rifles, 477 cases of rifle cartridges, 12 cases of automatic rifles with 96 cases of cartridges, all from Germany, billed to Nanking. On September 13, 1929, another German ship arrived with 201 cases of arsenal machinery and arsenal supplies. On October 22,

1929, SS *Rickmers* docked with machine guns and military telescopes. These were designed for Feng Yu-hsiang, but were seized by Nanking. Another *Rickmers* ship, in November, with German-made goods, consigned to a British firm on order for Nanking, brought one Maluchia dynamite magazine, 400 cases of gunpowder, 200 cases of gelnite, and five cases each of detonators and fuses. Still another German ship, which reached Shanghai in December, brought 22 77mm field guns, 25 2.5 centimetre guns, and 125,000 cartridge cases—all of German make. Nanking sent these on to the Mukden Arsenal, Mukden then being Nanking's ally.

Of course now that the arms embargo is removed, Germany is not the only country from which military supplies reach China.

The shipment of army bombing airplanes from the United States to China is a case in point. These shipments are made on order of the Nanking Government, and the planes leave the United States only under permit from the American State Department—a fact which causes all of Nanking's opponents in China to accuse the American Government, as it accuses Germany in greater degree, of "interfering in China's internal affairs," and of "siding with the Chiang Kai-shih clique."

In January of this year there arrived in Shanghai from Japan, consigned to Nanking, 50 field guns, a large

number of field howitzers, and miscellaneous field artillery equipment.

Last December a British deal involved 50,000 Enfield rifles and 10,000 Lewis automatics. These were bought, ostensibly, by a general in Szechuan province, then supposed to be hostile to Nanking. But by secret agreement he had espoused the cause of Nanking, and the fact that the arms were seemingly purchased by him was arranged in order to hoodwink Nanking's opponents.

It is interesting to note that the same Chinese, namely the Left Wing of the Nationalists, who in 1926 and 1927 were glad to have the assistance of Russian advisers, Russian munitions, and Russian money in their war against other Chinese, are now the people who are loudest in their denunciations of the employment of German military advisers and the purchase of German munitions by General Chiang Kai-shih.

Many conservative German businessmen in China recall that the period of Russian military assistance to a single Chinese faction led to the ousting of all Russians from all of China south of the Great Wall, and they fear a similar revulsion of feeling against Germany as a result of the present situation at Nanking. This revulsion, they say, will be hastened by the fact that the system of "squeeze" and "commissions" is enforced by some of the advisers against Chinese contractors and is therefore

breeding deep ill-feeling unconnected with political affairs.

At present there is much curiosity felt in all commercial circles as to the activities of the Retzman Trade Mission, a large body of Germans including electrical, railway, and civil engineering experts, representatives of the steel cartel, and representatives of many German manufacturing firms. This mission sailed from Germany for China on February 26th, 1930, for a long stay in China. The Chinese Minister at Berlin, Mr. Chiang Tso-ping, has reported to Nanking that this mission has been in process of organization for more than a year, and that German industrialists hope it will "have an important bearing on future Sino-German cooperation."

Many foreigners in Shanghai and in other parts of China profess to see a connection between the arrival of this large trade mission and the activities of General Chiang Kai-shih's German military advisers. The official German attitude is to scout all idea of such a connection, and to declare that the German military advisers are a hindrance to German trade in China because they are "professional trouble-makers, men who live by stirring up strife."

Early in 1930 quite a furore was created in China by a charge made by the Northern faction at Peking that Germany was selling poison gas bombs to the Nanking

Government. This charge brought from the German Legation to the German Consulate-General in Shanghai the following cable of official denial:

With regard to rumors circulated in the Shansi press and in other Chinese and foreign papers about the alleged shipments of poison gas from Germany to General Chiang Kai-shih, the German Legation has received official confirmation from Berlin that the manufacture of poisonous gas is strictly forbidden in Germany, and any violators are punished with the utmost vigor of the law.

But nevertheless it is an established fact that Nanking is not only experimenting with the use of poison gas, but that the Nanking forces even tried to use it in Honan in November, 1929, in the campaign against the Kuominchun rebels. The wind changed, however, and with disastrous results to the Nanking forces engaged.

At the Lunghua Arsenal, at Shanghai, experiments are being made under the direction of German experts in the manufacture of poison gas bombs, and it is known that gas masks are being manufactured there on a large scale.

The first concrete evidence of growing Chinese resentment because of the employment of German military advisers by General Chiang Kai-shih and because of large German munition shipments occurred early in January, 1930, when the *Republican Evening News*, a daily Chinese newspaper in Shanghai directed by

Wang Ching-wei, leader of the Left Wing of the Nationalists, appeared with both Chinese and English versions of Mr. Wang's "Warning to Germany."

This editorial pronouncement, to which great importance has been attached in China and in Berlin, pointed out that though Germany had concluded treaties with China on a basis of equality and reciprocity, which had resulted in increased trade and a deepening friendship, "it is a matter for regret that such a friendship is now being abused and exploited to the detriment of the Chinese people."

The "Warning" then cited the case of Russia, which under the guise of friendship meddled with China's internal affairs, and then continued menacingly:

What are many Germans doing in our country today?

A struggle is now in progress between all faithful followers of the late Kuomintang leader [Dr. Sun Yat-sen] and the influences personified by the treacherous Chiang Kai-shih which are working toward the extinction of the fundamental principles of the Revolution.

Loyal Kuomintang members who champion the cause of Democracy are today combining in an attempt to oust their common enemy, whose selfish desire to assume the role of Dictator in violation of the Kuomintang creed has plunged the country time and again into further bloodshed and misery, and whose corruption and unscrupulousness surpasses even that of the defunct Peking regime.

It is a critical struggle—one upon which hangs the fate of

the National Revolution. But it is an internal affair of the Chinese people, and all friendly foreign peoples should keep strictly neutral.

The facts are that a number of German military experts have been assisting Chiang Kai-shih in his various campaigns of oppression and personal aggrandizement . . . not as advisers to the National Government, but as personal tools of Chiang Kai-shih in his systematic destruction of the Kuomintang.

The Chinese people cannot but reflect with abhorrence that these same German war experts who had served as willing tools of the Kaiser and had succeeded in reducing Belgium, France, and other European countries to ruin, as well as in taking millions of lives, are now serving China's warlord in taking thousands of innocent Chinese lives.

Furthermore, large quantities of arms and munitions, war tanks and bombers, and other deadly implements of war are known to have lately been imported direct from Germany through the port of Shanghai, which is controlled by Chiang Kai-shih.

The Chinese people, therefore, must warn the German Government and people that such hostility toward the Chinese Nation is not only threatening to destroy the spirit of friendliness of the Chinese people, but is also arousing their bitter enmity.

Unless, therefore, Germany immediately ceases to interfere with the domestic affairs of China, and refrains from further opposition to the Kuomintang's present nation-wide campaign against Chiang Kai-shih, the Chinese people will feel constrained to adopt appropriate measures of reprisal in self defense, as well as for the sanctity of International Conventions.

Summaries of the foregoing "Warning," cabled from Shanghai to the press of the world, aroused the German Government, and the Foreign Office in Berlin issued the following denial, which was cabled back to China:

The attack in the Shanghai *Evening News* upon the employment of German officers by the Nanking Government, as well as charges concerning the shipment of war material to China, are declared to be misleading in every important point in accordance with known facts.

The German Government not only never recommended the late Colonel Bauer nor any other officers now serving at Nanking, all of whom have left the service of the German army years ago, but, on the contrary, tried to persuade them not to accept the engagement offered, as their activities in China might create the impression of German interference in inter-Chinese conflicts. These former officers, being private persons, the German Government, however, had no power to prevent them from doing as they desired.

It is furthermore pointed out that the manufacture by Germany of tanks, mine-throwers, and war materials of a similar nature is, under the Versailles Treaty, prohibited, and it is, accordingly, obvious that German-made war material cannot possibly have been imported into China from Germany.

Neither the Nanking Government, nor General Chiang Kai-shih, has ever made any reply to the charges about the German advisers, but neither their numbers nor their activities have been diminished.

And as to the shipment of German arms—anyone

familiar with Shanghai's waterfront knows that of all the ships which arrive at China's greatest seaport none are so rigorously searched for arms shipments by the Maritime Customs staff as are German ships. Very often, acting on some tip, tons of bunker coal are moved during these searches, and in most cases this labor is rewarded by the discovery of large caches of rifles, revolvers, or munitions.

In other words, German arms are often smuggled into China on consignment to some of the rivals of the Nanking Government. Nanking, knowing this, hunts for such consignments, and when they are found Nanking presumably confiscates them.

Chapter Fifteen

TREATY TANGLES

ONE of the main aims of the leaders of Nationalist China is the abrogation or modification of all "unequal treaties" with foreign Powers—that is, those treaties which give foreigners special rights in China. In particular Chinese patriots object to the extraterritorial provisions of the treaties which exempt foreigners of many nationalities from trial by Chinese courts and place them under the jurisdiction of Consular Courts and under the protection of the laws of the countries of which they are citizens or subjects.

Since these extraterritorial rights are the keys to all other special privileges enjoyed by foreigners and foreign firms in China, it is extraterritoriality which is particularly resented by the Chinese, and this resentment is not confined only to the Nationalist adherents, but is general in all circles of educated Chinese.

Theoretically the Chinese have all the best of the argument. The existence of extraterritoriality is an infringement of sovereignty; it does lead to grave abuses, and it is derogatory to the dignity of the government of any country in which it exists.

But extraterritoriality came into being in China before the middle of the last century, and it originated because foreigners could not secure justice according to Occidental standards in Chinese courts. Bluntly stated, the system continues today for the same reason that it was first founded, and all arguments to the contrary are merely a "face saving" ignoring of the harsh facts of the case.

Some of the Treaty Powers, notably Germany, Austria, and Russia, no longer enjoy extraterritorial rights in China. The German and Austrian rights were declared forfeited when China declared war on the Central Powers, and Russia voluntarily surrendered these rights, as well as control of the Russian Concession areas in China, after the founding of the Soviet Government in Moscow, and at a time when Russia was first trying to make use of China in order to forward schemes for the Communist World Revolution.

Ending of extraterritoriality and all other special treaty rights, and the securing for China of a place of equality amongst the nations of the world, have been the principal aims of the foreign policies of the Nationalist Party, and denunciations of the "unequal treaties" have played a leading part in the propaganda of the Party. The late Dr. Sun Yat-sen worked unceasingly with these aims in view, and at the time that the Russian advisers patterned the Nationalist propaganda they stressed these

aims because attacks upon "imperialism" were a natural part of the Russian campaign against the capitalist Powers.

Today, unfortunately, this propaganda has had such a profound effect that in the minds of millions of illiterate Chinese the Nationalist movement has little domestic significance, but is believed to consist primarily of a policy of anti-foreignism; and the present anti-foreignism, which is to be found even in Chinese judicial circles, affords merely another argument against the surrender of foreigners in China to the jurisdiction of Chinese courts.

There can be no doubt but that the Powers would welcome the day when they could, conscientiously, surrender extraterritoriality in China, but to the average uninformed or misinformed Chinese it now appears as though the treaty privileges are being forcibly retained without justification, and that this retention is merely another bit of evidence of the "oppressive" policies of "imperialism."

It is difficult to find many Chinese who will view the treaty question realistically, and this is not to be wondered at, since the Chinese leaders, in public pronouncements, continue to ignore the facts of the case and do not hesitate to make fine-sounding declarations on the issue which have no basis in fact.

In July of 1928, only a month after the Nationalist

armies had finally captured Peking, the Nanking Foreign Office, in a formal declaration on foreign policies, declared that:

The Nationalist Government, with a view to adapting itself to present day circumstances and with the object of promoting the welfare of and the friendly relations between China and different countries, has always considered the abrogation of all the unequal Treaties and the conclusion of new Treaties on the basis of equality and mutual respect for sovereignty as the most pressing problems of the present time. These aims have been embodied in declarations repeatedly made by the Nationalist Government.

Now that the unification of China is an accomplished fact, it is the task of the Nationalist Government to make every effort to fully realize these aims.

Here is what may be termed a typically Chinese ignoring of the facts of the case. On the date when this announcement was issued, the "unification" of China was far from being an "accomplished fact." There was, even then, grave danger of the beginning of new civil wars, which, however, were deferred for nearly eight months, but even then the Manchurian provinces were not flying the Nationalist flag and Nanking's mandates had no meaning outside of five provinces.

The next definite move toward a general abrogation or revision of treaties occurred on April 27th, 1929, when the Nanking Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent to

the Legations of several Powers identical notes urging the early abolition of extraterritoriality. Nanking had just concluded a brisk civil war with a faction which had its headquarters at Hankow and had emerged victorious but faced the certainty of other rebellions during the year. Nevertheless this note of April, 1929, uses the following phrases:

With the unification of China and the establishment upon a firm foundation of the National Government . . .

It goes without saying that extraterritoriality in China is a legacy of the old regime, which has not only ceased to be adaptable to the present day conditions . . .

With the close contact between China and the foreign Powers, the assimilation of Western legal conceptions by Chinese jurists and incorporation of Western legal principles in Chinese jurisprudence have proceeded very rapidly.

The American reply to this astonishing state paper was deferred until August 10th. After reverting to the origins of the extraterritorial system and the manner in which American cultural and commercial undertakings in China had thrived under extraterritoriality, the American note proceeds:

For the safety of life and property, the development of legitimate and beneficial business, depend in the last resort, in China as elsewhere, upon the certainty of protection from injury or confiscation by a system of known law consistently

interpreted and faithfully enforced by an independent judiciary. Where such protection fails, the life and liberty of the individual become subject to the constant threat of unlawful attack, while his property suffers the ever-present danger of confiscation in whole or in part through arbitrary administrative action. To exchange an assured and tried system of administration of justice, and under which it is acknowledged that life and property have been protected and commerce has grown and prospered, for uncertainties in the absence of an adequate body of law and experienced and independent judiciary would be fraught with danger in both the foregoing respects. . . .

My Government bids me add that it is therefore persuaded that the Government of China will concur in its belief, based as it is upon the facts set forth in succeeding paragraphs, that the sudden abolition of the system of protection by its extraterritorial courts in the face of conditions prevailing in China today would in effect expose the property of American citizens to danger of unlawful seizure and place in jeopardy the liberty of the persons of American citizens.

The American note then refers to the report of the Extraterritoriality Commission, which was organized under an agreement made at the Washington Conference, and which made a detailed report in September of 1926. This report, to quote from the American note, contained "recommendations carefully suggested as indicating the changes and improvements which would be necessary before there would be adequately developed a system of known law and an independent judiciary

capable of justly controlling and protecting the lives and property of the citizens of foreign countries doing business in China.”

After reiterating the desire of the American Government to surrender extraterritoriality, as soon as it can safely do so, and expressing renewed interest in the progress being made in China, the note realistically declares:

It [the American Government] fully appreciates the efforts which are being made in China to assimilate those western judicial principles—but it would be lacking in sincerity and candor, as well as disregarding of its obligations toward its own nationals, if it did not frankly point out that the recommendations aforesaid have not been substantially carried out and that there does not exist in China today a system of independent Chinese courts free from extraneous influences which is capable of adequately doing justice between Chinese and foreign litigants. My Government believes that not until these recommendations are fulfilled in far greater measure than is the case today will it be possible for American citizens safely to live and do business in China and for their property adequately to be protected without the intervention of Consular Courts.

The British reply to Nanking's proposals, which was also issued on August 10th, 1929, was just as emphatic as that of the United States, but brought up a different factor by stating that:

Courts which administer these [Chinese] laws should be free from interference and dictation at the hands, not only of military chiefs, but of groups and associations who either set up arbitrary and illegal tribunals of their own, or attempt to use legal courts for the furtherance of political objects rather than for the administration of equal justice between Chinese and Chinese and between Chinese and foreigners. Not until these conditions are fulfilled in far greater measure than appears to be the case today will it be practicable for British merchants to reside, trade, and own property throughout the territories of China with the same equality of freedom and safety as these privileges are accorded to Chinese merchants in Great Britain. Any agreement purporting to accord such privileges to British merchants would remain for some time to come a mere paper agreement to which it would be impossible to give effect in practice. Any attempt prematurely to accord such privileges would not only be no benefit to British merchants but might involve the Government and people of China in political and economic difficulties.

This was not only a sharp warning to the Chinese Government not to attempt to shoulder responsibilities which it could not fulfill, but was also an adroit criticism of the manner in which the Nanking Government had been permitting the local organizations of the Kuomintang Party to usurp the functions of the courts.

This usurpation of judicial functions by self-appointed Kuomintang leaders had been particularly

noticeable during the anti-Japanese boycott. Extra-legal courts were set up; Japanese-made goods were confiscated; Chinese dealing in such goods were imprisoned in improvised jails, and were heavily fined or punished after being "sentenced" by self-constituted courts. Repeated protests from Tokyo to Nanking brought from the Nanking Foreign Office no replies more satisfactory than vague declarations that the Government could not interfere with patriotic manifestations on the part of the people.

The Nanking Foreign Office, instead of attempting to marshal facts which would refute the statements contained in the replies from foreign Powers, made the mendacious statement that some of the Powers had agreed to relinquish extraterritoriality at the end of the year 1929. In a reply to the United States, Nanking stated:

It has perhaps been brought to the attention of the American Government that the Chinese Government has recently concluded treaties with several other Powers which have agreed to relinquish extraterritoriality on January 1, 1930.

The facts concerning these other treaties are as follows: Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, Italy, and Spain, whose treaties with China had expired, had made new treaties with the Nanking Government. In the case of all of these Powers, except Belgium, almost identical

wording in the new treaties provided for the surrender of extraterritoriality on January 1, 1930, but only after the making of suitable arrangements which must be satisfactory to the foreign Powers concerned, and in addition only if on that date all the other foreign Powers signatory to the extraterritorial treaties had also agreed to give up those rights on the same date.

The other Powers, which held unexpired treaties with China, and which had not agreed to relinquish extraterritoriality on that or any other specific date are the United States, Great Britain, France, Norway, the Netherlands, and Brazil. The treaty between Japan and China had long since expired. Nanking had declared it abrogated, but Japan had insisted upon the validity of a clause which specified an automatic ten-year renewal if a new treaty had not been concluded and ratified prior to the date of expiration. Japan, at any rate, continued the operation of her Consular Courts in China, as did the United States, Great Britain, France, Norway, and Brazil. The new Belgian treaty differed from the other new pacts by specifying that Belgium would surrender extraterritoriality when a majority of the other Powers did so.

This unfortunate reply from Nanking also contained a thinly veiled threat that if the United States did not yield to the demands for surrender of extraterritoriality, American citizens in China might suffer

boycotts and persecutions which Nanking would not check.

The first note of a threat was sounded by Mr. Sun Fo, the Minister of Railways at Nanking, who declared that if foreigners "refuse to give up the privileges of Consular Jurisdiction, that means that they refuse to treat us on the basis of equality, and therefore cannot be considered our friends. We must reject their merchandise and refuse to trade with them."

The Nanking Foreign Minister, in his note to the American Government, amplified this by declaring that if extraterritoriality were not surrendered it might "not infrequently give rise to complications and conflicts," and he added that in this event the Nanking Government would find itself unable to control "the natural expression of the people's feelings."

Refusal to surrender extraterritoriality is not a refusal to treat the Chinese on a basis of equality, nor is it an unfriendly act. Such a refusal is merely the result of a realistic admission of the fact that the regime attempting to govern China has not the power nor authority to make good its promises, and that China will find herself embroiled in an endless succession of foreign complications if foreigners are made subject to Chinese courts.

The Nanking Government insists that foreigners without extraterritorial rights are safe and prosper

under Chinese jurisdiction, and point to the Germans, the Austrians, and the Russians. This declaration is not borne out by facts. Few such foreigners ever risk appearing in Chinese courts, but settle litigious matters by arbitration and compromise.

The "White" Russians, who are disowned by Moscow and have no governmental protection of any kind, are subject in many parts of China to periodical arrests and imprisonments upon trumped up charges, and are held until they have paid over enough money to persuade their captors to set them free.

In Harbin, in North Manchuria, where the White Russians are particularly numerous, the Chinese police occasionally arrest and abuse an American or a Britisher, and then, to make amends, when they apologize explain that: "We thought you were a Russian."

Chinese officialdom is prone to declare that the masses of the Chinese people feel more friendly toward those foreigners who do not enjoy extraterritorial rights than they do toward those who enjoy the protection of Consular Courts, and to hint that it would therefore be "good business" to surrender the treaty rights. But trade statistics show that of China's imports fully 75 per cent are purchased from the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan, all extraterritorial Powers, and that only 10 per cent are purchased from Russia, Turkey, Germany, Austria, Persia, Egypt, and Czecho-

Slovakia, which do not enjoy extraterritorial privileges.

It is true that in the year 1929 the Legislative Yuan in Nanking passed more than 6000 new laws, and that feverish haste is being shown in the preparation of proper codes. But this vast mass of little understood and undigested statutes means nothing for the proper protection of foreigners until it can be handled by a trained and honest judiciary, and this judiciary must be free from the dictation of military chieftains and from the terrorization of Kuomintang and other party politicians and unscrupulous civilian officials before it will be able to administer anything like real justice.

China never possessed a code until twenty-five years ago, when one was drawn up under the last of the Manchu emperors, but even this code was never officially adopted or promulgated.

From the mythological period of Chinese history until the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty in 1912 it was never considered necessary for a judge to have a knowledge of law. Much discipline was administered under the authority of the family, or by the guilds. When a judge heard a case he decided it upon the traditions of local custom or on grounds of equity, unless he was bribed. China is such a huge country and local customs and traditions differ so greatly in different districts that it was considered impossible to compile anything like national laws that would be universally just or applicable.

The Nanking Government has been working valiantly to found, on paper, a system of uniform laws. The effort is laudable, but the matter of enforcing these laws is a much greater problem than merely adopting them.

Even in Shanghai, the city in China most under observation by foreigners, shocking cases of maladministration of justice occur with great frequency.

In the late summer of 1929 cases were recorded in which boys still in their teens were arrested on charges of Communist activities made by Kuomintang Party leaders. Kuomintang mass meetings "voted them guilty," to quote from the Chinese press, and they were executed the same day without further trial.

This, of course, occurred in the portion of Shanghai under Chinese control, not in the International Settlement nor in the adjoining French Concession.

Within the same month, under the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts of Greater Shanghai, a convicted murderer was executed in a new and atrociously cruel manner. The condemned man, hands tied behind his back, was roped by the neck to the crossbar of a ten-foot cross, and then the table upon which he stood was kicked from under him. The heavy executioners then grabbed his legs, and swung their weight, but the man writhed and twisted for twenty minutes. He was finally killed by being kicked in the stomach.

The details of the strangulations by which Chinese criminals are commonly put to death in Shanghai are too shocking to print, and the condition of the jail in which Chinese women are confined in the Chinese administered portion of Shanghai can be equaled only by ancient accounts of conditions in prisons in medieval Europe.

An example of how little progress has really been made in assimilation of Western ideas of jurisprudence was afforded in the autumn of 1929 in the city of Harbin where thirty-eight Russians were tried before a Chinese court after a raid had been made on the Soviet Consulate.

At these trials no witnesses were introduced by the prosecution, though the prisoners faced the grave charge of "violation of the law forbidding subversive assemblage." From the outset, the judge and procurator assumed that the guilt of the prisoners had been already established, and frequent references were made by these officials to "secret evidence" which had been submitted to the authorities before the opening of the trial.

None of the thirty-eight prisoners volunteered to testify, but one and all were cross-questioned by judge and procurator and badgered with accusations of pre-supposed guilt.

The judge refused to name the "secret sources" from which the asserted "secret evidence" had been secured,

but contented himself with a declaration from the bench that he was convinced by this evidence that the Russians had been guilty of plotting the spread of Communism and the overthrow of the government.

Attorneys for the defense were refused the right to cross-question their clients in court, and were also denied access to documents in possession of the court. The judge curtly refused applications to introduce witnesses on behalf of the defendants.

Thirty-seven of the accused were convicted, and only one was acquitted. Five sentences of nine years imprisonment were imposed after these farcical hearings, twenty-one sentences of seven years each, and seven of five years each. The four women defendants were each sentenced to two years in prison.

Foreign residents in China, and the foreign language press in the country were predisposed to believe that the accused were all guilty, but nevertheless there was a widespread outcry over what was termed a "miscarriage of justice," and the foreign press warned foreign residents that the Harbin trials were examples of the "justice" which would be meted out to foreigners if extraterritoriality were abolished or surrendered.

The question of the surrender of extraterritoriality is not concerned alone with the fate of the individual foreigner who might subsequently be arrested and tried in a Chinese court. The safety of many hundreds of

millions of dollars of foreign money invested in China must also be considered.

No one knows the exact amount of American, British, French, German, Belgian, Canadian, and Scandinavian money that is invested in missions, hospitals, schools, and colleges in China, but the total must mount into the scores of millions.

Foreign-owned business and residence properties in Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, Tsingtao, Dairen, and other protected areas or treaty ports are said to exceed \$300,000,000 in value, and most of the foreign-controlled areas have issued municipal bonds for additional tens of millions for electric light plants, water works, street paving, sewage systems, and other modernization ventures.

Roughly only 20 per cent of all shipping entering Chinese ports is under the Chinese flag, and 70 per cent of it is under the flags of extraterritorial Powers. Only 32 per cent of China's coastal and river shipping is under China's flag, and only 2 per cent under flags of Powers not enjoying extraterritoriality.

The Chinese plan to bar all foreign shipping from coastal and inland waterway trade, but this would cripple commerce, for there are not enough Chinese-owned vessels to carry the tonnage, and the result would be a worse distribution of necessities and goods than exists today.

Many huge industrial plants have been built in China under the protection of extraterritoriality, and branches of foreign banks opened under this same protection have exercised an invaluable stabilizing effect upon the business situation. What the fate of these enterprises would be if they were subject to whimsical taxation, to confiscation, or to such misuse as China's railways have suffered at the hands of the militarists can easily be conjectured.

Sentimentalists argue that what is good enough for the Chinese people should be good enough for those foreigners who elect to live in China. Admitting that conditions today are ruinous for the Chinese, these sentimentalists declare that foreigners who do not wish to face ruin with the Chinese people should pack up and leave China.

The truth of the situation is that conditions today are not "good enough for the Chinese people." The Chinese people find conditions intolerable—which is one reason that an alarmingly large proportion of the country is overrun by Communists and by bandits.

The foreign Powers, instead of agreeing to place their nationals in China in the same intolerable position in which the hapless Chinese people find themselves, should take thought as to the practicability of assisting the Chinese people toward the achievement of more tolerable conditions of existence.

Chapter Sixteen

THE NEBULOUS FRONTIERS

THOUGH the Nanking Government has insisted to the rest of the world that China is "unified," those of the Chinese people who know anything about affairs and conditions in that vast continental area called China realize fully that feudalism, regional autonomy, and separatism are stronger today than they were two decades ago in China proper, and that the far reaches of what was once the Chinese Empire are practically independent states.

Manchuria flies the Nationalist flag, but Nanking has never been able to collect taxes in Manchuria, nor to install a single Nationalist official in all the three Manchurian provinces. Thibet is inaccessible, knows nothing of the Nanking Government, and Nanking knows little of Thibet. Mongolia is not only an autonomous Soviet Republic, existing under Russian "protection," but even permits no Chinese to cross its borders, and is diverting all of its trade away from the old caravan routes to China. Chinese Turkestan is as remote and as unknown as is India.

Manchuria's area, larger than that of pre-war Germany and Austria combined, is 363,700 square miles;

Mongolia is 1,367,953 square miles in extent; Chinese Turkestan 550,579 square miles, and Thibet embraces 463,320 square miles.

Thus what may be termed China proper is only 1,532,800 square miles in area, compared to semi-independent or actually independent outlying reaches which together comprise 2,745,552 square miles of territory.

Though statistics in China, particularly those concerning population, are usually only more or less shrewd guesses, there can be no question but that the preponderance of population is vastly in favor of the provinces included in China proper. Post Office estimates for the year 1926 credit China proper with a population of 461,468,019, Manchuria with 24,508,838, Thibet with 6,500,000, Mongolia with 2,000,000, and Chinese Turkestan or Sinkiang with 2,491,000—a total of 35,499,838 people allotted to populate an area almost twice as large as that which contains the supposed 461,468,019.

Chinese Turkestan, also called Sinkiang or The New Dominion, was first overrun by Chinese armies in the First Century, and has been conquered and reconquered by various tribes and dynasties many times since then. The last pacification occurred in 1877, and since then there has been a Chinese governor, but clan and family organizations assure entire local autonomy. Chinese

money is not used, and no Chinese languages or dialects are spoken except by the handful of Chinese resident there. Much of Chinese Turkestan is a desert, and in elevation it ranges from below sea level to peaks that tower 24,000 feet into the air.

Thibet, the sparsely inhabited "Roof of the World," is claimed by China as part of Chinese territory, but in actuality Chinese authority does not extend there, and before Thibet can rightly be called a part of China many treaty disputes between China and Great Britain and between China and Russia will have to be settled. Though a bureau for handling Thibetan affairs is pompously maintained at Nanking, as is a similar bureau for handling Mongolian affairs, no Chinese government has enjoyed even a shadow of authority in Thibet for many years, and the Thibetans have repeatedly risen against and massacred Chinese garrisons and officials. Even in Szechuan, that vast province peopled by 60,000,000 human beings, which lies between the lower Yangtze Valley region and Thibet, most of the common people know almost nothing about the Nanking Government, and far-off Thibet knows and cares even less.

The Thibetan mountains and plateaux are actually ruled by a priesthood of lamas, and just now there is serious disruption amongst them. Theoretically the Dalai Lama is the temporal authority of the country, and the Panchen Lama the spiritual head. But these two

"Incarnations" have quarreled, and the Panchen Lama is now a refugee in China. He divides most of his time between Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and has not been in Thibet for more than five years.

Important as the fate of Sinkiang and of Thibet may become in the distant future, both to China and to outside powers, at present Manchuria and Mongolia are the great frontier issues, and the future control of their vast areas and enormous existing and potential riches is a question of the greatest moment to China, to Japan, and to Russia.

Because Manchuria is the richer and more populous of the two, because Manchuria has seaports and Mongolia is inland, and because both Russia and Japan have interests of great magnitude in Manchuria, it is the Manchurian question which looms most largely. Outer Mongolia is for all practical purposes entirely alienated from China, but it is noteworthy that Japan, in diplomatic papers referring to Manchurian questions, always refers also to Inner Mongolia as an area in which she has special interests.

In Chinese domestic affairs Manchuria occupies a unique position. It is really an autonomous state, and holds the balance of power in most cases of civil war, such as that which developed in the early summer of 1930. At that time the so-called Northern Coalition launched a violent attack upon Nanking, to which

Manchuria was nominally loyal. Had the Manchurian armies been sent to Nanking's aid they would have menaced the rear of the Northern Coalition, could easily have cut them off from access to the sea at Tientsin, and would have made the war of short duration.

But no—Manchuria maintained a nominal neutrality, knowing well that what was called neutrality was really siding against Nanking, for the mere certainty that the Manchurian armies would have come to the aid of what was called the "Central Government" would have made the civil war an impossible folly for the Northern Coalition to attempt.

Manchuria maintains armed forces totaling around 300,000 men, and has at Mukden an arsenal which employs 12,000 workers. Manchuria, compared to the rest of China, is rich and well governed. These facts support the belief, widespread in China, that Manchuria plans on standing aside for a long period, letting the factions in North and South China fight one another to the point of utter exhaustion, and then stepping in either as the arbitrator whose word must be heeded, or coming southward as an invincible conqueror.

While the Manchurian leaders of today stoutly deny any plan of ever again attempting conquests in China proper, they admit that if Manchuria remains at peace, accumulates wealth, remains well armed and prepared to resist any attack from any Chinese faction from south

of the Great Wall, and continues to attract vast numbers of immigrants each year, then Manchuria will, because of her own importance, play a dominating role in any federalization or practicable scheme which may finally be adopted for the unification of China.

The population of Manchuria today is probably between 25,000,000 and 27,000,000, but since the three Manchurian provinces possess enormous stretches of rich agricultural land never yet cultivated by man, Manchuria is to China what the Great West was to the United States in the days of the prairie wagons. Every year hundreds of thousands of peasants from the northern and even the central provinces of China emigrate to Manchuria in search of new lands, and in the hope of making new homes where they will not be subject to the trampling of rapacious armies, to the raids of brigands, and the periodical extortions of tax collectors acting for revenue-hungry warlords.

Manchuria, with not more than 27,000,000 people, can easily support a population of 70,000,000 at a higher level of well-being than a similar number of people can live in the same area in China proper. Besides this wealth of undeveloped agricultural land which is attracting hardy immigrants every year, Manchuria has great forests, coal and mineral resources, navigable rivers, water power, and is better supplied with railroads than is any other part of China.

In the long run, the character of the Chinese immigration into Manchuria will be an important factor in the politico-military strength of the Manchurian leaders. It is the mentally and physically energetic Chinese who emigrate from China to Manchuria in order to get away from intolerable conditions of misgovernment, and of these chosen ones it is the physically hardy who survive the hardships and rigors of the northern winters.

In other words Manchuria is being peopled by the cream of the population from great areas in China north of the Yangtze River, and as these millions go northward to become the stalwart pioneers they diminish the average of enterprise and hardihood of the populations which they desert in favor of "The Promised Land."

It is a curious development that this great wave of Chinese migration is making Manchuria securely Chinese, racially at least, for it is from Manchuria that the conquering Manchu Dynasty came to rule over China for more than 260 years until it was deposed in 1912. And for more than two centuries of that time Manchuria was closed to the Chinese people, for the haughty Manchu conquerors would not permit their Chinese subjects to settle in the Manchu fatherland.

In the late years of the last century the corrupt court at Peking practically was forced by Russia's threats to

give Manchuria to Russia, which was pressing southward along the eastern coast of Asia in quest of ice-free harbors.

Russia hurried to completion the Chinese Eastern Railway, which crosses northern Manchuria with a main line 930 miles in length, and built southward more than 580 miles from Harbin to Port Arthur and Dalny, now re-named Dairen. At the same time Russia made unscrupulous attempts to obtain control of Korea, which had for centuries been a kingdom tributary to China.

These expansionist policies brought on the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, which was fought on Manchurian soil and culminated in a Russian defeat.

Japan, which ultimately annexed Korea, wrested from Russia at the Portsmouth Peace Conference a cession of Port Arthur and Dalny together with an area of 1300 square miles at the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula in which these cities are located. Japan also forced the cession of the southernmost 438 miles of the Harbin-Port Arthur-Dalny railway, leaving Russian influence confined to North Manchuria where Russia continued in control of the 930-mile east-west railway and of 149 miles of the line leading southward from Harbin. Japan also owns and operates a branch line from Mukden to Antung, where it connects with the Korean system. This, with several shorter branches leading to mines and small harbors, brings Japan's mileage of railway in Man-

churia to a total of 695, while Russia's total is 1079 miles.

The Japanese-controlled railways in Manchuria are owned by the South Manchuria Railway, 51 per cent of the stock of which is the property of the Japanese Government, the rest being distributed amongst private Japanese investors. This railway system, together with the 1300 square miles of territory embracing Dairen and Port Arthur, is supposed to revert to China, without purchase, late in this century.

The Russian-controlled line, called the Chinese Eastern Railway, was built by Russia, is nominally a joint Sino-Russian enterprise, and is to revert to China many years hence, or may, under treaty provisions, be purchased by China in the interim. In the summer of 1929 the Manchurian authorities, presumably with the concurrence of the Nanking Government, attempted to seize this system on the pretext that Russia was violating the railway agreement and using the Russian members of the railway staff to spread Communist propaganda in Manchuria. This brought about a virtual state of war, though there was never a formal declaration of hostilities. Russian armed forces attacked Chinese areas at both ends of the railways, and the Chinese forces, which vastly outnumbered the attackers, were ignominiously defeated.

The outcome of this bungling incident, which put the Moscow Government in the unique and amusing role

of defender of the sanctity of treaties and of an imperial capitalistic investment, has been that the Russians are in a stronger position along the railway than they have been for several years, and that Manchuria has learned the bitter lesson that the huge Manchurian armies, while they are superior in equipment and in fighting abilities to most Chinese armies, are no match for a handful of foreign troops.

A great tangle of treaties exists between Japan and various successive Chinese governments, and many of them pertain to the Manchurian railway situation, to the right to the ownership of land in Manchuria by Japanese subjects, and to kindred questions. Japanese protests against asserted violations of these treaties have been piled high, but are usually ignored by the Mukden Government and by whatever clique is, for the moment, posing or recognized as the Government of China.

One treaty provision is to the effect that no railways may be built parallel to the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway, but this has been repeatedly violated by the Chinese, despite Japan's protests. There is a growing mileage of Chinese-owned railways in Manchuria, in the financing and construction of some of which Japan or the South Manchuria Railway has willingly assisted.

Japan's position in Manchuria is generally misunderstood in America and in Europe. Admitted that long ago Japan probably hoped to annex Manchuria, as did

Russia thirty years ago, the Japanese have long since abandoned any aggressive role there. The Japanese railway system is not being expanded. There is no Japanese attempt under way to "colonize" Manchuria. In fact, today the total of Japanese in Manchuria is smaller than it was fifteen years ago, and falls below 250,000. This figure, however, does not include Koreans, now Japanese subjects, who have immigrated into Manchurian lands to a total of nearly 1,000,000 persons.

Under existing treaties Japan is permitted to maintain a maximum of 15,000 troops along her railways in Manchuria, but the permanent strength of these railway guards rarely exceeds 7500.

Furthermore the oft-repeated charges that Japan is "exploiting" Manchuria and growing rich at the expense of the Manchurian provinces, is all tosh. The South Manchuria Railway, which is not over-capitalized, pays 10 per cent in dividends yearly. Most of the company's surplus earnings are spent on schools, libraries, hospitals, agricultural experiment farms, and similar enterprises which are maintained for the equal use and benefit of Chinese and Japanese living along or employed by the railway. In fact the semi-philanthropic expenditures of this company are so extensive every year that the South Manchuria Railway has been termed by foreign observers, and not in a spirit of fulsome praise, the greatest civilizing force in eastern Asia.

It is true that over-populated Japan finds Manchurian raw materials essential to her existence. It is also true that Japan finds Manchuria essential as a market for her manufactured goods. The coal and steel she is now deriving from her Manchurian mines and smelters, operated by the South Manchuria Railway, are also of vital importance to her economic life.

Then, too, as frank Japanese military men and statesmen will admit, Manchuria is considered the Japanese frontier in a military sense, for the seas about Japan, or even the Korean peninsula, would afford no proper defensive lines in case of a great war.

Here, then, lie these great Manchurian plains and mountains, lands of almost unimaginable richness. They are quickly being settled by Chinese, but these same lands have once before been the scene of a titanic struggle between outside Powers, and may again experience such usage, for Soviet Russia differs no whit from Czarist Russia when the matter of aspiring to ice-free ports on Asia's east coast is concerned.

The government of Manchuria today is headed by a young man in his early thirties—Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. His position is practically hereditary, for he succeeded his late father, Marshal Chang Tso-lin, when the latter, after being driven out of Peking by the Nationalists, was killed by a bomb explosion just as his special

train was pulling into his own capital, Mukden, early in June of 1928.

Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's position, or the position of anyone who may succeed him, is made curiously secure by the clash of outside interests. Russia does not dare to encroach upon Manchuria lest Japan be provoked to preventive measures. Japan does not dare to even press too hard for the upholding of her treaty rights in Manchuria, lest the Russian bear show its teeth. Russia and Japan do not dare to partition Manchuria, even if they wished to do so, because the rest of the world would not countenance such an act.

Meanwhile the Manchurian regime is safe from molestation by the factions in China proper because Japan has announced and reiterated that she will tolerate no civil wars in the zone traversed by her railway, and Mukden, the Manchurian capital, is within that zone. All Chinese factions know that if any of them attacks Manchuria the Japanese will make good their threat to disarm, by force if necessary, both sides to any civil conflict that may disturb conditions in her railway zone. The Chinese, all factions alike, are afraid to take any step that might provoke active Japanese interference, lest such interference bring about a Japanese protectorate modified by an "Open Door" pronouncement to appease the rest of the Powers.

Indeed the charge is often heard, in the Far East, that Japanese were the instigators or perpetrators of the bomb outrage which killed Marshal Chang Tso-lin in 1928, and that his assassination was planned in the hope that it would create such confusion in Manchuria that Japanese intervention would be justified. The facts of the case have never been brought out, but even the Japanese Diet is periodically agitated by discussions of the affair.

It must be noted, however, that while Japan will not permit Chinese factions from south of the Great Wall to attack Manchuria, there is no prohibition against Manchuria launching campaigns south of the Great Wall against other Chinese factions. In fact the late Marshal Chang Tso-lin, when he ruled much of China down to the Yellow River and even beyond, and established an approximation to an imperial court in Peking in 1927, was drawing most of his revenues from taxes levied in Manchuria. His son, if so inclined, might attempt to make history repeat itself.

Inner Mongolia, which joins Manchuria on the west, is a sparsely settled land into which, however, Chinese immigrants are pressing farther and farther every year, and gradually preempting the great grazing lands on which, for countless centuries, the Mongol princes and tribesmen have reared their great herds. The trade routes of Inner Mongolia drain naturally into South



A typical inn of North China



Modern transportation at Manchouli, the farthest western "city" in Manchuria

Manchuria, and if Inner Mongolia is ever to have railways they would normally be extensions of those now feeding into the Japanese railway zones, rather than northward extensions from the Peking-Tientsin area south of the Great Wall.

But it is not the railway question, primarily, which has caused Japan to include Inner Mongolia in her zone of influence—a zone which her original claims did not extend beyond South Manchuria. This extension was caused when Outer Mongolia came under the domination of Russia, for had Japan not announced special interests for herself in Inner Mongolia, Russia would, beyond a doubt, soon have encroached there too, and would then have menaced the western flank of the Japanese-owned railway, besides holding the great east-west railway system stretching for nearly 1000 miles across North Manchuria.

Today, whatever may be the diplomatic fictions of the case, Outer Mongolia is not only isolated from China, but is practically Russian territory.

The Mongols have long been restless, and during the World War they formally declared their independence of China. Russia was quick to give the Mongolian Republic, organized in 1921, formal recognition, though no other Power has done so. Today Mongolia is a Soviet Republic under a constitution adopted in 1924, in name at least, and many of the official positions are held by

Buriats sent into Mongolia from the Lake Baikal region in Siberia.

All departments have Russian "advisers," supplied by Moscow, and the army, said to exceed 50,000, more than 35,000 of whom are cavalrymen, is not only advised but is also largely officered by Russians.

Inner and Outer Mongolia together are credited with only 2,000,000 people, of whom, according to figures given out at Urga, the capital of Outer Mongolia, 676,000 live in the Mongolian Soviet Republic. Of this total 579,000 are Mongols, nearly 70,000 are Chinese, and 9000 are Russians. The Moscow Government maintains an embassy at Urga, and the Urga Government supports a legation at Moscow.

For uncounted centuries China traded with Mongolia over caravan routes that were probably well worn when Moses was a boy. In modern times China sought to tighten its hold upon Mongolia by building a railway northward from Peking through Kalgan and on to Paotow, a total distance of 507 miles, thereby greatly shortening the caravan trip.

Today, under Russian urging and advice, Outer Mongolia has closed the old caravan routes leading southward into China, and no tonnage to or from Mongolia is hauled over this railway line. Today Mongolia's trade routes have been diverted into Siberia, and such railway

tonnage as the country affords feeds to the Trans-Siberian line.

There is now a wireless station at Urga, under Russian direction, and Russians head the censorship bureau which censors all mail going into or leaving Outer Mongolia. An air service is maintained connecting Urga and Verkhneudinsk, and a motor transport system connects Urga and Irkutsk and Urga and Kiachta.

Within the last two years many of the lamaseries have been taken from the monks, and converted into schools where Mongolian children are taught the Russian language, and custom houses, with staffs headed by Russians, have been erected along the southern trade routes the more effectually to keep out Chinese trade.

Foreigners of almost any nationality may obtain permits to travel in Mongolia, but permits are not granted to Chinese, and many of the Chinese who have long lived in Mongolia are now returning to China because of the persecutions they suffer from the Mongols.

Outer Mongolia now boasts two military schools, a university, three small colleges, seven middle schools, and more than 100 grammar schools—all headed by Russians, and all teaching Communist theories. The military schools are headed by Russian army officers, and native officers of the Mongolian army are sent each year for additional training to Chita or to Irkutsk. The

Irkutsk newspapers run standing advertisements offering positions to Russian teachers who will go to Mongolia on a salary of 200 roubles plus free living quarters, and the Russian Sanitary Office at Irkutsk maintains at Urga a Russian commission of fifteen health experts.

The Mongols have always been opposed to railway construction in their country, but official reports from Moscow tell of the conclusion of treaties with the Urga Government under which Russia is to loan to the Mongolian Soviet Republic money for building a railway from Urga to Kahikta, a point on the Trans-Siberian Railway. The line will be built by Russians, and will be operated under Russian supervision until the loan is repaid. It will be of broad Russian gauge.

This project was first talked of under the Czarist regime, as long ago as 1905, when Russia lost the southern portion of her Manchurian railway to Japan. This line from Kahikta to Urga, if extended southward to Kalgan and thence to Peking and Tientsin, would shorten the trans-Siberian haul to the waters of the Pacific by 600 miles, and would afford access to a port ice-free the year around, while the longer haul is to Vladivostok which is ice-bound nearly half the year.

With these conditions obtaining in Mongolia, in Manchuria, in Sinkiang, and in Thibet, who can say just where China's frontiers lie? While the main China is being continuously partitioned and re-partitioned by

warring Chinese generals, the far-off provinces and one-time dependencies are in various stages of alienation, and today it is impossible to accurately describe China, to name her actual boundaries, or to define her area.

Chapter Seventeen

CLASHING CULTURES

IN many respects the clash of Occidental and Oriental cultures in modern China has been as destructive of the fundamentals of Chinese life and thought as the clashes of rival armies have been destructive of the countryside in which they fought; and while these clashes were under way, China's whole economic structure was breaking down as a result of the clash with the mechanical methods of production of the western world.

What wonder, then, that with these three conflicts going on at the same time, the nation has disintegrated until today it is no longer a nation but a people without adequate personnel for leadership?

At the same time that the Revolution robbed the Son of Heaven of his supposed sanctity and overturned an ancient system of government, new ideas were destroying the traditions of family discipline and of family responsibility. And while these processes were under way the armies of rival militarists were ruining the land and making the struggle for survival so keen that old standards of honesty and fair dealing had, perforce, to be abandoned. Coincident with these processes railways

were throwing out of employment hundreds of thousands of coolie burden bearers, steamboats on the rivers were taking the livelihood out of the mouths of hundreds of thousands of men who had carried China's inland water traffic in junks and canal boats, and were making useless the work of the tens of thousands who had acted as trackers and hauled the old-style ships up the Yangtze River gorges. Foreign factories were sending machine-made goods into China at the same time, and foreign capital was building modern factories in Chinese cities, thereby helping to destroy the household and small shop industries which had existed with little change for centuries.

The combination of these forces created unemployment and want, and unemployment was coincident with the period when rival warlords were busily recruiting sectional armies, hence the armies soon became swollen to unmanageable proportions; and since many of them were often unpaid desertions and mutinies increased banditry and piracy.

The country's leaders, men ranging all the way from those actuated solely by greed and ambition to high-minded and unselfish patriots, could find no way to agree upon the forms or powers of a new government to replace that which had been destroyed. The conservatives, convinced that the old ways were best, and that foreign ideas and methods were utterly alien to the

race, fought stubbornly against the radicals who wanted to obliterate the old ways and begin anew, and the two factions were so proud and so stubborn, as they still are today, that they made accomplishment impossible for the moderates who wanted to proceed slowly and rebuild the state and the nation by fusing the best of the old and the new, the indigenous and the foreign in methods and cultures, political procedures and economic rehabilitation.

Many harsh comparisons have been made concerning China's inability to adapt itself to twentieth century conditions in contrast to the amazing success which Japan has achieved in re-making herself into a highly efficient industrial nation without losing the inherently essential elements of Japanese cultural life.

"Returned students"—a phrase which applies in China and Japan to any man, regardless of his age or how many years have elapsed since his return to his native land—were to have remade both nations. In Japan the hopefulness with which this class was regarded proved justified—a poor and numerically inferior people have become a World Power. In China the returned students have not aided in quelling the turmoil which has now produced chaos.

It was in 1868 that the Chinese Government first sent students abroad. In that year, Dr. Yung Wing

took thirty boys to the United States for schooling, and later others followed until the total was 120, but all were recalled before they had completed college courses, and then the movement was interrupted for a time.

But after China was disastrously defeated by Japan, in a war in the last decade of the last century, the movement took on new life. China realized that modernization was essential, and students were sent abroad in ever growing numbers. In the first decade of this century the numbers were greatly increased when students connected with various abortive revolutionary attempts sought refuge in foreign lands. At this period Japanese universities, in particular, were flooded with Chinese students, and the number in American and European places of learning increased year by year.

Japan, through her returned students, has learned efficiency. Japan has built factories. Japan competes successfully in the world's ocean-going trade. Japan long since freed herself from extraterritoriality, and has sound laws and good courts. Japan has an army and a navy of such efficiency that her word carries weight in the world. But then, Japan has experienced no revolution, no overturn of a dynasty, and no widespread civil wars.

In general, however, it may be said that the Chinese

who went abroad to study neglected the sciences and snubbed mechanics. Following the old Confucian idea that a scholar must devote himself to politics and to statecraft, most of China's students abroad specialized in political economy, philosophy, or cultural subjects. They brought home with them a wide variety of clashing economic, political, and social theories. The Chinese returned students, too often, were cultural hybrids; the Japanese returned students were splendid technicians and industrial experts. The Japanese on returning home brought material changes into the life of their country; the Chinese on returning home brought theories which could not be assimilated by a disorganized nation largely peopled by illiterates.

Dr. Hu Shih, China's noted young philosopher, who today ranks with the great thinkers of the world, has been courageously unsparing in his criticisms of his country's shortcomings. He declares that China has found its old culture incapable of dealing with "poverty, disease, ignorance, and corruption—the four cardinal enemies of the nation."

China's hesitancy in acknowledging the defeat of her old civilization, says Dr. Hu Shih, is only the natural evidence of the pride of a great nation with a glorious past, and he points out that never before has China been in conflict with a race which combined superior military strength with an advanced civilization. More than once

China has experienced conquest at the hands of warlike barbarians, but in the end her culture conquered the conquerors. Sometimes, and voluntarily, China has submitted to a cultural invasion, as she did when India sent Buddhism into the Middle Kingdom—but the advent of Buddhism was not accompanied by a single soldier from India.

Now, for the first time in her history, Dr. Hu Shih points out, China is in conflict with a civilization backed by political and military strength unprecedented in history. She cannot differentiate between the civilization and the military strength behind it, and to acknowledge that Occidental civilization is superior seems to the Chinese to be an act of submission to imperialistic aggression.

“Only a myth” is the way in which this young Chinese philosopher dismisses the contention that Occidental civilization is “materialistic,” while Oriental civilization is “spiritual.”

Western civilization, he says, is idealistic and spiritual in its scientific aspects, in its democratic institutions, and also in its mechanical progress which relieves human suffering and enhances human happiness. The older civilization of the Far East, he insists, merely resigns itself without attempting adequate measures to subjugate the forces of nature for mankind’s benefit.

“It is materialistic in the worst sense of the term,”

he declared late in 1929. "I can see no spirituality in a civilization that uses human beings as beasts of burdens and carriage, and that tolerated foot binding of its women for 1000 years without a protest.

"Our old arts are dead, and we have not learned to master new ones; the old social order has become decadent, and we are unwilling to build up a new one. During our half century of vacillation and hesitancy, decadence and inaction, the remnants of our old culture—the old paintings and bronzes and porcelains—have been leaving the country to swell the collections of America, Europe, and Japan, and our temples and other architectural monuments of the past are permitted to go to ruin because of neglect and lack of funds necessary for repairs.

"Religion and imperial power and peace produced these arts, but poverty and devastation have destroyed them all. For a hundred years we have not seen the rise of a painter, a poet, a thinker, or a teacher of the first magnitude. And yet we are still talking of preserving 'the national heritage' and 'the essence of national culture.'

"What have we to preserve when starving peasants are chopping off the heads of ancient sculptures to be sold for a bowl of rice, and when soldiers are pillaging imperial tombs in search of buried treasures for the foreign markets?"

Dr. Hu Shih, who does not scruple to hold up to ridicule the shallow pretensions of his countrymen which he, as an intellectual patriot, holds to be detrimental to China's progress, has incurred the violent enmity of the Kuomintang Party, and several times it has been officially proposed that criminal proceedings be instituted to punish him for his frankness.

The existence of the evils which he decries is not denied, but his critics contend that for the sake of China's "face" he should be silent concerning those evils. Fortunately for the good name of the Nanking Government the clamor of the lesser politicians against this great man has been somewhat subdued, and the only formal governmental action in his case has been the transmission of a "warning." This attempt at intimidation has been ignored by Hu Shih, who continues his courageous and outspoken policy.

In a startling foreword to a book entitled *Some Bigger Issues in China's Problems*, written by Julean Arnold, the Commercial Attaché of the American Legation in Peking, Dr. Hu Shih spoke frankly to the world and to his fellow Chinese, as he did in his contribution to a compiled volume entitled *Whither Mankind?* In the foreword to Mr. Arnold's book this Chinese philosopher, who in his own person contradicts his lament that China has produced no great thinker within the last century, says, in part:

We must know ourselves. We must confess that we are terribly poor, and that our people are suffering miseries which justly horrify the civilized peoples.

We must confess that our political life is rotten to the core. . . .

Let us no longer deceive ourselves with complacent talk about imperialistic Powers hampering our national progress and prosperity. . . .

What is needed today, it seems to me, is a deep conviction which should amount almost to a religious repentance that we Chinese are backward in everything and that every other modern nation in the world is much better off than we are.

Indictments of this kind from the most illustrious living Chinese are different from the adverse criticisms of foreigners, for most of the latter take the attitude that the Chinese, owing to some innate lack, will never be able to manage their own affairs. Dr. Hu Shih's criticisms, however, seem to be designed to arouse the latent abilities and energies of his fellow countrymen, and to convince them of the follies of conceit and self-satisfaction. Foreign criticisms arouse resentment and a balky feeling of sulkiness; perhaps Dr. Hu Shih's diatribes will serve as spurs.

Until within the last few decades most Chinese regarded all foreigners as "barbarians" and as inferiors, but this racial arrogance received a rude shock when China lost war after war with foreign Powers, and

when the trend of events convinced the most enlightened of her people that Occidental civilization is in many respects superior to that of the Orient.

This shock has resulted in the development of a curious combination of the former superiority complex with a new inferiority complex, and the result of this in many cases is a peevish, fretful attitude which disregards reason and facts.

In Chinese circles today may be found pessimists who are convinced that geographical, climatic, and cultural forces have been at work to render the Chinese people incapable of regeneration. Equally unreasoning Chinese optimists are plentiful, and they declare that despite the present chaos of their country the Chinese are inherently superior to the rest of the world, and will dominate the globe within the next century. These latter scorn modernity and the present state of the world, and point to China's one-time greatness, to the nameless Chinese inventors of gunpowder, the compass, and the art of printing, and to China's great sages of long ago.

There is no doubt but that the importance of the question of racial inferiority or superiority has been heightened by the arrogant attitude of many foreigners living in China who do not attempt to conceal their convictions of their own superiority. How much of this deeply resented attitude on the part of many foreigners is due to stupidity, and how much is due to

arrogance or to a natural instinct of self-protection, it is difficult to determine, but the resentment of all Chinese to this pose is both natural and healthy.

In justification of the foreigner who thus offends, it can be said that possibly his attitude is, to a great extent, that of a small boy who whistles in the dark in order to keep up his courage.

Suppose one takes the case of 40,000 foreigners surrounded by about 3,000,000 Chinese, as they are in Shanghai, or the case of half a dozen foreigners isolated in some interior city with a Chinese population of 100,000. The natural instinct of these foreigners is to emphasize and insist upon the things which make them different from the great hordes of strange human beings who surround them. Only by insisting upon those differences, magnifying their value, can the foreigners keep from being submerged entirely in a strange life by strange customs and by a people of different color, alien culture, and incomprehensible language.

The Chinese who goes to America or to Europe does not adopt this policy of deliberate isolation. As a rule he goes either to study and to learn, or merely to trade. In any event he must acquire the strange tongue of the land in which he tarries. But most foreigners who go to China go to trade or to teach. If the former, they do not have to acquire the language, because they can hire middlemen for a pittance; if the latter, they are

there to impose their own learning or culture upon the Chinese—rarely to learn from them or to attempt to acquire or investigate Chinese culture.

There has been much criticism of the fact that Chinese, no matter how eminent they may be, are not admitted either as members or as guests to many of the clubs which foreigners maintain in the cities in China. This prohibition, though probably supported by some club members because of a feeling of racial snobbery, is probably deeply rooted in the instinct to keep some place purely reminiscent of "home," some retreat entirely foreign in its aspects and operations. If Chinese were admitted to these clubs they would probably soon greatly outnumber the foreign members. No doubt the Chinese residents of San Francisco, New York, and London, yielding to this same instinct, support clubs to which Americans and Britishers are not eligible for membership.

It is the returned student and student classes which are today the most restless in China, except that small proportion of them who have been able to establish themselves in the larger cities or have become identified with governmental work of some kind. They and the students now in Chinese colleges and universities are dismayed at the fact that there seems to be no place for them in their own land.

Benefiting by the ancient tradition which com-

manded paying respect to learning, the students of China some years ago began to play a vital part in politics. It was largely as the result of student agitations that the existing Peking Government, just after the World War, was forced to instruct its delegates not to sign the Treaty of Versailles, for China's young patriots objected seriously to Japan succeeding to Germany's holdings in Shantung province and to other stipulations in the peace agreement.

From that time on the students, as a class, were powerful factors in the progress of the Revolution, and they were of incalculable service to the Nationalist movement.

In the spring of 1929, the student world of China was dismayed by an order issued by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang at Nanking which, in effect, ordered them to leave politics to their elders and to return to their studies. The student class had worked arduously in support of Nationalism, and this seemed to them a shabby reward. The reaction was immediate and violent, and now no faction in opposition to the Nanking Government is more outspoken in its denunciations than is the student class. They denounce the Nanking regime as "a reactionary clique," and declare that it is attempting to "arrest the processes and frustrate the purposes" of the Chinese Revolution.

A clash of this kind was almost inevitable, for the

student class had embraced the radical doctrines of the Left Wing with a fervor not unnatural to youth, and failed to understand that the Nanking Government, always fighting on the defensive in order to continue its existence, was forced to become more and more conservative or else connive at its own undoing.

There is no disputing the fact that the students had got completely out of hand. They called strikers, attempted to dictate the personnel of faculties, picketed the offices of the heads of educational departments when affairs went contrary to their liking, and in general tended to become more and more high-handed.

The Kuomintang Party countered with an order that all student patriotic activities must "be conducted under the guidance of the Kuomintang." The reply of the students is that the present government is composed of tyrants masquerading in the robes of the genuine patriots of former days, and that the Kuomintang Party, under present leaders, is no longer fit to be their guide.

The alienation of the student class is a misfortune for China, for it is from this class that the administrators of the future must be drawn, just as the old imperial government looked to the ranks of scholars to recruit the mandarinat. If the youthful intelligentsia are to be forced into opposition to the Kuomintang Party and to the government which that Party has created and

controls, it means that future administrators must be drawn from the ranks of the military, and this will prolong indefinitely the "period of tutelage" and probably result in future upheavals designed to overturn what will be termed a tyranny supported by force and opposed to reason.

Chapter Eighteen

SIDELIGHTS

IN the China of today there is a vast and often fundamental difference between the things which are important and the things which are interesting to the casual reader, and in that topsy-turvy land it often occurs that real importance attaches only to things and affairs which seem of little moment.

In a superficial sense the struggles of rival generals, long sieges, famines, revolts of provinces, and the sack of burning cities may seem to be the most important events. It is occurrences and events of this kind which engage most of the time and attention of a newspaperman stationed in China, but after a while the recurrence of these tragedies robs them of their spectacular appeal.

After four years, for instance, it suddenly was borne in upon the author of this book that most of the generals who had been of paramount importance in 1925 had altogether vanished from the scene. Some were in their graves, some were in retirement in Buddhist monasteries, some were living in shameful affluence in foreign lands. They had come, and gone, and all their victories and defeats had had no more effect upon the history of China

than the glittering of dragon flies in summer sunlight has upon the progress of the seasons of the year.

While these often gaudy gentlemen had been fighting for power which they could not hold, while they had killed their fellow countrymen, and ruined the areas over which their coolie armies passed like blighting swarms of locusts, more important affairs had been going on in China.

For instance, the last two years have seen the opening of more than one hundred electric lighting plants in the province of Chekiang. A development of this kind profoundly affects tens of thousands of people. A single candle flame is not good to read by. Perhaps thousands of the inhabitants of Chekiang, who formerly went to bed with the dusk, or drowsily smoked opium, are now revising their habits under the glow of electric light bulbs.

Towns and cities are still being looted and burned in China, but at the same time the number of towns and cities which are starting libraries is constantly on the increase.

Ancestor worship continues in China, but today in nearly every town and city in the coastal regions there is lively debate as to whether large schools for foreign-trained midwifery are to be preferred to public classes in birth control.

This fragmentary chapter of "Sidelights," made up of the impressions and experiences of four years of living and traveling in many parts of China, may assist foreign readers in understanding something of life in a land so distant and so strange.

The extent of the startling changes which have come upon "changeless China" were strikingly exemplified during the second week of July, 1929, when Mr. Henry Pu Yi moved from one house to another in Tientsin and General Chiang Kai-shih paid a hotel bill in Peking.

Mr. Henry Pu Yi had been paying \$650 a month rent for a comfortable house in the Japanese Concession at Tientsin, but finding his resources dwindling, he removed to a smaller house, the rent for which was only \$300 a month.

On the day that he moved General Chiang Kai-shih paid a hotel bill in Peking which amounted to \$17,000, and this covered a stay of only fifteen days in this hotel for General Chiang, his wife, his secretaries, and the officers of his bodyguard. At the same time General Chiang gave the lump sum of \$1500 as tips for the hotel servants, and made a gift of \$1000 to the members of the Peking police force.

Yet less than a decade ago General Chiang was a low salaried clerk in a brokerage office in Shanghai, and Mr.

Henry Pu Yi, the deposed Son of Heaven and ex-Emperor of China, was still living with his court in the Forbidden City of Peking.

Pretty little Mei Fang-tsi, only sixteen years of age, was all smiles and her heart was light that sunny day in October of 1929 when she was sewn into her elaborately embroidered bridal sedan chair and was carried through the streets of Shanghai to the home of her waiting bridegroom, Hsu Fu-tai, keeper of a fruit shop.

But pretty little Mei was a cold corpse half an hour later when she walked across her husband's threshold.

The little bride died in the sedan chair, presumably from heart failure, and when her corpse was found inside the chair at the door of her husband's abode it so happened that the owner of the property from whom the bridegroom rented his shop and house was standing nearby.

Now this owner was a superstitious man of the old school, and firmly believed that if a dead bride were carried into a house evil days would befall the owner of the roof-tree.

"If she cannot walk in, as custom prescribes a bride should do, then she may not enter," was the owner's harsh decision, and he summoned the police to uphold him in his rights.

The grief-stricken young bridegroom then hired two

stalwart coolies who needed money more than they feared bad luck. He bound the left leg of his bride's corpse to the right leg of one of the coolies, and the right leg of the girl to the left leg of the other coolie. The coolies then strode into the shop and on into the living quarters beyond, with the young bride apparently walking upright between them.

Fervent young men patriots of Shanghai, who disapprove of all things foreign, have taken to publicly branding Chinese women and girls who appear in Shanghai's streets clad in foreign-style clothing, or in dresses made from imported materials.

These young men carry concealed in their gowns large rubber stamps and red ink pads. When they see young women who offend their patriotism they act as quickly as "Jack the Ripper," and brand the dresses with striking Chinese characters which read:

I am not a decent woman because I wear foreign goods.

Then the patriots vanish, and leave the hysterical young women to make their explanations to hostile and jeering crowds.

Sometimes it seems a folly to be wise in the matter of understanding the Chinese language, for foreigners who understand Chinese often overhear conversa-

tions in the streets and in the bazaars which undermine optimism, and entirely banish comfortable complacency.

One hot August day in 1928, soon after the Nationalists captured Peking, a great open air rally was held just south of the main gates to the Forbidden City. From ten different platforms Nationalist orators and propagandists were haranguing a crowd of more than 40,000 somewhat unenthusiastic Peking residents.

On the edge of this crowd stood a portly, pompous middle-aged American woman, well-known member of the resident foreign community in Peking, and with her were two other foreign women—both tourists.

A Chinese girl student, bobbed of hair and modernized, mounted the nearest platform and began an impassioned harangue in Chinese.

"We are all rejoicing that women are beginning to take a part in China's public life," burred the portly guide to her tourist friends. "They are bound to have a softening and uplifting influence upon politics."

But the bobbed-haired young girl orator at that moment was denouncing the existence of the Legation Quarter in Peking, was denouncing the "insolence" of foreigners in daring to attend a patriotic Chinese rally, and was exhorting the crowd to "wait and work for the day when our cannon will level the walls of the Legation Quarter, so that we may march in over the dead bodies

of the foreign dogs and put the torch to the hated symbols of imperialism."

Near the three American women stood two ragged little Chinese boys, about eight and ten years of age.

"They are so bright and sweet and friendly," cooed the portly, pompous one, and then gave each of the urchins a "small dime," then worth about four cents in American money.

The eldest of these two "sweet and friendly" little lads then said to the other, in colloquial Chinese: "The old fat bitch is a fool: let's spit on her."

They circled back of their benefactress, and suited their actions to those words.

The three American women, noting the uproarious laughter of the crowd, thought the girl orator must have made some particularly bright quip.

Storms of protest were raised by an article in a Shanghai Chinese periodical, written by Mr. Cheng Chi-woo, in which he was trying to make the point that there exists the fundamental "right of a nation to commit suicide without outside interference."

The protests were not caused by Mr. Cheng's argument in favor of the right of China to self-destruction, but rather by the admissions which he made, which were to the effect that by factional strife China had already come upon a period of famines, bankruptcy, and de-

population. But even these conditions, he maintained, afforded neither moral nor legal justification for friendly foreign intervention.

Missionaries in remote Kansu and Sinkiang provinces report that the grinding poverty and continual food shortages in those isolated areas have brought about the curious custom of married men renting out their wives.

Sometimes these rental agreements are for only one or two months; sometimes they are "long time" leases for as much as two or three years, with money paid in advance. These long leases are usually made so that the unlucky couple may be assured of money enough to raise a favored child.

But if the rented wife bears any children while she is living away from her husband's house, these children belong to the man who has been renting her, and when she returns to her husband's abode she loses all claim to them.

Shanghai. Sunday afternoon at five o'clock. The entrance to the Majestic Hotel ballroom. A magnificent limousine rolls to the curb, and a young Chinese couple, well dressed in foreign clothing, alight.

Just before the door of the motor car is closed, a glimpse of the interior reveals a magnificent brass cuspidor screwed firmly to the floor of the car, and on the



Mass meeting of Chinese held at Peking to agitate against using foreign-made articles

back seat two small square cushions covered with blue satin on each of which is embroidered, in large yellow letters, the hospitable invitation: "Please Sit Down."

Taochow, an ancient walled city in Kansu province. The Moslem rebellion of the spring of 1929 has ended in a truce, and the Moslem population of Taochow, which fled into the desert for fear of reprisals, have been officially invited to return to their homes. As they file back through the city gate, each man and boy is given a passport promising clemency. More than 6000 men, women, and children are tallied as they return inside the walls of Taochow.

Then the commander of the Chinese garrison harangues the crowd, and announces that the governor has ordered a week's ration of barley to be given to every one of the men and boys. They must file out of the south gate, surrendering their passports as they go, receive their barley, and then come back and rejoin their families.

Interested American missionaries are walking on the city wall, and see the great crowd of men and boys on the military parade ground outside the South Gate, all waiting patiently for the barley ration.

Suddenly Chinese soldiers launch a concerted attack on the unarmed Moslems. Swords, daggers, and revolvers make quick work of the trapped victims of a crafty

revenge. The Moslem womenfolk, waiting inside the walls, hear the uproar going on outside, and add to it by their hysterical cries.

Soon there is silence outside the South Gate, and then the frantic Moslem women stream out, with wild cries, to try to identify their own dead.

The number of bodies officially counted for burial that evening totals 2996.

Constant recurrence of military crises, frequent attacks upon cities in China, the growing number of murders and kidnappings of foreigners in the interior—these things have combined to make commonplaces of situations which elsewhere would provoke gravest alarm, and have served to develop amongst the foreigners living in China a curious detachment and *sang-froid*.

At Canton, when corpses of soldiers from battles up the river are floating past the city, foreigners unconcernedly board launches and go down stream to the golf course, even on days when attacking armies are known to be only twenty miles or so away. If the sound of the guns arouses any comment it is merely a casual remark that they sound closer, or more distant, than the day before.

At Shanghai, though mutinous troops may have cut the Shanghai-Nanking Railway only twenty-five miles away from the International Settlement, and there are

shootings in the Chinese city adjoining the foreign-controlled area, life goes on as usual.

At the big foreign hotels in Shanghai the foreigners (and an undiminished number of wealthy Chinese) go about their tea-dancing with the usual fervor. At the clubs the usual number of players assemble in the bars and in the bridge and mah-jongh rooms. Precautionary measures are taken by the defense forces, of course, but there is no excitement to be noted.

At Peking, when attackers were only a dozen miles from the city in 1926, and the flashes from the artillery could be seen from the roof of the tallest hotel, there was dancing on the roof garden, and the number of promenaders on the old Tartar Wall was larger than usual.

But once, in the summer of 1928, Peking's indifference was replaced by the keenest anxiety. The Northern faction had been in retreat for many days. The Nationalists, when they captured Tsinanfu, the capital of Shantung province, had come into violent conflict with the Japanese. There had been eight days of fighting, with the Japanese victorious. But many Japanese civilians had been murdered, and their bodies frightfully and shamefully mutilated by the Chinese. American missionaries had been murdered by advancing Nationalist troops. The Nationalists had, in many newly captured cities, looted extensively, and had carried out summary "pun-

ishments" against civilian Chinese who had been identified with the old regime.

All Northern soldiers had been withdrawn from Peking, except a handful of about 3200 men left to maintain order. For six days Peking's massive city gates had been closed and barricaded. For six days no one had come into or gone from inside the grey old walls. For six days the railway and the telephone and telegraph lines had been cut, and except for wireless installations in the Legation Quarter, Peking had been entirely isolated from the rest of the world.

Then, on the evening of June 5th, it was announced that an arrangement had been made under which, at ten o'clock the next morning, the Nationalist troops were to enter Peking by the South Gate, while the small Northern force was, at the same hour, to march out of the Northeast Gate.

There was a resplendent moon, nearly full, in the clear June sky that night of the 5th, and under the white light of that moon lay the great city of Peking, a city of more than a million people, huddled inside useless medieval walls, and waiting for an unknown fate.

Ancient as the written history of man, that vast grey-walled city, which still bore vivid scars of other captures and convulsions, cowered in silence. Peking hoped the taking over of control would be peaceful, and nearly every house had ready a blue and white Nationalist flag,

but Peking also feared that at any moment it might hear the first clamor of an assault upon its closed gates.

Those hot, clear June days just past had been much like other days, except for the over-supply of alarmist rumors and the rising prices and alarming shortage of vegetables and fresh meats. But that night of June 5th was different from other nights.

The narrow streets and alleys were almost deserted, and the city's throaty hum was stilled—that distinctive hum of Peking which in normal times is a great human overtone audible at any hour of the day or night.

There were no soldiers to be seen in the moon-drenched streets; even the police had taken to cover. But when the Legation Quarter was approached there were soldiers in plenty—American marines, British Tommies, Japanese soldiers, French soldiers, Italian marines.

The Marco Polo Gate into the Legation Quarter was guarded by the Japanese, and there was barbed wire strung along the top of the Legation Quarter wall. Machine guns on either side of the gate and on the wall were placed to sweep all approaches along the roadway and the great open glacis outside the moat.

The large Wagons-Lits Hotel was deserted. Half a dozen women, none young, huddled apprehensively in the lobby, and talked in whispers, offering a grotesque contrast to the one man there—a Britisher of unruffled

appearance. This one man, stiffly correct in a dinner jacket, with a white kerchief protruding from his left cuff, sat alone sipping a yellow liqueur.

A walk down the southeastern stretch of the Tartar Wall, which is the southern boundary of the Legation Quarter, brought nothing but the comforting silhouettes of American marines pacing up and down, rifles on their shoulders.

The great Chinese section of Peking, lying outside of and south of the Tartar Wall, but still inclosed in a smaller wall of its own, was also unnaturally silent. No hum of activity arose from the streets of that area where 300,000 people lived, and those of the streets that could be seen were deserted.

To the north, the immense area of the yellow-roofed Forbidden City, deserted by Marshal Chang Tso-lin and his government a few days before when they fled to Manchuria, showed not a single light.

The brilliant moonlight glazed the roofs of the Forbidden City as it must have done as long ago as that similar interregnum in 1644 after the last Ming emperor had hanged himself in a pavilion on Coal Hill and just before the victorious Manchus entered Peking from the north to found a new dynasty that was to rule until 1912. But the last of the mighty Manchu dynasty was, that night, plain little Mr. Henry Pu Yi, living in semi-poverty in a foreign concession at Tientsin—a disre-

garded factor in the tragic drama which had again brought conquering armies to the gates of China's ancient capital.

From the Tartar Wall, looking over the buildings in the compound of the American Legation, the black line of the Western Hills was visible, only eleven miles away. Hostile cavalry had appeared that afternoon at the Summer Palace, nine miles from Peking, and just at the base of those temple-built Western Hills. That Summer Palace, built at a cost of \$50,000,000 by the old Dowager Empress who had selected little Mr. Henry Pu Yi to fill the Dragon Throne, had been one of the factors in the long train of events that had brought China and Peking to the crisis of that June night—but that, too, is a separate story.

There had been fighting around the Summer Palace that afternoon—sharp fighting while the glow of the sunset reddened the lotus blooming on the bosom of the palace lake. And many yellow-faced soldiers, yellowed more deeply by the moonlight, were lying dead in the weeds and ditches along the Summer Palace road that night. But their story was mercifully ended.

It was the men in uniform, cavalry and infantry, uncounted tens of thousands of them converging upon Peking that June night who were important—grey-coated soldiers covered with sweat-caked dust and grime, who might begin to press through Peking's old gates at

dawn. The moonlight glazing the Forbidden City roofs was also streaming down upon those thousands of grey-coated men, glinting from their rifles and from their bayonets.

And Peking was waiting.

Waiting.

Peking, huddled quietly under moon-bathed roofs and behind moon-whitened walls and in the black shadows of its thousands of immense old trees—Peking was wondering if the men marching all night would enter as friends or foes.

Would they loot?

Would they kill?

Peking, that night, meant more than the hundreds of thousands of Chinese and Manchus and Mongols.

It meant the American Minister, awake in his legation, scanning again the arrangements for bringing all American citizens into the comparative safety of the Legation Quarter walls. He was in touch with the *U. S. S. Pittsburgh*, near Taku Bar, below Tientsin. The wireless station in the legation compound spluttered its messages all night. He was in touch, by wireless, with General Smedley Butler commanding 3400 American marines at Tientsin. General Butler's two dozen airplanes were ready to come to Peking at the first sign of trouble. His two dozen "baby" tanks were ready, and so were more

than half a hundred motor trucks. Oil and water for the engines had been kept heated to the temperature for a quick start for many anxious weeks. And two battalions of the 15th U. S. Infantry were also at Tientsin—ready to march.

Peking, that night, also meant the British and Japanese and French and Italian and other legations, most of which also had warships ready at Taku Bar, and land forces ready at Tientsin, eighty-eight miles away by road. Peking, that night, meant 1800 American and European civilians marooned in the walled city, and about 2000 Japanese civilians, most of whom had already moved into the Japanese Legation compound.

The commanders of all of the legation guards, too, were wakeful that night—waiting.

The gate into the Legation Quarter nearest to the Italian Legation was guarded by Italian marines, trim in dark blue uniforms and white caps. British soldiers, with machine guns, guarded the gate nearest to the British Legation. And just above them, in painted letters about eight inches in height, the words *LEST WE FORGET* stood out whitely in the moonlight. Below those words, pitted deep in the wall, were the marks made in 1900 by bullets fired by the besieging Boxer hordes.

Northward and across the wide boulevard lying north of the Legation Quarter, stood the club-house main-

tained by the non-commissioned officers of the American Legation Guard. No one there, except five white-gowned servants—five scared Chinese.

But they were not too scared to serve cooling German beer, and then one of them chose a phonograph record at random—"Chant de Bonheur," played by a mighty organ. "The Song of Happiness" swelled its moving chords and harmonies into the silence of Peking's fateful night.

A brighter moon, and blacker shadows. Streets entirely deserted, even at eleven o'clock at night. Scarcely a glow of light shining through any chink in any building. Doorways and windows shuttered tight—some of them red lacquered doorways bearing the Chinese emblem of happiness.

"Chant de Bonheur."

Down narrow, deserted alleys—alleys so narrow that two rickshas could not pass. But there were no other rickshas to be met.

Then, at a corner, organ music once more—music from the kind of small portable organ that missionaries take with them on trips into the interior. A thin soprano voice singing in English:

"Jesus loves me, that I know—"

"Chant de Bonheur?"

Another sharp corner. The sound of the hymn quav-

ering out into the moonlight was cut off abruptly—just as a bullet might cut off a prayer, or a curse.

One more turn, and then a familiar red gate—the white-walled compound of home.

Absolute silence.

Waiting.

Willow trees, so motionless in the moonlight that even the black edges of their shadows did not stir upon the ground.

The red happiness-gates closed, bolted.

Ears strained for a shot to shatter the loveliness of the night.

But only silence.

Waiting.

When large cities like Hankow or Canton are attacked or captured, the American and European newspapers chronicle the facts under large headlines—but the rest of the world knows nothing of the horrors which were perpetrated in Fushan in May of 1929.

Fushan is in eastern Shantung province, far from railroads, and not very close to the sea. In the spring of 1929 several ex-warlords returned from exile in Japan and launched an abortive rebellion in eastern Shantung. General Chu Yu-pu, who a year before had ruled the 30,000,000 people of Chihli province as military gov-

ernor, was one of these luckless leaders, and when the rebellion collapsed Chu Yu-pu and his soldiers retired into the little walled city of Fushan. Then began a siege which lasted for thirteen days. About 20,000 unarmed civilians lived in Fushan, and were helpless when Chu Yu-pu's 4500 armed coolies and ex-bandits marched in and locked the gates behind them.

During that thirteen days of siege the defenders tied more than 400 women and children to posts on the top of the city walls, and from behind these living shields fired down upon the attackers.

But the siege came to an abrupt end. The soldiers of Chu Yu-pu had been guilty of such frightful excesses of rapine and brutality that the women and girls of the city, by a prearranged plan, hurled themselves down into the wells which were Fushan's only source of water supply. They kept jumping into the wells until the water sources were filled with the dead bodies of these frenzied suicides.

Then Fushan surrendered.

But General Chu Yu-pu was not punished. He was not even made a prisoner by the victorious "Nationalist" forces which shouted allegiance to the Nanking Government.

In China one never knows. Today's enemy may be next month's invaluable ally.

So General Chu Yu-pu, in spite of the well-known

atrocities perpetuated in Fushan, was given safe conduct to the coast, and was permitted to sail away to Korea, taking with him \$400,000 in silver bars and coins.

Nanking did not punish Chu Yu-pu, but several months later the peasants of eastern Shantung did the decent thing to him.

He returned from his easy exile, and when the peasants of the Fushan district caught him they dug a deep pit, buried him alive up to the chin, tramped the soil down firmly, and then stood around in a solid, silent circle while the hot sun and the big red and black ants had their way with his Excellency, the ex-Governor.

In the spring of 1929, from April 6th to 13th, the large city of Changteh endured a reign of terror after it was recaptured from "rebels" by Nanking's "Nationalist" troops, which were reinforced by bandit gangs which had been promised a free hand at looting as the price of their allegiance to the forces of the "Central Government."

Mr. H. C. Pelling, an American engaged in the tobacco business at Changteh, hid in a coolie mud hut for seven days. He saw Chinese women and children slaughtered in the streets; he saw some of the townsfolk driven back into their burning homes by soldiers armed with bayonets, and he watched the soldiers laughing while their shrieking victims died in the flames.

Mr. H. Gabb, an American missionary, was less lucky. His place of concealment was discovered, he was stripped of all clothing, bound hand and foot, and dragged naked through the mud for the delectation of the mobs. And then he was stabbed in the left thigh by a soldier's bayonet.

Canton, December, 1929. A young Chinese aviator, employed by the Nanking Government, is just back from a flight during which he has dropped bombs on nine villages on the suspicion that some of the "Iron-sides" division might be hiding there during daylight hours, preparatory to resuming their advance against Canton at dusk.

The bombs which wrecked the villages, by the way, were dropped from an American-made war plane, exported to China under permission of the American Secretary of State.

The young aviator, drinking brandy neat from a large tumbler, airs his views:

"Very soon China will be governed from the air. No, the Air Force will not be bought over by first one and then by another faction, as the Army and Navy have repeatedly been bought.—Oh, no, we are not going to uphold the present Nanking crowd, either. As soon as we are strong enough, we'll drive them out of the country.—Why should we fight for a faction at Nan-

king, or join any other faction, when the airplanes will be the deciding factor in the war situation? We are going to hold together, and run the whole country to suit ourselves.”

Two days later the Chinese Red Cross sent to Nanking a formal protest against the habit of bombing harmless villages from war planes. But all through January, February, and March of 1930 American-made bombing planes continued to arrive at Shanghai under export permits bearing the O.K. of the American Secretary of State.

The factions opposed to Nanking want to boycott American trade because of these shipments, which they declared to be tantamount to interfering in China's internal affairs and to taking sides with a single faction in China's civil wars.

But Nanking was given formal recognition by Washington and the arms embargo against China was raised. Can one government refuse to permit the sale of war materials to the government of another friendly nation?

The initial blunder was that of granting formal recognition to Nanking as the Government of China, particularly at a time when China was far from united and when the Nanking regime could make only hollow pretensions to stability or to authority. But had recognition been withheld, the Nationalists would have denounced "imperialistic" Washington, and would have charged

the United States with withholding support in an effort to "frustrate the Revolution."

A bright reverse to the dark picture of famine, misgovernment, treacheries, and corruption in China is a spectacle afforded in Tsinanfu, the capital of Shantung province, of charitable and humane Chinese, Christians and non-Christians, working side by side to finance relief work and the operation of a hospital to care for neglected wounded soldiers of all factions.

Djang Ta-chen and Ho Chien-chiang furnish this spectacle, and they differ as night from day in religions, in fortunes, in personal backgrounds, and in viewpoints.

Djang Ta-chen is a Christian, past fifty years of age. He was a preacher for a time, then a highly paid professor. But he gave up teaching to devote himself to social service work under the Y.M.C.A., at a salary only one-fourth that which had been his as a professor. Mr. Djang manages a Red Cross hospital in Tsinanfu, and in times of famine also manages gruel kitchens which feed thousands of men and women a day.

Ho Chien-chiang, now nearly seventy years of age, is a "gentleman of the old school," and is reputed to be very wealthy. He largely finances Mr. Djang's relief enterprises from a fortune which he accumulated as an officer in the old Imperial Army under the late Dowager Empress. For a time he was military governor of Chahar,

under the Manchus. In 1921 he gave \$750,000 to the famine relief fund in his own province.

Mr. Ho is not a Christian, and he has four wives.

Men of Mr. Ho's type will rarely talk about politics. Present day militarists would gain "much face" if they could persuade men like Mr. Ho to accept appointments as "advisers," but they wisely abstain from participation in public affairs. They are not numerous enough to oust the present militarists and politicians.

Men like Mr. Djang and Mr. Ho are really patriots, not propagandists. They are under no illusions, and their hearts are heavy because of the present plight and dark future of their fellow countrymen.

In the autumn of 1929, while the Nanking Government was insisting upon the surrender of extra-territoriality and upon trying to make all foreigners in China subject to Chinese courts and to Chinese laws and justice, the four sons of the late Sheng Kung-pao, multi-millionaire philanthropist, were wording a long petition to General Chiang Kai-shih and the Nanking Government.

This petition protested against the official order for the confiscation of the 15,000,000 taels estate left by their late father, of which sum 5,000,000 taels was bequeathed to Chinese charitable institutions in and around Shanghai.

Confiscation of the estate was ordered because of asserted embezzlements by Sheng Kung-pao in the days of the Manchu Dynasty.

Sheng Kung-pao died in 1916, the sons pointed out, and even if their father had been guilty the Chinese statute of limitations had long since run out, for his connection with government affairs ended in 1911. But the process of confiscating the property, even that portion left to charity, continued briskly under government supervision, even while the Nanking Foreign Office assured the rest of the world of its readiness and ability to "protect the lives and properties of all foreigners" under Chinese laws and courts.

The future of foreign trade in China is discussed daily by foreigners who live there—discussed not only in banks and other places of business, but in the club bars and dining rooms and at private dinner parties, and the views expressed range from bitter pessimism to rosy optimism.

"China is going back to the stage of river junks and coolie carriers," says one. "Her streams are silting, her railroads will soon cease functioning, and she will drive all foreign merchant ships from her inland and coastal waterways."

"The future will be marvelous," argues another. "More and more Chinese are finding foreign-made ar-

ticles indispensable; the luxuries of ten years ago are the necessities of today."

"Our firm is withdrawing all foreigners from all interior points," the head man of a big company announces. "Hereafter we shall deal only through Chinese agents, and I expect to see the day when even the Shanghai office is entirely staffed with Chinese. We must turn the business over to Chinese, or stop importing our goods into China; anti-foreign propaganda is having this effect."

"We've abandoned Szechuan," says another apostle of gloom. "There are thirteen independent stations collecting transit taxes along a stretch of 180 miles of river above Ichang, and when we've paid those thirteen taxes our goods are so expensive that the Szechuan people cannot afford to buy them."

Rumors of unemployment and of "hard times" in the United States have caused a prodigious amount of headshaking amongst the heads of many European firms doing business in China.

They fear that the pinch of domestic competition, the glut of over-production, and the push of unemployment in the United States will drive the more hardy and adventurous Americans to foreign lands.

"Your capitalists know," they say, "that every 5000 successful American businessmen established in foreign countries will eventually furnish business for the em-

ployment of 1,000,000 workers in the United States. With the capital now available in the United States, and with your unquestioned mechanical and factory superiority, America will probably win the mastery of world trade.

“For generations the Americans have had the mental viewpoint of pioneers who conquer unpeopled places. Now that the remaining unpeopled places are inaccessible or uncongenial, the Americans are accomplishing an abrupt shift of this pioneer instinct, and are essaying victories in the most thickly settled parts of the globe—namely where the choicest plums of trade are to be found.”

The “cage of disgrace” was frequently seen in China in 1928 and 1929, generally being used as a means of punishing Chinese merchants who had persisted in dealing in Japanese-made goods in spite of the mandates of the Anti-Japanese Boycott Association which was organized in many cities immediately after the clash of Japanese and Nationalist troops in Tsinanfu in May, 1928.

This “cage of disgrace,” which has had immemorial usage in China, is usually made of bamboo or of woven osier. The offender put into it must stand erect, and often on tiptoe, for only his head protrudes through a round hole at the top. The cage is then tied with ropes

and hauled into the air about twenty feet above the street level. Large cloth signs, telling of the luckless one's offense, hang from the bottom of the cage, and all passers-by may fling verbal abuse or material filth at the sufferer if they choose to do so.

During the tyranny of the Anti-Japanese Boycott Association many luckless dealers in Japanese-made goods were suspended in this manner for as long as forty-eight hours, or until they agreed to pay the "fines" imposed by the Association.

This Anti-Japanese Boycott Association was not a government organ, nor had it any legal standing, but in many cities it maintained its own courts and jails, searched stores and warehouses at will, levied fines, and punished offenders.

Repeated official protests from the Japanese Government brought replies from the Nanking Foreign Office that the Nanking authorities could not "interfere with a patriotic manifestation of Nationalism."

Ku Hung-ming is dead now, but he was an outspoken old gentleman in 1928, and time was when his books were extremely popular in China, and when he ranked with the greatest living Chinese thinkers. Born in Penang in the middle of the last century, he was nominally a British subject, but always scorned to seek the protection to which this technical status would have entitled

him. He was sent from Penang to Scotland to be educated, and never saw China until he was twenty-five years of age. When he returned to China he was ashamed to admit that he was a Chinese; the filth, the smells, the social habits of his countrymen revolted him. But soon he changed, and, as he phrased it in his old age, became "more Chinese than China itself."

"The Powers must let us alone," declared Ku Hung-ming, shortly before his death. "We must settle this long series of civil wars in our own way. The democracy of America is based upon the right of shouting and voting. China's democracy is based upon the right of shouting and fighting. What Americans can settle by the ballot, we must settle by the bullet.

"China could not put her best man into power by an election. She has always, after a dynastic overturn, settled such matters by prolonged wars, and today she must endure her strife until victory determines who is really the best man. Only victory will show who is right.

"The old China had too much rotten learning. The new China has too much half-baked learning. We suffer from the illusions of too many half-educated returned students who are ripe for any folly.

"Our whole history shows that all revolutions have been started by the dissatisfaction of the intelligentsia—that is, by the student classes. And all of them have progressed through years of misery until the intelli-

gentsia were out of the picture and the bandits virtually ruled the country.

"I can see no justification for what would be termed even 'benevolent intervention' by the Powers. America and Europe, from 1914 to 1918, enjoyed a big foreign-style mah-jongh game called the World War. Even had China been powerful enough to intervene benevolently in that war on the ground that a continent was being ruined and millions of people were being killed and other millions being brought to misery—even had China been strong enough to take such an attitude it would have been unjustified.

"Just now we in China are having an incomparably smaller mah-jongh game, and there is no justification for American nor European intervention on the ground that we are ruining a continent and bringing millions of people to misery and death.

"I sniff at the idea of a future of democracy in China. The best form of democracy for this country will be a despotism, tempered by the right of the people to rebel.

"We Chinese had too many years of soft peace. A nation which does not know how to fight cannot be independent—indeed, it does not deserve independence. It is not an unhealthy sign that our only improvement since 1911 has been improvement in methods of warfare."

Ku Hung-ming entertained cynical views concerning

the many philanthropic and benevolent enterprises maintained in China by the expenditure of American money, and he phrased his views pithily but sometimes cruelly.

"The main trouble with America's relations with China," he declared, "is the fact that the United States sends us too many of its own pests—what I call the Three P's. By this I mean patriots, politicians, and professors. And the missionaries are even worse.

"The patriots are over-zealous worshipers of everything American, so much so that they can see no good in any other land. The politicians are not statesmen—they take too narrow a view of all the implications of Far Eastern affairs, and imagine they are diplomats. The professors think that because they have specialized in and mastered some particular line of learning they are therefore qualified to deliver edicts on every knotty question under foreign skies.

"As to missionaries—the old type busied themselves with preaching Christianity and with works of mercy, and were splendid men and women. But most of the present day missionaries spend their time trying to teach 'the new learning,' and meddling in our political affairs, which, after all, are none of their concern. They are far from splendid.

"However, even the new style missionaries, by keeping the hypocrisy of morality alive, prevent the beach-

combing and die-hard treaty-port types of foreigners from being too arrogant. They are like a constant brake upon their more aggressive fellow nationals.

"The greatest harm the United States has done to China, in my opinion, has been the well-intentioned American policy of spending a lot of money upon the education of young Chinese in America. These half-baked students come home useless to their own country because they have what you Americans picturesquely call 'swelled heads.' What we need in education is quality, not quantity. Reverse your policy; send us your very ablest men to learn our problems and help us to solve them, instead of taking our brightest sons from us and making aliens of them by teaching them your ways.

"Our main trouble is economic. The Americans, for instance, feared that a great influx of cheap Chinese labor would upset industry and lower the American standard of living. Therefore the United States shut the door against Chinese immigration.

"But China has not been able to shut the door in the face of the invasion of foreign machines and cheap machine-made goods, and those two invasions, by making idle tens of millions of our skilled hand workers and coolies, have ruined us, just as an influx of millions of Chinese laborers would have upset the American industrial scheme."

Chapter Nineteen

TO JUSTIFY HOPE

WHILE the rivers of China are salty with the tears of its women and red with the blood of its men, what is happening in that distracted land which justifies hope for the future of its tortured people?

Is the whole picture dark and unredeemed by highlights, or are processes under way which may help to shorten the coming of days of peace when ruined cities may be rebuilt, ruined fields be re-sown, ruined lives be reilluminated by a justified optimism?

The days of lasting peace are probably far away. Indeed it is doubtful if any Chinese alive today will experience a really enduring period of law and order in their own land. Temporary and precarious truces may be arrived at, but all signs indicate that however artificially these truces may be prolonged they will still be periods of uncertainty and justified dread, and that civil strife must continue for many a decade—always supposing, of course, that the rest of the world permits China to continue to destroy itself.

But even during the present spasm of self-destruction there are many things being accomplished which will

prove to be of solid worth to the China of tomorrow.

The war lords, as they prosecute their almost continuous campaigns, are creating in the masses of the people a weariness of war that may some day develop into a pressure of public opinion strong enough to check even the ambitions and unscrupulous rapacity of those who misgovern the country.

Even while the militarists ruin the areas over which their armies trample, they are building roads. If one faction wins a war by the use of motor transport, the other factions all take the lesson to heart, build new highways, and order motor trucks from abroad.

Each faction that is struggling for control has learned the value of propaganda and the necessity of trying to win some measure of popular support. The use of propaganda is gradually educating the illiterate masses, and is teaching them to think politically. In many cases they are being wrongly educated, and are basing their thoughts upon fallacies, but the important thing is that they are learning to think, and that the mere fact that they are being appealed to by propagandists is teaching them the lesson that they are of importance and have a latent power which even their military rulers have begun to respect and to court. This consciousness of importance, individually and collectively, grows and spreads, and will be an important factor in the evolution of the race. It is a new thing in China, where for cen-

turies only the scholars were of importance, and even they were mere chosen agents of the mysterious Son of Heaven.

Does an army of 50,000 men of Kwangtung province march far northward into Honan province, plundering as it goes? This progress is not altogether a wasteful and destructive thing. The Kwangtung men, heretofore entirely provincial and speaking a tongue not understood in Central China, gain some knowledge of how other Chinese live, and they also learn the dialects of the districts in which they are quartered. This helps to break down narrow sectionalism.

At the same time that militarism is playing its destructive role, a tremendous ferment of ideas is under way in China, not only in the coastal provinces, but far in the interior. Education is more highly prized today than ever before by Chinese, and this is saying much about a land where learning has always been honored. Moreover education is being made easier in China from year to year, simplified methods of learning are being perfected, and in the great cities the number of printing presses is steadily increasing. Books are published in almost incredible numbers, considering the percentage of illiteracy in the land, and newspapers and other periodicals are increasing in numbers and in circulation.

The desperation of the plight of the people is not resulting in a fatal mental lethargy and resignation;

instead it has brought about a new hunger for knowledge, almost as if the Chinese consciously sought from learning the whys and wherefores of their present distress.

There is a tremendous vitality in a people which can produce men of the types of the Chinese university professors of Peking who, when their salaries had not been paid for twenty-six months, continued teaching in the classrooms daily, and at night, in order to earn a meagre living, blackened their faces as a disguise and pulled rickshas in the cold and windy streets in order to earn enough money with which to buy food.

Sinkiang, one of the most remote of China's provinces, has a population almost 100 per cent illiterate. There is one bookstore in the whole province, and only one newspaper, a weekly publication with only 53 subscribers. And yet in the autumn of 1929 the Secretary of the Sinkiang Provincial Government made a trip clear to Shanghai to buy a printing press and books for a provincial library—a trip which consumed three months of time and involved traveling by sedan chair, by mule cart, by river junk, by camel caravan, by railway, and finally by river steamer.

Instances of this kind would not be worth recording if they were exceptional, but they are not exceptional. They are typical and characteristic.

What can be done to educate China's hundreds of

millions? Obviously there will be no adequate funds available from Chinese sources so long as civil wars continue, and unhappily for the Chinese people many of the mission schools and colleges have been closed as a result of officially nurtured anti-foreignism.

The Commissioner of Education of Hupeh province, the capital of which is Hankow, published a survey of the educational needs of Hupeh in the autumn of 1928, and revealed startling figures. He stated that in this one province there were 3,200,000 children of school age who were receiving no education of any kind. In order to give these children even the barest smattering of education 80,500 new schools were needed. The quality of the education planned may be gauged from the fact that the official estimate was that these 80,500 schools could be opened and operated for one year for \$10,465,000 in Chinese money—an average of \$130 per school each of which would average an attendance of about 40 pupils.

Where is the money to be obtained for even this meagre educational appropriation in one province?

The Nanking Ministry of Education, in a formal statement issued in January of 1930, estimated that there were in China 37,000,000 children of school age who could neither read nor write, and who had small chance of ever learning to do either.

In order to give these 37,000,000 even the rudiments

of an education, said the official estimate, China would need at once 1,200,000 trained teachers, and the cost of giving one year of teaching to these 37,000,000 children, without allowing a penny for buildings or rentals, would total \$260,000,000.

In China today there exist 275 normal schools, with a total attendance of 38,277 students who are fitting themselves to become teachers. Only one of these schools, which is located in Peking, admits women students. The average cost per year per student is only \$168.61—less than \$65 in American money.

These, at first glance, seem to be despairing statistics. But in reality great progress has been made in China in the matter of educating the masses.

In 1906, in all of the schools in China, there were only 468,220 pupils and students, of whom only 286 were women or girls. In 1929 the total of all pupils and students had increased to 6,615,772, of whom 417,820 were women or girls. In short, within twenty-three years the number of women and girls being educated had increased to almost the total of combined male and female registration for the year 1906, and the total of all pupils and students had been multiplied fourteen times.

Even before the Nationalists captured Peking, the Nanking government summoned a National Educational Conference at which careful plans were outlined covering a minimum of four years of compulsory edu-

cation, and lines of study were mapped from kindergarten ages to post-graduate work in the universities. Unhappily this program, like many other laudable plans evolved by the Nationalists under the national tutelage scheme of the Kuomintang Party, has come to nothing because civil wars have devoured all the government's revenues.

In 1920 the then Peking Government formulated an educational scheme for enforcement in various types of communities which contemplated introduction of compulsory education as follows:

1921	provincial capitals and open ports
1922	county seats and cities
1923	towns with more than 500 families
1924	towns with more than 300 families
1925-26	towns with more than 200 families
1927	towns with more than 100 families
1928	villages with fewer than 100 families.

Unhappily this program, too, came to nothing, and only in Shansi, the province ruled by Yen Hsi-shan, "The Model Governor," has substantial progress been made in educational lines. In Shansi more than 75 per cent of the children of school age were actually in schools in 1929, and continuation schools were compulsory for illiterate adults under twenty-five years of age. This class was being made to complete a one-year

course in the Chinese language, arithmetic, and citizenship. Kiangsu province, too, has made special efforts to forward a ten-year program for training teachers, and a special land tax totaling about 40 cents per acre has been authorized which will raise more than \$5,500,000 a year to support the scheme.

The Mass Education or "1000 Character Movement" is also making great progress, and has plans outlined for the elimination of 200,000,000 illiterates within thirty years.

This "1000 Character Movement" offers a system of education for beginners which is both cheap and easy. Four "readers," which together cost only 10 cents, Chinese money, contain a reading vocabulary of 1200 Chinese characters, and the average illiterate adult, by devoting one hour a day to study, can master these 1200 characters within four months. This equipment makes possible the reading of ordinary newspapers and also a great range of books upon cultural and technical subjects which have been written especially for the "1000 Character" students.

This four months of study, and the education which it brings, is, of course, only a beginning, but even this fragment of learning removes millions from a life of absolute illiteracy and dense ignorance hitherto enlightened only by rumor and gossip.

Here and there in China are "model villages" and even

a few "model counties," where efforts are being made to educate the peasants along various lines, and these districts are becoming object lessons to the surrounding countryside.

A notable contribution to the cause of national education was made in 1929 when a Chinese-owned publishing house issued in 2000 volumes a "Complete Library" containing, translated into simplified popular language, not only the cream of the Chinese classics, but also hundreds of volumes of the best of the world's foreign literature, as well as comprehensive sections on history, geography, mathematics, medical science, agriculture, physical culture, and even a thirty-volume encyclopaedia.

This comprehensive publication, put out at a retail cost of only \$350, Chinese money, is so cheap that even the smaller and poorer cities can afford to buy it as the nucleus of a public library.

The response was immediate, and within six months nearly 5000 complete sets had been taken. Some provincial governments ordered more than 100 sets each, and every vessel in the Chinese navy was equipped with one set.

The spread of education has resulted in remarkable strides being made in the emancipation of Chinese women from the state of ignorance and subjection in which they had been kept for countless centuries, and already in many localities brisk campaigns are under way

to end the system of plural marriages and to do away with the institution of concubinage and the slavery of women.

Concubinage was the natural result of the old system of family life, under which marriages were arranged by parents or guardians. The Confucian system of ancestor worship also made concubinage seem good and proper, for it was the duty of a man to beget as many sons as possible in order that the male line might never be in danger of extinction.

Under the Nationalist regime divorces are easier, and women at last share in inheritances equally with men.

As yet no law exists providing for the punishment of men who commit plural marriages or purchase concubines, but organizations of Chinese women are springing up which demand the passage of such a law.

In many Chinese cities today there is brisk discussion of the merits and demerits of systems of birth control, and free love is both preached and practiced by some of the young radical revolutionaries. The growing popularity of what are termed "temporary unions" is causing apprehension in many circles, and is a common topic for serious discussion in many Chinese publications.

Some form of birth control seems to be among the eventual necessities for China and should bring an amelioration of social and economic conditions. Such in-

complete statistics as exist indicate that the average adult Chinese woman bears nine children during her lifetime, but less than half of these offspring live beyond the age of five years.

This excessive childbearing, it is declared, has tended to devitalize the race, and is probably one of the causes for the fact that the average length of life in China is only 22 years against 45.3 years in England, 50 in Switzerland and Norway, and 39 in Prussia.

Lack of sanitation, ignorance of modern medical knowledge, wars, famines, and pestilences also play their part in making the average human life in China shockingly short, but if the average life were longer, under the present birth rate, overpopulation and the rapidly rising cost of living would soon sink the nation into hopeless pauperism.

Many and diverse as are the forces at work in China which eventually will make for betterment, they are today not powerful enough to promise any early amelioration of conditions which are rapidly tending from bad to worse.

The Nationalist movement, it is true, has done much toward effecting a mental and emotional unification of the people in certain areas and amongst certain classes, and some foreign optimists have been led to believe that China will experience a regeneration as rapid and as thorough as that experienced by Turkey.

The comparison is not a happy one, for modern Turkey is restricted in area, and when compared with China has a mere handful of population. If China were only the size of one of the average Chinese provinces, and if it had only a score of million of population, there might be a possibility of a speedy regeneration, but China is of continental area and is inhabited by hundreds of millions of people.

Change and improvement in such a scene must, of necessity, be both painful and slow, but it need not be a torture indefinitely prolonged if the rest of the world will admit that it should offer aid to China, and if China will accept outside help.

Chapter Twenty

CONCLUSIONS

ONE of the greatest problems of this century is that of devising some way in which China can be incorporated into present day civilization, and neither impatience nor harshness should be permitted to influence the attitude of the rest of the world toward China's continuing woes and seemingly abortive struggles.

The present tendency is toward utter chaos, and this tendency must be retarded and changed into a process of evolution. At all costs the fine and fundamental qualities of the race must be saved from obliteration, and the Chinese must be given the assistance necessary in the difficult task of becoming adapted to modern conditions and of absorbing such qualities from Occidental civilization as will merge with but not submerge national characteristics.

These are not distinctively Chinese problems. They are world problems, for the character of the civilization and government finally evolved by the 480,000,000 human beings who people China will go far toward determining the future of the rest of mankind.

The two main schools of thought about modern China are in violent opposition.

One has adopted such slogans as "Hands off China"; and "Let the Chinese settle their problems in their own way." This school is to a large extent made up of optimists who see in every new turn of events and in the rise of nearly every new leader the quick deliverance of the country from wars, lawlessness, and misery.

The other school declares that the Chinese are racially incapable of ever evolving a modern government, insist that the Chinese, as a people, offer a mass case of arrested mental development, and that this "child-mindedness" makes it necessary for the white races to take over the administration of China.

The newcomer to China is likely, at first, to side with the optimistic school. His principal contacts in the great cities are likely to be with charming Chinese men and women, many of them foreign educated, or with the trained official classes whose duty it is to feign optimism or who may be sincere to the point of fanaticism in their belief that the nation's regeneration is at hand.

But after a year or so the average foreign resident in China is apt to begin to favor the school of pessimism. He wonders if the Chinese, as a race, really are "child-minded," or, remembering their glorious history, he wonders if as a race they have reached a period of senility.

Are they "child-minded," he asks himself, or are they, racially, in their second childhood?

Then begins the quest for what, in Western parlance, would be called adult minds. They are distressingly few and hard to find, even amongst the men who have returned from foreign universities with masters or doctors degrees.

This disappointing quest is apt to end in a settled attitude of pessimism—a pessimism confirmed by the continuance of civil wars, mounting evidences of the insincerity and venality of many of the leaders, and the rapid acceleration of the pace at which the country is going down the road to ruin.

But a pessimism based upon a disappointment is not sound; to be a valid thing such a pessimism must be based upon evidence and reason. The race which can produce some of the great and able Chinese living in China today is not a "child-minded" race. Some of China's present leaders are what, in the West, would be called "self-made men." Some have sprung from the peasant class, some from the laboring classes. China is not peopled by millions of "child-minded" folk who have been ruled by an inherited aristocracy of brains. Century by century her great men have come up from small beginnings, with neither wealth nor ancestry as a background.

The Chinese are alien-minded to the American and

European, but this is because for countless generations they were not only cut off from the rest of the world, but because during their isolation their own culture, religions, social habits and systems became ingrown. Strip this alien-mindedness from the average illiterate Chinese peasant or laborer, and he will be found as shrewd, as human, as humorous, and usually more kindly and more thrifty and hard-working than the average isolated and illiterate peasant or laborer of other lands. He is backward, yes; but inferior—emphatically no!

Because so many tens of millions of Chinese are backward, because events have conspired to nearly bankrupt the country at the same time that it has become dominated by hordes of hungry armies, China has become unable to manage her own affairs. If a selected group of Chinese patriots and administrators were to be supplied with adequate funds, they could no doubt bring order out of chaos. Money could purchase quietude on the part of restless generals, could disband the armies, and could launch great and needed public works which would give employment to the discharged soldiers. Prosperity would return to the land.

But money to the extent of the hundreds of millions necessary for these enterprises will not be forthcoming under present conditions. If, by a miracle, the disbandment could be effected and the public enterprises be

begun, then money would flow to China seeking profitable investment—always supposing that absurd anti-foreignism did not keep it out.

Lacking such a miracle, the only alternative seems to be an international intervention—a benevolent intervention undertaken solely to end China's misfortunes both for the sake of the Chinese people and because of the prosperity which a proper settlement of China's problems would help to bring to the rest of the world.

As a rule intervention from without in the domestic affairs of a nation is justified only when the political development indicates either childhood or decay. The supposition of either racial or national childhood or decay is, naturally, offensive to all thinking Chinese, and because of this fact proposals for intervention will always be violently opposed by most of the articulate portion of the population.

But an intervention in Chinese affairs today need not and should not be inspired with the idea that China is too "child-minded" or too senile to accomplish its own regeneration. The facts of the case justify neither assumption, but the facts of the case do show that the problem is too great both geographically and numerically to be successfully handled by the relatively small number of Chinese who today are properly trained and educated for the herculean task that lies ahead. The fact that China lacks a sufficiently large personnel of

properly trained men is not to China's discredit—it is a natural outcome of her geographical and historical isolation from the nations which have developed the mechanical civilization of today.

Compulsion exercised upon a nation from outside usually follows the failure of the nation in question properly to administer its own affairs. The fact that the population of a given portion of the globe is indigenous to the area it holds gives no perpetual title to that area unless that population can prove its fitness to administer and develop the lands it occupies.

The Chinese today, because of tremendous changes which they could not control, can neither administer nor develop their own land either to the satisfaction and welfare of their own race, or in a manner which prevents their domestic affairs from being a menace to the rest of the world. Time was when they could and did administer and develop their own land efficiently and even vastly extended its borders and their own racial authority. But when there seemed to be no more worlds to conquer, development first slowed and then ceased, and there ensued a stationary period which was brought to a violent end by contact with new forces and new cultures from lands the very existence of which had not been guessed by the Chinese.

Today the interests of the people of China are far from being identical with the interests of the militarists

who rule China. Armed minorities hold power. The vast majorities have no voice in the unstable governments that come into existence, have no choice but to pay higher and higher taxes, and are then misgoverned and victimized by the minority who extort from them the fruits of their labors and use the extorted funds to maintain their tyranny.

The Kuomintang theory concerning the necessity for a period of political tutelage is a sound theory, but the Kuomintang has not been able to end the period of militarism, and the ending of militarism is a necessary condition precedent to the period of tutelage. The Kuomintang, despite the efforts of the idealists who sought to retain control, has itself passed under a militaristic domination—indeed the Party itself is now split into militaristic factions which differ so widely that it has become an absurdity to insist that they all belong to the same political organization.

If this process of destruction is not soon halted the Chinese people may indeed be reduced to that condition of lack of vigor and general impotency which will make self-regeneration impossible, and will bring about precisely that decay of the race which the pessimists believe is already far advanced.

The fact that China was once a great nation is not a valid argument to offer as proof that she must necessarily again become great and strong. Other nations have been

great, have brought about their own destruction, and have sunk into oblivion. The numerical strength of the Chinese as a race will not of itself save them and assure them a great future, and the qualities and assets necessary to make this numerical strength a national asset are now in danger of destruction.

In the face of this critical emergency, which directly affects nearly an eighth of the world's land area and nearly one-fourth of the inhabitants of the globe, and which is necessarily having serious effects upon the rest of the world, the time has come for the Powers to take counsel.

The League of Nations is obviously not the organization to take up consideration of the problem of helping China, for the United States is not a member of the League, and the United States has always been China's friend and protector. But the Powers which signed the Washington Conference agreements might consider acting, or the signatories to the Kellogg-Briand treaties might be called into conference. Russia and Japan, however much they might object to having the problem of Manchuria and Mongolia considered by such a concert of Powers, would probably acquiesce in the end.

It is possible that the mere calling of such a conference would so shock and alarm the Chinese leaders that they might of their own accord reach some agreement which would give the people of China at least a breathing spell.

Failing such a happy and, alas, not altogether probable effect, the Powers would then be justified in warning China that if peace were not arranged within a given time and some beginnings made for the rehabilitation of the country, a benevolent intervention would be begun.

This warning, of course, would have to make clear that no permanent impairment of China's sovereignty was intended, and that there would be no permanent occupation of Chinese territory and no alienation of a single foot of Chinese land.

In order to allay all suspicions, in China and elsewhere, that the intervening Powers were really a *plunderbund* masking as an international philanthropy, treaties defining the purposes and extent of the intervention, and the conditions necessary to terminating foreign control, would have to be mutually signed and published to the world.

But if China resisted?

There would be war, of course. But it would be a short war, and not costly in either lives or money. Seizure of the ports would be a simple matter, and this would be quickly followed by foreign military control of the railways. Foreign gunboats strung up the Yangtze River would cut the country in half, foreign cruisers on coast patrol, and foreign control of the customs would make impossible the smuggling of arms into the country, and

the Chinese arsenals would, with unimportant exceptions, come under foreign control when the railways were seized.

With these projects carried out, the Chinese armies would be powerless, and the Chinese people would awaken from a nineteen-year nightmare of civil war, insecurity, and extortion to a period of peace, honest administration, and reconstruction.

The costs of such an intervention should, and could easily be borne by China. An honest collection and handling of taxes under peaceful conditions which would permit the revival of industry and trade would more than run the country, support the forces of occupation, and provide a surplus for education and public works.

Action of this kind would at last make possible the beginning of the "period of tutelage" which the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Nationalists admit to be essential for the people. The Kuomintang Party, freed of military tyranny, could take the lead in the tutelage of real nationalism to the Chinese people, at the same time that China was enjoying a breathing-spell which would permit the training of a Chinese personnel large enough to handle the administrative problems of China's enormous area.

Then and only then could foreign capital find safe investment in China, and under conditions which could

be made to safeguard the Chinese from mortgaging their future for an indefinite period to American or European capitalism.

The project for an intervention of this kind may appear quixotic to the uninformed, and may be dubbed the advocacy of an unjustifiable expenditure of lives and treasure.

"Send foreign soldiers and foreign money to help put China in order? Let the Chinese stew in their own juice!"

Unfortunately many people take this attitude.

But the lives and money which such an intervention would cost would be only equivalent to paying a premium on a fire insurance policy, for China today is heading for chaos and ruin, and is prostrate and inviting aggression and partition. If aggression and partition are attempted, the result will probably be another World War, the costs and probable consequences of which are too appalling for contemplation.

Two powerful deterrent factors must be considered—the probability of bitter Chinese resistance, and the difficulty of overcoming the international jealousies and suspicions which might hinder real international cooperation.

As to Chinese resistance, the intervention could be so clearly grounded, as to purposes and aims, that it need not be humiliating to Chinese patriotism, and if it were properly conceived and carried out it would probably win

a surprisingly large measure of Chinese support—for the Chinese people are war-weary to a profound degree, and many of the educated classes would probably rather accept a benevolent international intervention than run further risk of the Communistic dictatorship of illiterate peasants and coolies.

The international jealousies and suspicions could surely be allayed, or else modern statecraft is bankrupt indeed. The nations which would have to be most active in the intervention would be the same nations which would benefit most by the ending of the peril of a great conflagration in the Far East, and self-interest alone should make it possible for them to reach a reasonable agreement.

The Chinese people today are powerless to check the destructive processes which are bringing about the ruin of their own country, and coincidentally are creating a serious menace to the peace and well-being of the whole of mankind.

Humanitarianism alone should prompt the rest of the world to devise some means of giving immediate help to these people who cannot help themselves, and self-interest and the instinct of self-protection also counsel against delay.

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